N.G.O. Pereira
Linda H. Pereira

Work Ethics and the Collapse of the Soviet System

ABSTRACT: The goal of this historical survey at ten sites in Russia was to increase our understanding of changing work attitudes and behaviours during the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras, and to assess how they were related to political loyalty to the Soviet system. A questionnaire was administered by Russian interviewers to 625 respondents at selected work sites in Moscow, its outlying regions, Samara, and St. Petersburg. We determined that there was evidence of diminishing support for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) among ordinary workers beginning already in the Brezhnev period, but reaching a low of 27.6% under Gorbachev. Negative behavioural patterns included drinking on the job (50.5%) and moonlighting (38.5%); while 20.2% expressed overt alienation from the system. But the picture was not all negative: 53.9% of respondents found their work to be creative; and 55.8% thought their salary was satisfactory. Those with the better jobs were most likely to remain loyal to the CPSU; moreover, for them the nature and quality of their work was more important than pay.

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

This paper describes the results of a survey conducted during 1998–2000 in Russia. Most of the interviewing took place in the wake of the financial crisis of August 1998. The main research questions related to work attitudes and behaviours spanning the Brezhnev through Gorbachev eras, with a view to determining whether loyalty to the Soviet state and political system decreased or deteriorated during the course of that quarter-century. The immediate impression, especially from the older segment of our interviewees, was unfavourable to Gorbachev and his reforms, as well as all that followed. Indeed, we found evidence of mass nostalgia for the Brezhnev years as an era of bounty and good times. The words of one respondent in our survey captured the fond feelings of many: "with Brezhnev, ...we already lived under communism, but we didn't realize it."[1] By contrast, Gorbachev was blamed for all manner of

Funding and support for this research were provided in large part by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and also by the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, NJ, the Harriman Institute of Columbia University, and Dalhousie University. Linda Cook, Robert V. Daniels, Theodore Friedgut, Peter Kenez, Tatiana Neklioudova, Hugh Ragsdale, Vladimir Shlapentokh, and several anonymous reviewers provided critical readings and advice at various stages.

1 *Pereira Soviet Workplace Study Archive* [hereafter referred to by site and #] (Kirov, #56). This was echoed by a fifty-three year old female farm worker: "under Brezhnev we still believed we were heading for Communism" (Farm-V, #9). Site abbreviations with # refer to specific respondents in the survey. All the original questionnaires are archived at

Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes
Vol. XLV, Nos. 1–2, March–June 2003

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

hardships as well as rising social inequality; moreover, he was seen as overly influenced by the West and by the "democratic" intelligentsia within Russia.[2]

To understand the theoretical context and historical background of work ethics in Russia, one may begin with Marx who argued that human labour should be the quintessential expression of creativity, fulfillment and self-realization. Under capitalism's unceasing drive for profits, however, labour was expropriated, and the worker became alienated from his product. Capital objectified and exploited the worker, compensating him only to the extent necessary for survival and reproduction. This state of affairs could change only under socialism, when work would achieve its full human and productive potential.[3]

Following Marx and Lenin, the drumbeat of official Soviet ideology proclaimed that all social and economic exploitation ended in Russia with the victory of the October Revolution in 1917, when workers finally became free to enjoy the full fruits of their labour. Maxim Gorky famously proclaimed: "the meaning of life [is] in work;"[4] under Soviet power it would be also "a transformative experience...."[5] This early revolutionary euphoria was captured in Nikolai Bukharin's classic *ABC of Communism*:

> No worker in communist society will have to do as much work as of old. The working day will grow increasingly shorter, and people...will be able to devote more time to the work of mental development. Human culture will climb to heights never attained before....[6]

But Marxist humanism as a formula for proletarian felicity never lived up to its billing; it suffered catastrophic blows during the 1930s and through World War II and later years. Starting with N.S. Khrushchev's post-Stalin "thaw" and

---

the project director's office in Halifax. *Agence France Presse*, Moscow (29 January 1999), reported on a poll of 1500 respondents showing that more than half of Russians believed the rule of Brezhnev was a "golden age."

2 Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) 227.

3 Karl Marx, *The Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967) 33–39.

4 M. Gor'kii (Gorky), *Izbrannye proizvedeniia* (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1968) 1: 493.

5 Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 75.

6 Nikolai I. Bukharin, *The ABC of Communism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966) 77.

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

increasing during the first part of L.I. Brezhnev's administration, however, workers did experience marked improvements in their labour and living conditions—with social security and welfare, education, public transportation, basic medical service, and subsidized food and housing becoming nearly universally available.[7]

If "the Bolshevik reconstitution of Marxism as a culture-transforming ideology for industrializing Russia" always had as its main goal the collective "building of socialism," then labour was supposed to benefit the larger community of one's co-workers rather than oneself.[8] But the Soviet government never fully trusted workers to follow this prescription on their own; there was always a more coercive agency that suggested less than universal acceptance of the official vision. This was still evident in the words of Brezhnev's 1977 Constitution: "It is the obligation and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen of the USSR [to engage in] conscientious work.... The evasion of socially useful labour is inconsistent with the principles of a socialist society."[9]

By the late 1970s, systemic economic slowdown combined crudely with official corruption and incompetence. Strident rosy promises and militarist *agitprop* slogans praising the achievements of "shock workers (*udarniki*) on the labour front" and "heroes of socialist labour" could hardly camouflage the economy's reversal and serious downward trend. Moreover, for the first time in Soviet history, ordinary citizens—especially residents of major cities like Moscow and Leningrad—were able to observe the outside world and make comparisons through direct contact with unofficial visitors from the West. Despite obvious measures by the KGB to discourage such meetings, they occurred in growing numbers, especially among students, and did much to correct the highly distorted negative picture of life in capitalist countries.[10]

---

7 E. Iu. Zubkova, *Obshchestvo i reformy, 1945–1964* (Moscow: "Rossiia molodaia," 1993) 162, quoting Khrushchev: "We are trying to achieve the ideal life, the most beautiful life on earth, so that man can live without wants, so that he would always have work and it would be satisfying, so that he would not have to worry about what tomorrow might bring, so that he would live happily and in dignity, not merely exist."

8 T.W. Luke "The Proletarian Ethic and Soviet Industrialisation," *American Political Science Review* 77.3 (1983): 588–601. Also R.G. Kuzeev and M.B. Iamalov, "Dvizhenie za kommunisticheskoe otnoshenie k trudu na sovremennom etape," 3 *Istoriia SSSR* (1978): 165–73.

9 From Article 60 in *Konstitutsiia (Osnovnoi Zakon) Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1978) 20.

10 Gail W. Lapidus, "Society Under Strain," *Washington Quarterly* 6.2 (1983): 29–47.

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Interest in Western liberal ideas, however, remained largely the province of a small group of dissident intellectuals whose social and political agenda found little resonance in the general public. For the latter, state guarantees of job security, minimal income, and cheap bread and vodka counted far more than politics in general and civil liberties in particular.[11] Moreover, extremely modest and cramped living conditions were acceptable, so long as not too much labour effort was required in return.[12] This lax formula—that fell far short of the official work ethic—was the basis for the passive social harmony of the "Brezhnevite stagnation" spanning nearly two decades; it made life tolerable for ordinary citizens who turned a deaf ear to unending exhortations for "socialist competition," "labour heroism," and "completing the plan ahead of schedule."[13]

To be sure, Soviet work attitudes had deep and complex cultural/folk roots predating the twentieth century. The word work (*rabota*) itself has close etymological ties to slavery.[14] A common thread in the roughest, most vulgar and widely used synonyms was the suggestion of very intense, rapid, violent activities: *vkalyvat', vlamyvat', lomit', upirat'sia rogami, v"ebyvat'*—all signifying the use of brute force to get the job done. Labour was seen as a necessary evil, of instrumental value at best, to be avoided and put off, and then (when finally it had to be done) completed as quickly as possible. "Work is not a wolf," according to the peasant saying, "it will not run away into the forest."

While unfazed by a task's strenuousness, hazards, or hardships, the Russian worker was given to neither precision nor punctuality.[15] Shock tactics and "storming" were supposed to make up for inconsistency, and were in any case interrupted by frequent breaks "for a smoke, as is needed by the organism." It

---

11 Victor Zaslavsky, "The Regime and the Working Class in the U.S.S.R.," *Telos* 42 (1979–80): 5–20; also V. Kuvaldin reported in *Izvestiia* (3 July 1991): 3, on a poll that showed continuing support for preserving "the state's responsibility for solving social problems...."

12 Murray Yanowitch, ed., *Soviet Work Attitudes* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1979) 37–39.

13 Igor Faminsky & Alexander Naumov, "Historical Review of USSR Economic Institutions Since the Revolution," in Paul R. Lawrence and Charalambos A. Vlachoutsicos, eds., *Behind the Factory Walls* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1990) 37–55.

14 A.N. Arinin, et al, eds., *Sovremennaia rossiiskaia tsivilizatsiia* 2 (Moscow: Sovero-Print, 2000) 30.

15 N.S. Kurshakova, quoted in V. Berdinskikh, *Krest'ianskaia tsivilizatsiia v Rossii* (Moscow: Agraf, 2001) 349: "The best workers were sent to Siberia. Only those who worked poorly remained."

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

was generally understood that "workers suffered a low standard of living but in return gained the right to have sloppy work (*khaltura*) accepted."[16]

Nineteenth century Russian romantics observed that the peasant commune (*obshchina*) constituted a natural school for egalitarianism, and stressed cooperation rather than competition.[17] Long before the Soviet era, peasants as well as their urban cousins were accustomed to sharing scarce resources and being held accountable before the community: at school, in church, at work, in the army – all the places where people spent most of their time. The practice of "leveling" property possession as well as work performance became the norm and persisted, lest the bosses conclude that production quotas should be raised.[18] Individuals who out-performed their peers were despised as "commune-eaters" and subjected to ostracism, if not physical retribution.[19]

There is new and significant evidence of workers' protest against living and labour conditions in the USSR.[20] But identifying covert opposition is much more elusive, despite some intriguing theories about how non-cooperation and poor performance on the job may have been forms of political protest.[21] All that can be said with certainty is that there was growing frustration with the inefficiencies of the planned economy; by the end of the Brezhnev era it was painfully obvious that "building socialism" left Soviet workers worse off than their Western counterparts.[22]

16 K. Tidmarsh, "Russia's Work Ethic," *Foreign Affairs* 72.2 (1993): 70. The word has at least two meanings: moonlighting and/or shoddy work.

17 Useful comparisons may be found in George M. Foster, "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good," *American Anthropologist* 67.2 (1965): 293–315.

18 A.Z.Vakser and V.S. Izmozik, "Izmenenie obshchestvennogo oblika sovetskogo rabochego 20-30-kh godov," *Voprosy istorii* 11 (1984): 93–109.

19 There is reason to believe that accumulation of private wealth was regarded generally in Soviet society with suspicion and hostility. See Nikolai P. Popov, "Labor Relations in Soviet Public Opinion," *Sociological Research* 31.5 (September-October 1992): 34–37; also Alex Pravda, "Spontaneous Workers' Activities in the Soviet Union," in Arcadius Kahan and Blair Ruble, *Industrial Labor in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979) 343.

20 Jochen Hellbeck, "Speaking Out: Languages of Affirmation and Dissent in Stalinist Russia," *Kritika* 1.1 (2000): 95; Sarah Ashwin, *Russian Workers: The Anatomy of Patience* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999) 4–7.

21 James Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) 191–92.

22 T.I. Zaslavskaia, *A Voice of Reform* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1989) xii.

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Ironically in light of what followed, living conditions actually improved under Gorbachev initially (despite what most Russians seemed to believe).[23] Labour unrest remained rare until the end of the 1980s, and then it was limited to a few locations and industries, notably mining.[24] Moreover, some of the strikes and work stoppages may have been less indicative of a broken "social contract" than the state's new permissiveness combined with reduced capacity or willingness to maintain order by force.[25] Dramatic deterioration in the trade balance—reflecting sharp falls in oil prices on the international market just as M.S. Gorbachev became General Secretary—severely diminished the government's ability and resources to satisfy workers' most pressing demands.

The question of the role of Gorbachev and his policies in upsetting the status-quo and bringing on the final crisis of the USSR remains controversial.[26] Despite very contrary and generally negative assessments from observers, especially inside Russia, the initial purpose of perestroika appears to have been a

---

23 According to Bertram Silverman and Murray Yanowitch, *New Rich, New Poor, New Russia* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997) 39, the percentage of the Soviet population below the poverty line actually diminished until 1990. Joseph R. Blasi, Maya Kroumova, and Douglas Kruse, *Kremlin Capitalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997) 28, show that from 1989 to 1991 wages were allowed to grow at two to three times the normal rate, and social benefits were increased by 25% in 1990 alone. But according to William Moskoff, *Hard Times. Impoverishment and Protest in the Perestroika Years* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993) 9–15, economic growth, which during the decade 1961–1970 averaged 4.8% annually, fell to a mere 1.7% a year from 1981 to 1985, and then went into reverse.

24 Simon Clarke, Peter Fairbrother, Michael Burawoy, and Pavel Krotov, *What About the Workers*? (London: Verso, 1993) 44; and Theodore Friedgut and Lewis Siegelbaum, "Perestroika from Below: The Soviet Miners' Strike and its Aftermath," *The New Left Review* 181 (1990): 5–32. Nevertheless, Stephen Kotkin, *Steeltown, USSR* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991) 254, argues that the challenges to the CPSU came "overwhelmingly [from] representatives of the intelligentsia... [not] industrial workers...."

25 The social contract theory is based on the notion that in exchange for basic social services and economic security, society in general and workers in particular reciprocated with unqualified political loyalty toward the Soviet state. See Linda J. Cook, *The Soviet Social Contract and Why It Failed: Welfare Policy and Workers' Politics from Brezhnev to Yeltsin* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993) 5.

26 Aleksandr Zinov'ev, *Post-Kommunisticheskaia Rossiia* (Moscow: Izd. Respublika, 1996) is viciously anti-Gorbachev, while Alexander Yakovlev, *Omut pamiati* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001) is sympathetic. Donald Filtzer, *Soviet Workers and the Collapse of Perestroika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 4; and Hillel Ticktin, *Origins of the Crisis in the USSR* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992) 124, argue that the true purpose of Gorbachev's reforms was to increase extractions from workers, while promoting the interests of the Soviet elite.

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

genuine attempt to save Soviet socialism by fixing the economy through improved work attitudes and performance. Gorbachev sought precedents in the past, such as in Lenin's and Bukharin's New Economic Policy, as well as similar initiatives under Nikita Khrushchev and Alexei Kosygin. The theory of perestroika was to turn the economy around by loosening ossified centralized planning in favour of more flexible local controls and accountability; encouraging individual performance and initiative; allowing a measure of industrial competition that rewarded efficient enterprises (even if that meant others would fail and thus cause unemployment); and freeing prices after removing government subsidies from a range of consumer staples.

It is worth remembering that Gorbachev and his reforms enjoyed high levels of popular support as late as December 1988. Over the next two years, however, it became clear that perestroika involved considerable added demands on workers while jeopardizing their job security and social entitlements, so his popularity plummeted. Still until the very end Gorbachev himself insisted that "everything we are doing is aimed at revealing the potential of socialism."[27]

In sum, perestroika was not supposed to call into question either the political monopoly of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), or the basic principles of what Gorbachev never tired of calling "our historic socialist choice."[28] But in fact his efforts—for reasons he himself failed to understand—made things worse to the point of no return. And much remains moot, not least why the collapse of the USSR happened when it did.[29]

27 M.S. Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday, 1995) 250.

28 Gorbachev, *Memoirs* 2–3.

29 Michael Cox, ed., *Rethinking the Soviet Collapse* (London: Pinter, 1998); and Manfred Hildermeier, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion, 1917–1991* (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1998).

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

METHODOLOGY[30]

a) *Personnel*

Our survey team was made up of nine Russian interviewers (OMV, VNS, NGS, VBM, OVB, TAB in fall 1998; and OMV, VNS, and TAB were joined by IuAK, IAK, and MVM for the winter 2000 interviewing); a Russian co-ordinator (LVB); the Canadian project head (NGOP); his Canadian project co-ordinator (TW); the Canadian statistical consultant and co-author (LHP); and a Canadian data entry technician (TN).[31] Six of the interviewers were women. They were given instructions and training following standard Western interviewing procedures.

b) *Sites*

Recognizing that it would be impossible to do a fully representative survey of the whole Russian population, we selected specific work sites and used standard random methods for obtaining a representative sample of employees at each site.[32] We determined that factory workers, farm workers, and professionals were the three occupation groups of greatest comparative interest with regard to the Soviet work ethic and party-government loyalty; for some contrast, a

30 The decision to use quantitative methodology instead of qualitative oral history was taken after consulting several excellent examples of the latter: Ronald Fraser, *Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986); John Neuenschwander, "Remembrance of Things Past: Oral Historians and Long-Term Memory," *Oral History Review* 6 (1978): 49–50; Paul Thompson, *The Voice of the Past: Oral History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); Jon Vansina, *Oral Tradition* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965); Alessandro Portelli, "The Death of Luigi Trastulli: Memory and the Event," in *The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991) 1–26; and Kees Boterbloem, *Life and Death under Stalin* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) xix–xxii.

31 OMV – O.M. Verbitskaia, VNS – V.N. Shishlova, NGS – N.G. Samarina, VBM - V.B. Morozova, OVB – O.V. Baryshev, TAB – T.A. Barysheva, MVM – M.V. Moskalev, IuAK – Iu.A. Kleiner, IAK – I.A. Kleinera, LVB – L.V. Belovinskii, NGOP – N.G.O. Pereira, TW – Tracy Wilcox, LHP – Linda H. Pereira, and TN – Tatiana Neklioudova. All members of the interviewing team have university degrees, and were native Russians recruited in Moscow, Samara or St. Petersburg. LVB is a professor of Russian history and folklore in Moscow. IuAK has a similar position in St. Petersburg. TW received a Russian history M.A. from Dalhousie University. LHP has a Masters in epidemiology and worked for several years at the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley; and TN is a recent émigré (with Ph.D. equivalent degree) from Russia.

32 Earl Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991); and his *Survey Research Methods* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1990).

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

merchants' co-operative was also included. We assumed that factory workers would be the most positively disposed to the Soviet system, and that farm workers would be at the opposite pole. The issue of the professionals' attitude seemed less predictable because earlier studies had been inconsistent regarding their loyalties.

Initial contacts were made in consultation with Professor Leonid V. Belovinskii for five locations in and around Moscow and for two in Samara; the remaining three sites in the St. Petersburg region were chosen with the help of Professor Yuri A. Kleiner.

The 1998 segment of the survey sampled 505 people at seven sites. These included 100 from a total employee population of approximately 1200 at *State Farm Sergeevskii* (hereafter Farm-S), located 135 kms. southeast of the capital on the Moscow River; 100 of 720 employees at *Rope Factory Kanat* (hereafter Rope) in the city of Kolomna about 20 kms. from Farm-S, at the cross-point with the Oka River; 50 of 780 at the *Merchants' Co-operative of Voskresenskii District* (hereafter Co-op), some 55 kms. from Farm-S on the way back to Moscow; 100 of approximately 2000 at the *Russian State Public* (formerly Lenin) *Library* (hereafter Library) in the capital itself; and 50 of 502 at *Moscow State University of Culture* (hereafter University) in Khimki.[33]

The two additional sites in Samara (an important port of two million people located 1100 kms. east of Moscow on the Volga River) were the *Volga Cable Factory* (hereafter Cable) where we selected and interviewed 40 of 644 employees; and the *Samara Valve Factory* (hereafter Valve) where we interviewed 65 of 980.

The winter 2000 segment of the survey sampled 120 respondents at three sites, all in the St. Petersburg region: 50 of approximately 600 workers at the *Special Construction Bureau of the Trade Association for Machinery* (formerly Putilov Works and then Kirov Factory); 50 of 620 at *Vsevolozhskii State Farm* (hereafter Farm-V), a few kms. outside St. Petersburg on the way to the small town of Vsevolozhsk; and 20 of 278 at *Polyklinika No. 34* (hereafter Polyclinic), Zverinskaia ulitsa 15, in the Petrogradskii district of St. Petersburg.

33 Ronald Inglehart, et al, *Human Values and Belief: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998) 1: "Within Russia, greater Moscow is a very distinctive region. But in global perspective... the results from Moscow would be in the same ballpark as those from Russia."

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

c) *Sample Selection*

After obtaining the agreement of the manager at each site to conduct interviews, we requested a list of all personnel or access to the personnel files themselves. Interviewees were selected at random—within a range of every seventh to every seventeenth name (depending on the size of the pool)—from the full register. Interviews were then set up through the administration. It is possible that some individuals were excluded from the registries we were given, but actual selection was in all cases done by our interviewers according to our protocol.

We included an extra 5% to 10% in our sample selection procedure in order to allow for refusals, absences, illness, etc. In fact, there were very few substitutions because our rate of refusal was very low. The latter may be explained in part by carry-over from Soviet times when participation in surveys was virtually mandatory, but was probably also influenced by the fee of $5 US (in the ruble equivalent) we paid each respondent. Even in the winter of 2000, the refusal rate did not exceed 10% at any site.

d) *Interview Instrument*

A pretest was conducted in March 1998 using a questionnaire with several open-ended questions, including "what did you like about your job?" and "what did you dislike about your job?" Moreover, if respondents admitted to working less than conscientiously, they were asked to explain why. Their answers were used to develop checklists of what they liked and disliked about their jobs. The final questionnaire (see Appendix) was administered in the late summer of 1998 and the winter of 2000.

e) *Interviewing*

We were concerned that respondents might be intimidated into presenting their views in unduly positive terms, especially since our project was identified as having foreign financing (principally from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada), and also because in the large majority of cases the interviews took place at the work sites—at times and in a room designated by the enterprise administrations.[34]

---

34 For similar types of concerns, see Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Public Opinion Research in the Soviet Union: Problems and Possibilities," in Arthur H. Miller et al, eds., *Public Opinion and Regime Changes: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993) 37–50. Also Harry Eckstein, "Russia and the Conditions of Democracy," in Harry Eckstein et al, eds., *Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia*? (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998) 371; V.G. Ovsiannikov, "O nauchnosti oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* 9 (1991): 19; and Michael

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

According to our interviewers, respondents divided into roughly three equal categories: those who answered as if wishing to provide the "correct answer," those who thought before answering and tried to reply honestly, and a group who showed great interest in the survey and were effusive in their responses, either because they enjoyed reminiscing or wanted to comment more broadly. We were sensitive to the issue of reliability and accuracy with (especially distant) memory; nevertheless, the survey method's quantitative approach historically has been recognized to produce meaningful statistical results.[35]

f) *Construction of Coding Categories*
In our total sample of 625 individuals, 61.8% were women and 38.2% men. Particular sites contributed to this skewing of the sample: Library with 86% women; Co-op also 86%; and Polyclinic 95%! We divided age categories into three of approximately equal size to avoid potential problems of small cell size during analysis. The categories used in this report are based on the age of respondents at the time of the interview. For the education code, classifications after high school were open-ended on the pretest. From pretest write-ins, four categories were defined for the final questionnaire: high school or less, vocational school, technical school, and university.

Monthly salary was based on wages as of 1988 (the middle of the Gorbachev period). It was initially divided into four groups: under 100 rubles, 100-200, 200-300, and more than 300. The resulting frequencies were 8.2%, 54.8%, 26.2%, 10.7%, respectively (.5% unanswered). Simple chi-square tests comparing salary with other variables using both the four original ones and a collapsed variable (200 rubles or less, more than 200) found statistical results to be similar, but because of small cell sizes in three-way tables, we generally used the two category code during analysis.

The key demographic variable affecting attitudes toward work and the CPSU was job type. Thus, interviewers were instructed to collect extensive information on exactly what each respondent did at work up to 1991. Since 42% of our sample had just one job prior to 1992, only the attitudes associated with that job were included in the analysis. While using the basic code of the American Classification of Occupations and Industries as our guide, we made

---

Swafford, "Sociological Aspects of Survey Research in the Commonwealth of Independent States," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 4 (1992): 346–59.

35 John P. Robinson et al, *Measures of Occupational Attitudes and Occupational Characteristics: Appendix A to Measures of Political Attitudes* (University of Michigan Survey Research Center, Institute for Social Research, 1969); Marvin E. Shaw and Jack M. Wright, *Scales for the Measurement of Attitudes* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967).

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

adjustments to take into account differences between Western and Russian organizations. For example, in addition to the category "manager," we created another for "supervisors/foremen" to reflect the bureaucratized nature of several of our sites. When small cell size was a concern in the analysis, we combined service and clerical workers, since their education, age and salary were similar; and there were very few respondents in the service category. Otherwise, a nine category job code was used [see Table 6a].

We attempted to use a Russian or Soviet coding system for occupation, but only found one based on industry. The Western model we adopted is clearly biased by education, although it does include in the professional category artists and actors who may have little formal schooling. The basic criterion is work done primarily with the mind, rather than with the hands. All other arguments aside, in order to compare our results with other Western studies, it seemed prudent to use the coding system with the widest international provenance.

Those who operated farm machinery were coded in the semi-skilled category, along with machine operators in factories. The largest category in our sample were professionals. They were especially numerous at the University, Library and Polyclinic, but 62.0% of the sample from the Kirov Factory were engineers and also coded as professionals. When there was any doubt about how to code a particular respondent's job, his/her education was checked. Education by itself did not determine job classification, but was used when the job description was inconclusive. We ended up with nine job categories: professionals; managers; supervisors/foremen; clerical; skilled; semiskilled/ machine operators; service; unskilled; and farm labourers.

A formula for the Soviet work ethic was developed based on positive response to three of our questions: being part of the collective; social utility of the job; and commitment to fulfilling the plan at work. Taken together, 398 (63.7%) of respondents in the sample ascribed to all three parts of this construct of the Soviet work ethic. These particular questions were used because strong sense of the community, belief that one's work should benefit society, and commitment to fulfilling the *Gosplan*, were all basic to the Soviet work culture. Another construct—"social status"—was developed for comparison with other studies. Our formula for social status was based on job and salary. A respondent was included in the high social status category if he/she had a managerial or professional job and high salary. By this definition, our sample included 85 (16.2%) respondents with high social status.

Our definition of "Party Loyalty" was based on answers to two questions: "Did you share the ideology of the CPSU" under Brezhnev; under Gorbachev? Those who answered "yes" to both questions (n=131) were category "B-G-Yes."

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Those who answered "no" to both questions (n=265) were category "B-G-No" Those who answered "no" to the Gorbachev period, but did not answer this question for the Brezhnev period (n=74) were category "G-No"; for 64 in this group, their first job only began in 1983 or later (i.e. after Brezhnev's death), while the remaining 10 answered other questions for the Brezhnev period but refused to answer this one. Those who answered "yes" for Brezhnev and "no" for Gorbachev (n=108) were category "B-Yes/G-No." There were also two very small groups: one that answered "no" for Brezhnev and "yes" for Gorbachev (23), and the second who only answered "yes" for Gorbachev (16). These were so small that we eliminated them from the analysis altogether. Moreover, all questions on the Brezhnev years were necessarily restricted to those who actually worked then; thus, our data for Brezhnev was based on a total of 542 respondents rather than the full 625 for Gorbachev.

We used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for the data analysis. Since numerous chi square tests were carried out, we only reported relationships between variables as significant when the level of probability was at least .01. Many three-way cross-tabulations and chi-square tests helped control for confounding effects of important descriptive variables. When necessary, regression analysis was used to help understand confounding effects and identify collinear variables.

RESULTS

Demography

The main demographic identifiers in our sample were age, sex, education, salary, job type, and work site; and we found them to be highly interrelated. As might be expected, salary increased with age. Of the three age groups (22–41, 42–51, and 52–76), 29.1%, 33.6%, and 47.4%, respectively, had a salary of 200 or more rubles a month (p=.0003). Tables 1a/b show the relationships between job and other demographic variables. The statistical associations between both salary and education with job in our data were very strong, but the relationship of salary with education (p=.07) was weak. One reason for this anomaly was that women were paid less than men in almost all age and education categories [See Table 2].

We also analyzed the impact of parental education on respondents' career. Of those respondents whose father had been to university (15.7% of the sample), fully 81.1% also had a university education, compared to 40.2% for the total sample (p=.000001). Both father's and mother's higher education (university or technical) was significantly related to the level of respondent's job, respondent describing his/her job as creative, and enjoying high social status [see Table 4a].

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Job Attitudes

Respondents checked all the statements that described what they liked about their jobs from a list of twelve on our questionnaire. They were also asked what they did not like about their jobs from a list of eleven. The frequency each statement was checked is displayed in Tables 3a/b. The average number of positive statements was 7.4, while for negative statements it was 2.6. The selection of so many positives raises doubts, although similar patterns have been reported elsewhere.[36] A possible explanation is that, in general, job satisfaction was greater than has been assumed by critics of the Soviet system.[37] Another might be the patriotic wish to put the past in a positive light (especially since we made known the Western origins of our study), as well as loyalty to the organizational collective and its management. Respondents who were still working at the same place and under the same administration as during the Soviet era may also have feared for their jobs (despite our formal guarantee of anonymity).

The Soviet work ethic [see Table 4b] was statistically related to several positive work attitudes—including "leadership role on the job," "reasonable job demands," "interest in the work itself," "possibility of career advancement," and "acquiring new skills." It was also associated with being helped by the trade union and by the CPSU during both the Brezhnev and Gorbachev years.

Selecting "creative nature of the work" from the questionnaire was significantly related to age, education, and job type and higher salary. Creativity of the job was chosen by 46.3% of the youngest group, 50.2% of the middle-aged, and 72.4% of the oldest (p=.0005). Creativity also was indicated by 30.4% of those who completed high school, 40.3% of those with vocational training, 52.7% of those who had technical training, and 72.4% of those with university education (p=.000001). Only 26.2% of farm labourers and 39.0% of semiskilled workers described their jobs as creative, compared to 55.2% of skilled workers, 57.0% of supervisors, 71.9% of managers, and 79.3% of professionals (p=.00001).[38] Feeling that the job was creative was statistically associated with

---

36 Michael Ryan, *Contemporary Soviet Society: A Statistical Handbook* 6 (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990): 265, concluded that more than two-thirds of his respondents were satisfied with their work.

37 At Farm-V, two middle-aged male respondents (#49 and #46) were outspoken in praising management for creating "a good moral atmosphere," and for "paying enough so that we could live on it."

38 Professionals especially believed that there ought to be "genuine interest in the work itself" (Library, #408); that there was "a duty... to fulfil [it] conscientiously" (Library,

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

other positive work attitudes: leadership role on the job, social utility of the work, interest in the work, possibility for career advancement, and acquiring new skills. Creative nature of the work was also related to high social status and the Soviet work ethic.

Checking the statement "good organization with technical resources" was statistically related to job type: it was selected most often by managers (71.9%) and semi-skilled workers (70.3%) (p=.0004). Those with university education were less likely to endorse this statement (46.5%) than those with high school, vocational, and technical education (64.5%, 68.8%, 68.0%, respectively). Professionals were more critical of inadequate resources and other aspects of organization that hindered their work.

The most frequently selected negative job attitude was "too many work hours to meet the plan." It was checked more by men (49.0%) than women (37.8%) (p=.006), and was related to lower levels of education: high school (53.6%), vocational (51.9%), technical (44.3%), and university (30.9%) (p=.00003). By job, the complaint was highest among farm labourers (61.5%), skilled (49.3%), and semiskilled (46.6%) (p=.0003). The work sites with the highest percentage registering this criticism were Farm-S (62.0%), Valve Factory (56.9%), and Farm-V (56.0%) (p=.00001). There was a strong statistical connection between this complaint and the negative statement "work conditions were harsh, unsanitary, or exhausting." Dissatisfaction with working conditions was indicated by a higher proportion of farm labourers (30.8%) and the semiskilled (30.7%) (p=.0002). Harsh working conditions were strongly associated with low level of education and the two farms in our sample.

Respondents had the opportunity to describe their salary as "good pay" or "poor pay." A comparison with their actual salary shows that "good pay" was checked by 47.7% of those with low salary and 69.6% of those with high salary, while "poor pay" was selected by 46.2% of those with a low salary and 22.6% of those with a high salary.[39] This variation may be explained by the subjective nature of what people believed to be appropriate pay for their age, education, and work experience. In our survey, "good pay" was most strongly related to work site: Cable Factory (85.0%), Farm-V (70.0%), Co-op (65.0%), and Rope

---

#418); and that "its social benefit and the knowledge that it is objectively useful" should be sufficient motivation (Library, #484).

39 At the top were construction workers who in 1988 were making 282 rubles per month. People in public education, art and culture made between 130 rubles and 170 rubles, whereas scientists at 240 rubles made almost as much as transportation workers (260 rubles). Allan P. Pollard, ed., *USSR Facts & Figures Annual* 15 (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1991): 103.

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Factory (62.0%). In addition, it was checked more often by men and by those with high school and vocational training. A higher proportion of farm labourers, semiskilled workers, and managers expressed satisfaction with their pay.

"Poor pay" was marked more often by those with technical and university education, and with professional jobs. The sites where dissatisfaction with pay was greatest were Polyclinic (70.0%), University (44.0%), Farm-S (44.0%), and Library (43.0%) (p=.002)—all with disproportionately large numbers of women.

Comparison of Brezhnev and Gorbachev Periods

Section Two of the questionnaire compared the Brezhnev and Gorbachev periods. Respondents were asked several potentially sensitive questions about their work performance, such as whether they took materials home from the work site. There was very little difference comparing the frequencies of positive responses during the Gorbachev and the Brezhnev periods for questions 1–8 [see Table 5]. Therefore for these questions, only the answers for the Gorbachev period were analyzed. However, attitudes toward the trade union and the CPSU showed significant deterioration from the earlier period to the latter.

For the Gorbachev years, 19.3% admitted to working "less than conscientiously" (slacking).[40] This admission was more common among the young (26.5%) and middle-aged (22.2%) than the old (9.9%) (p=.00006). Admitting to slacking was more common among respondents whose father or mother had a university education (32.6%, 42.2%). There was also a statistical difference among work sites, with the highest proportions at Polyclinic (40.0%), and at the Lenin Library (29.3%) (p=.007). Those who saw their job as creative (p=.006) and those who ascribed to the Soviet work ethic (p=.00001) were less likely to acknowledge slacking behaviour. Respondents who believed that management was unfair or not committed to the Plan were more likely to admit that they themselves worked less than conscientiously. Slacking was associated with reporting late for work and leaving early (p=.00001), pilfering (p=.00001) moonlighting (p=.0007), and alcohol consumption during working hours (p=.00003).

Those who said "they worked less than conscientiously" were asked to give reasons for their behaviour. Three reasons were offered as options in the questionnaire, but some respondents added their own. "Rejection of the system" was selected by 5.0% of the total sample. More men than women were in this

40 Remarkably similar to Soviet era claims that 75% of collective farmers worked conscientiously; see P.I. Simusha, *Sel'skii trudovoi kollektiv. Voprosy vospitaniia* (Moscow, 1984) 68.

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

group (p=.002). Several negative attitudes from the first section of the questionnaire were statistically related to this choice: "Management unfair" (p=.004), "strict rules" (p=.007) and "obstacles to initiative" (p=.01).

Respondents were then asked whether co-workers did their jobs less than conscientiously. This question was included on the chance that respondents might be more inclined to answer honestly about co-workers than about themselves. More than half of the sample (n=355, 57.0%) answered affirmatively. A positive response to this question was given more often by men (p=.0002) and those who worked at the two farms (64.0%, 74.0%) and the Polyclinic (85.0%) (p=.00001).

In explaining their co-workers' behaviour, respondents chose "too many hours to meet the plan" (47.0%, p=.004); "management unfair" (25.1%, p=.00001); and "harsh working conditions" (24.8%, p=.0001). There was a strong association between describing co-workers as working poorly and positive response to the question: "Were you upset when it did not matter how well you performed on the job? (p=.009).[41] The view that co-workers did poorly was associated with other work behaviours: "playing hooky" (p=.006), drinking on the job (p=.00001); "moonlighting" (p=.00001); and pilfering (p=.00001).

If respondents said co-workers worked poorly, reasons for this behaviour were explored further. "Rejection of the system by co-workers" was chosen by 13.1% of the total sample and by 21% of men compared to 8.0% of women (p=.00001). Rejection was mentioned by 22.1% of those with vocational training, 16.7% of those with high school, 13.2% technical and 8.2% university education (p=.007). High school education of mother and father, lack of creativity of job, working at the two farms, and farm labour in general were all associated with "rejection of the system."

Another reason given for co-workers' slacking was alcoholism (7.7% of the sample). This reason was mentioned by a higher proportion (19.4%) of skilled labourers compared to others (p=.006), by those with technical education (p=.01), and those who complained that there were too many work hours required to satisfy the plan (p=.007).

An additional reason given for co-workers working less than conscientiously was poor pay (7.4% of the sample). This was mentioned by 14% of professionals, a statistically higher proportion than for any other job group (p=.002), by those with a university education (p=.003), by those who worked at

41 This is consistent with a Soviet survey done in 1986–88: I.F. Beliaeva, "Material'noe stimulirovanie v novom khoziastvennom mekhanizme," *Sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie* 3 (1989): 6.

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

the Library and the University (p=.00001), and by those who complained that management was unfair (p=.001) and that there was ideological control from above (p=.01).

"Consumption of alcohol during work hours" was observed by 50.5% of our sample. Men were much more likely to respond affirmatively to this question, as were respondents in certain jobs: clerical workers (68.2%), service workers (63.3%), and managers (59.4%) (p=.0005). Sites with high proportions of respondents acknowledging drinking on the job were the Valve Factory (66.2%), the University (65.3%), the Kirov Factory (58.0%) and the Rope Factory (58.0%) (p=.001). Indicating that alcohol was consumed during work hours at the work site was strongly associated with job-related misbehaviours by the respondent: playing hooky (43.6%, p=.00001), pilfering (23.8%, p=.00001), and moonlighting (49.4%, p=.00001) . Drinking on the job was also associated with the complaint that work performance was not appreciated (64.4%, p=.008) and the negative work attitude "ideological control from above" (p=.0001).[42]

Moonlighting was acknowledged by 38.5% of the whole sample: 54.0% of the men, and 28.9% of the women (p=.00001). It was a practice more often admitted by those with skilled (56.7%) and semi-skilled (44.4%) jobs (p=.0002). Curiously, moonlighting was more common among those with a high salary (47.0%) than among those with a low salary (33.3%) (p=.0007). The sites where the greatest proportion of respondents engaged in moonlighting were Farm-V in St. Petersburg (53.1%), the University (46.9%) and the Kirov Factory (44.0%) (p=.0007). Moonlighting was strongly related to other negative work behaviours: playing hooky, pilfering, and slacking. In addition, this activity (*na levo*) was associated with the negative work attitudes "too many work hours to satisfy the plan" and "ideological control from above."

Belief in the ideology of the CPSU was strongly related to whether or not a respondent was helped by the party at work. Of those who shared the ideology of the CPSU under Gorbachev, 56.8% said that they received aid, compared to only 7.2% of those who were not Party supporters. Overall, 128 (20.7%) were helped by the Party during the Gorbachev period. Of those who had a salary over 300 rubles a month, it was 33.3%. Only 9% of the young believed that they benefited from Party assistance, but that increased to 23.9% for the middle-aged and 27.9% for the oldest group (p=.00001). A comparison of jobs showed that

42 Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Love, Marriage, and Friendship in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1984) 226, makes the explicit argument that "drinking is an act with strong political overtones, for it involves the release of frustration generated by the strictures of Soviet life."

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

59.4% of managers, 30.2% of supervisors made the claim, in contrast to a mere 13.7% of professionals and 13.8% of farm labourers (p=.00001). Finally, of those who believed they were helped by the Party, 68.8% found their jobs creative, wheras among those who did not receive such assistance, only 50.1% felt that way (p=.0001). Good or poor pay, on the other hand, was not related to thinking that the Party helped on the job.

The key question for this study was "Did you share the ideology of the CPSU?"—asked for both the Brezhnev and Gorbachev periods. For both, sharing the ideology of the CPSU or Party loyalty was associated with the oldest age group, higher education, job type (a high proportion of managers, a low percent among semi-skilled and farm labourers, the remaining jobs in the middle), and belief that living conditions would improve. In order to understand the drop in loyalty to the Party from 45.5% to 27.6%, we calculated a new variable that differentiated support for the Party's ideology throughout the Brezhnev and Gorbachev years into four discrete categories, as noted above.

These four groups were compared using demographic variables, work attitudes and work behaviours, and Party related attitudes (*partiinost'*). [See Tables 6/a-b]. For ease of discussion we refer to these groups as "loyalists" (B-G-Yes), "oppositionists" (B-G-No), "young nihilists" (G-No), and "disillusioned" (B-Yes/G-No). The "loyalists" included the highest percentage of respondents in the oldest age category. They were the group with the most university and technical education, and benefited from the trade union and the CPSU. Therefore, it is not surprising that they supported the Party during both the Brezhnev and the Gorbachev years.

The "oppositionists" included almost half of the sample, had the greatest percentage of high school educated, and a relatively high proportion of farm and factory labourers. They were the least interested in their work and complained most about overtime hours, but after the "loyalists" group, they were most likely to mention "good pay."

The "young nihilists" had the lowest status and proportion of respondents who subscribed to the work ethic. This group had the largest percent with low salary and vocational training, and held jobs that were clerical, skilled, semi-skilled or farm labour. They were more likely to "play hooky," pilfer, and work less than conscientiously.

The "disillusioned" included the largest percentage of women (mainly middle-aged), a high proportion with technical and university education, many professionals, supervisors and skilled workers. They ascribed to the Soviet work ethic and they regarded their job as creative. Their profile was similar to "loyalists" except that their pay was lower, they admitted to slacking and, most

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

important, they were not helped by the Party under Gorbachev by contrast to their experience with Brezhnev.

The final question in Section Two of the questionnaire asks respondents to indicate whether work conditions were better under Brezhnev or Gorbachev. Only 37.6% chose the latter. However, there were differences by age, education, job, and work site. Those who favoured the Gorbachev period included 49.6% of the young, 54.0% of the university educated, 52.0% of the professionals; as well as 70.6% at the Polyclinic, 53.6% at the Library, 51.3% at the University, and 51.1% at the Kirov Factory.

Overall, "loyalists" and "disillusioned" both preferred their work environment under Brezhnev, while the other two groups regarded the Gorbachev period much more favourably. The likely explanation is that the former valued the stability and security of the old Soviet system, while "oppositionists" and especially "young nihilists" were at least partly influenced by other considerations, such as greater freedom of opportunity.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

While the political failure of the CPSU by 1991 was beyond dispute, the historical success of the Party's inculcation of a Soviet work ethic remains moot. As already noted, Marx promised that under socialism all segments of society would experience work as a creative experience. Our study found this to be true for about half the sample population, especially professionals, managers, and supervisors.

Paradoxically, for ordinary workers (at both factories and farms), the picture was far more negative, and has been so at least since the harsh anti-egalitarian, social and economic measures taken by Stalin. The chief beneficiaries of the Soviet system were not the broad mass of the proletariat in whose name the October Revolution had been made but an upwardly mobile elite with the *Nomenklatura* at its apex. Moreover, while their social privileges could not directly be passed on to the next generation, their children had greater access to education and all accruing benefits.[43] Our study confirmed the association between respondents' career development and their parent's higher level of education.

Among the proletariat broadly speaking the socialist work ethic probably never fully "took"—if we may judge by the endless (and apparently fruitless) campaigns to raise worker productivity and discipline dating back at least to the Stakhanovite movement of the mid 1930s, and repeated in milder forms by

---

43 David Lane, *Soviet Society Under Perestroika* (London: Routledge, 1992) 159–60.

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

every Soviet government thereafter. N.S. Khrushchev reversed several of Stalin's most draconian work-place regulations (such as imprisonment for absenteeism or even tardiness),[44] and also did much to ease the lot of the beleaguered collective farmers.[45] But it was only during the Brezhnev years that it became possible to discuss the issue of productivity and bad work habits in public, and even then far more often in the form of anecdotes than serious analysis.

It comes as no surprise that during the Brezhnev period the Soviet work ethic deteriorated—whether because it was possible to get away with working less than conscientiously or because there was little incentive to do good work, or a combination of these and other external economic factors. Even orthodox Soviet research on Russian work attitudes at that time (when sociological study was first permitted in the USSR) recognized significant differences in mentality between the early 1960s and the late 1970s, principally with regard to an increased appetite for personal material goods, at the expense of the prime injunction to "build socialism."[46] Recent research confirmed that older people still valued the traditional Soviet work ethic, while increasingly the young wanted jobs with "good working conditions,"[47] and were disposed to view work as mere means to an end—getting the most out of an unwieldy and bureaucratized economy for themselves and for their families.[48] In our study as well this was the pattern.

A post-Soviet Russian researcher suggested that the importance of creativity may have been exaggerated by his famous predecessors V.A. Iadov and A.G.

---

44 Sarah Davies, *Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 245.

45 V.I. Lebedev, "Dvizhenie za kommunistiskoe otnoshenie k trudu v sel'skom khoziastve," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 112 (1985):255–72.

46 A.G. Zdravomyslov and V.A. Iadov, *Chelovek i ego rabota. Sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie* (Moscow: Nauka, 1967). For the change in attitudes, see V.A. Iadov, "Otnoshenie k trudu: kontseptual'naia model' i realnye tendentsii," *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia* 3 (1983): 50–62.

47 A.V. Novokreshchenova, "Deformatsii soznaniia sel'skogo naseleniia i puti ikh preodeleniia" (Moscow: Kandidat dissertation, 1990).

48 V.G. Britvin, S.V. Kolobanov, and E.G. Meshkova, *Obshchestvennoe mnenie v usloviiakh perestroiki: problemy formirovaniia i fuktsionirovaniia* (Moscow: Institut sotsiologii AN SSSR, 1990). Also Ronald Inglehart, et al, *Human Values and Belief: A Cross-Cultural Sourcebook* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998) 5, concludes that "gradual erosion of emphasis on work during the Soviet era...[was] reflected in intergenerational differences, with the oldest generation still emphasizing work most and the youngest generation emphasizing it least of all...."

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Zdravomyslov; he concluded that what really mattered at all times was level of pay.[49] But on this critical point, our findings are surprisingly close to Iadov's and Zdravomyslov's, at least for older and middle aged respondents.

What to do about the Soviet work patterns, especially as directly related to economic productivity, was clearly a major dilemma facing Gorbachev when he came to power in 1985. Perestroika was his clumsy, ill-conceived attempt to reform the Soviet work ethic and performance—that is to make it more market and reward-oriented, efficient, productive, in a word more "capitalist." This process and its impact on the daily life of workers, as became more and more apparent, clearly contributed to the dramatic decline in Gorbachev's popularity: during the course of 1990 alone from over 50% to 17% (according to VTsIOM—All-Union Center for the Study of Social Opinion in Moscow), while the pro-worker populist rhetoric of Boris Yeltsin elicited 70% support at mid-year. When asked who was primarily responsible for the difficulties in which the country found itself, 45% pointed to the present government, only 11% blamed earlier administrations, while 24% attributed them to the "very nature of socialism."[50]

Whereas Soviet surveys may be seen as methodologically unreliable and politically slanted, those conducted in the West on Soviet emigrants may also be criticized—for their unrepresentative sampling.[51] The original Harvard Study (HS) under Alex Inkeles was done shortly after World War II using Russian and Ukrainian refugees at displaced persons' camps in Western Europe.[52] A second major study—the University of Illinois Soviet Interview Project (SIP)—involved 2,667 voting age respondents of educated, urban, and predominantly (90%) Jewish origin, who were approached in their homes in the U.S. The interviews took place over the course of several months during 1983, and respondents were asked to comment on their recollections of the latter Brezhnev

49 V.S. Magun, "Trudovye tsennosti rossiiskogo naseleniia," *Voprosy ekonomiki* 1 (1996): 49–50.

50 VTsIOM, *Obshchestvennoe mnenie v tsifrakh* 8.1 (1991): 9. Before the end of 1990 socialism was the choice of less than half of party members, although few were "in favour of a full-scale restoration of capitalism." Stephen White, "Communists and their Party in the Late Soviet Period," *Slavic and East European Review* 72.4 (1994): 651.

51 Elena I. Bashkirova and Vicki L. Hesli, "Polling and Perestroika," in Miller, *Public Opinion and Regime Changes* 24; also Richard Dobson and Steven Grant, "Public Opinion and the Transformation of the Soviet Union," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 4 (1992): 302–04.

52 Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (New York: Atheneum 1968) 236.

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

years.[53] Since then, and especially after 1988 (despite serious continuing obstacles), numerous investigations and surveys have been conducted in Russia by research teams made up of locals, foreigners, and combinations of both.[54] There is now available much new data, but still little consensus about the nature and meaning of changing attitudes.[55]

According to HS, the critical variable in determining people's feelings about the Soviet regime was their social status—that is, individuals in managerial and professional positions were most satisfied and those at the bottom of the job hierarchy (especially farm workers) were most alienated. Remarkably, nearly three generations and a regime-change later, our survey comes to similar conclusions, with the caveat that our professionals were more critical of their work conditions, specifically the lack of resources to do their jobs properly.

HS also found that it was the young who were generally most pro-system.[56] In contrast, our data strongly indicated that it was the older generation who supported the CPSU, probably because they saw it as their best guarantor of welfare and social security.[57] The young in our study generally were much less pro-system.

SIP findings, on the other hand, were similar to ours regarding the impact of age. The divide for SIP was exactly the opposite of HS in that older respondents were most supportive of the regime (and its role in running the economy), while the younger tended to be impatient with the slow pace of material progress in the USSR.[58] But the most striking association was between education and a critical

---

53 Paul R. Gregory and Janet Kohlhase, "The Earnings of Soviet Workers: Human Capital, Loyalty, and Privilege," Soviet Interview Project [hereafter SIP] (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois, 1986), Working Paper 13, 5–6.

54 Murray Yanowitch, "Work in the Soviet Union: Attitudes and Issues," *International Journal of Politics* 14.3–4 (1984–85): 3–196.

55 Ada W. Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining The Political System Of The USSR: Mass Support For Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 86.4 (1992): 857–74.

56 Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967) 337.

57 Farm-V, #3: "We did not have to worry about tomorrow under Brezhnev; we all had enough to eat."

58 Donna L. Bahry, "Politics, Generations and Change in the USSR," SIP Working Paper 20, 37. (To be sure, the young in HS would have become the old generation by the time of SIP).

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

attitude.[59] SIP responses indicated that support for the government declined as level of education increased,[60] whereas the respondents in our sample with a university degree were more supportive. The difference may reflect the greater understanding of the educated, despite their frustrated hopes with perestroika, as well as the exposures of the "blank spots" of Russian history through glasnost, and the subsequent years of additional turmoil under Yeltsin.

A high degree of satisfaction with their former jobs in the USSR was one of the most striking findings of the SIP study, and this was almost as true for younger as for older respondents; it was especially so for women who emphasized non-economic social relations on the job and security of employment.[61] The major criticism of the Soviet system uncovered by SIP was absence of appropriate incentives and rewards for superior work performance.[62] A similar complaint about inadequate recognition of performance on the job was made by about 60% of our sample population.

Our study shows that 45.8% of the sample did not support the CPSU during both the Brezhnev and Gorbachev years. These "oppositionists" came from all ages, educations, job types, and work sites. What stands out is that they were helped least by the Party during the Brezhnev years. The "disillusioned" were 17.3%, and they appeared in many ways to be positive to the system: well educated, found their work to be creative, and compared to the other three groups they had the highest proportion subscribing to the Soviet work ethic. It is possible that through glasnost they became more aware of the gross disparity between themselves and similarly educated people who were highly privileged; so while they remained loyal during the Brezhnev years despite low pay, under Gorbachev they became disillusioned and joined the "oppositionists" or were "young nihilists."

Loyalty to the CPSU and the Soviet government was most directly related to the issue of how workers viewed the Party in its principal role as their support system. Their growing feeling that they were not getting enough help from the CPSU, especially under Gorbachev, was our major finding. The denouement of

---

59 Brian D. Silver, "Political Beliefs of the Soviet citizen: Sources of support for regime norms," in James R. Millar ed., *Politics, Work, and Daily Life in the USSR* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987) 124.

60 James Millar and Peter Donhowe, "An Overview of First Findings of the Soviet Interview Project," SIP Working Paper 16, 2.

61 James Millar and Elizabeth Clayton, "Quality of Life: Subjective Measures of Relative Satisfaction," SIP Working Paper 9, 12.

62 Paul R. Gregory, "Productivity, Slack and Time Theft in the Soviet Economy," SIP Working Paper 15, 19–21.

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

1991 was undoubtedly precipitated by high politics and *la trahison des clercs*, but its deeper meaning may be found in the alienation of ordinary workers who had become increasingly disillusioned over the course of several decades. Their experience with perestroika—and its implicit rejection of the Soviet work ethic—only confirmed that sense of betrayal. So ended the grand Marxist-Leninist experiment, not with a big bang but a barely noticeable whimper.

Table 1a
Comparison of Job Types with other Demographic Variables
(n=625)

Salary	total %	Types of Jobs								
		professional	manager	supervisor	clerical	skilled	semi-skilled	service	unskilled	farm workers
200 rubles or less	63.0	61.6	39.0	65.1	84.9	55.2	58.5	94.1	66.7	59.4
Over 200 rubles	37.0	38.4	71.0	34.9	15.1	44.8	41.5	5.9	33.3	40.6
p=.00001 *										
Education	total %	professional	manager	supervisor	clerical	skilled	semi-skilled	service	unskilled	farm workers
High school	22.1	0	0	14.3	15.1	1.5	55.1	27.8	66.7	56.9
Vocational	12.3	1.2	0	4.8	5.8	20.9	24.6	11.1	8.3	32.3
Technical	26.7	9.1	25.0	46.0	50.0	59.7	12.7	44.4	16.7	10.8
University	38.9	89.6	75.0	34.9	29.1	17.9	7.6	16.7	8.3	0
p=.00001										
Age	total %	professional	manager	supervisor	clerical	skilled	semi-skilled	service	unskilled	farm workers
22-41	30.4	18.9	25.0	15.9	41.9	38.8	33.1	44.4	25.0	44.6
42-51	35.4	32.9	34.4	36.5	36.0	35.8	38.1	27.8	50.0	33.8
52-76	34.2	48.2	40.6	47.9	22.1	25.4	28.8	27.8	25.0	21.5
p=.00006										
Gender	total %	professional	manager	supervisor	clerical	skilled	semi-skilled	service	unskilled	farm workers
Men	38.2	26.2	43.8	39.7	3.5	67.2	64.4	11.1	58.3	36.9
Women	61.8	73.3	56.3	60.3	96.5	32.8	35.6	88.9	41.7	63.1
p=.00001										
total n		164	32	63	86	67	118	18	12	65
total %		26.2	5.1	10.1	13.8	10.7	18.9	2.9	1.9	10.4

* χ^2 test

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Table 1b
Number and Percent of Different Jobs at Four Types of Work Sites
(1) University, Library, and Polyclinic; (2) Cable, Kirov, Rope, and Valve; (3) Farm-S and Farm-V

Types of Work Sites		pro-fessionals	managers	Super-visors	clerical/ sales	skilled	semi-/ unskilled	farm workers
professional organizations (1) n=170	n %	104 61.2	9 5.3	13 7.6	21 12.4	16 9.4	7 4.1	0 0
Factories (2) n=255	n %	51 20.0	17 6.7	24 9.4	44 17.3	33 12.9	86 33.7	0 0
Farms (3) n=150	n %	7 4.7	1 .7	15 10.0	11 7.3	17 11.3	34 22.7	65 43.3
Merchant Cooperative n=50	n %	2 4.0	5 10.0	11 22.0	22 44.0	1 2.0	9 18.0	0 0
Total Sample n=625	n %	164 26.2	32 5.1	63 10.1	98 15.7	67 10.7	136 21.8	65 10.4

Table 2
Salary by gender, by education, and by age
Significant differences by χ^2 are displayed *

Age: 22–41				
Education:	High school	Vocational	Technical	University
	% high salary	% high salary	% high salary	% high salary
Men	42.9	47.6	66.7	42.9
Women	33.3	18.2	10.9 (p=.00004)	18.6
Age: 42–51				
Education:	High school	Vocational	Technical	University
	% high salary	% high salary	% high salary	% high salary
Men	68.8	55.6	62.5	62.5
Women	22.6 (p=.002)	37.5	14.3 (p=.0001)	19.0 (p=.0001)
Age: 52–76				
Education:	High school	Vocational	Technical	University
	% high salary	% high salary	% high salary	% high salary
Men	32.1	41.7	52.2	90.6
Women	42.1	42.9	30.0	40.3 (p=.00001)

* Figures for low salary not shown, but are included in calculation of χ^2 test

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Table 3a
"Indicate what you liked about your job"

Number	Statement	Percent of those who agreed with the statement
1	Being part of the collective	93.0
2	Good organization with technical resources	57.6
3	Clear and reasonable job demands	77.1
4	Leadership role on the job	34.7
5	Social utility of the work	84.2
6	Job-related conveniences (close to home, housing, day care, services)	59.2
7	Creative nature of the work	53.9
8	Relative freedom from controls	25.4
9	Good pay	55.8
10	Interest in the work itself	83.4
11	Possibility for career development	54.2
12	Acquiring new skills that raised self-esteem	67.2

Average number of positive statements checked by respondents: 7.45

Table 3b
"Indicate what you did not like about your job"

Number	Statement	Percent of those who agreed with the statement
1	Bad relations with co-workers	4.6
2	Management engaged in unfair practices	18.9
3	Poor quality or shortages of technical resources	35.8
4	Too many work hours, especially at month's end, to satisfy the plan	42.1
5	Working conditions were harsh, unsanitary, or exhausting	19.4
6	Job-related inconveniences (far from home, inadequate housing/services)	25.9
7	Boring or tedious nature of work	13.0
8	Ideological control from above	23.7
9	Strict rules or red tape	27.4
10	Low pay	37.4
11	Obstacles to initiative on the job	15.7

Average number of negative statements checked by respondents: 2.6

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Table 4a

Association of Social Status with Demographics		*High Status*
Age	n	%
22–41	12	6.3
42–51	19	8.4
52–77	54	25.7
p=.00001 *		
Education	n	%
Technical	5	3.0
University	80	32.9
P=.00001		
Education of Father	n	%
High School	38	10.4
Vocational	3	6.5
Technical	6	16.3
University	28	29.5
P=.00001		
Education of Mother	n	%
High School	46	10.6
Vocational	2	7.4
Technical	11	11.2
University	26	40.6
P=.00001		
Worksite	**n**	**%**
Professional	49	28.8
Merchant	3	6.0
Factory	31	12.2
Farm	2	1.3
p=.00001		
Total	**85**	**13.6**

*χ^2 test

Table 4b

Association of Soviet Work Ethics with Demographics		*Work Ethic Adherence*
Age	n	%
22–41	99	24.9
42–51	147	36.9
52–77	152	38.2
p=.0002		
Salary	n	%
<100 rubles	20	39.2
100-200 r.	217	63.6
200-300 r.	115	70.6
>300 r.	43	64.2
p=.001		
Education of Father	n	%
High School	246	63.6
Vocational	31	8.0
Technical	62	16.0
University	48	12.4
p=.005		
Worksite	n	%
Professional	86	21.6
Merchant	42	10.6
Factory	176	44.2
Farm	94	23.6
p=.00002		
Total	**398**	**63.7**

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Table 5
Frequencies of Positive Answers for Brezhnev (n=542) and Gorbachev (n=625) eras

	Questions	Brezhnev n (%)	Gorbachev n (%)
1	Did you feel committed to fulfilling the plan at work?	454 (83.9)	490 (79.4)
2	Did you on occasion "play hooky," report late, or leave early?	183 (33.8)	204 (32.8)
3	Was alcohol consumed during working hours?	257 (47.3)	314 (50.5)
4	Did you have occasion to engage in activity – not as part of your official job – for which you received some form of remuneration (either in money, barter, or services)?	158 (25.3)	239 (38.5)
5	Did you take materials home from the job site?	83 (15.4)	105 (17.0)
6	Were you upset when it did not matter how well you performed at work?	387 (62.4)	368 (59.4)
7	Did you, at times, do your job less than conscientiously? (If *Yes*, interviewer checks reasons below for that behaviour)	99 (18.2)	120 (19.3)
	(i) Too much work at home, family responsibilities	45 (7.2)	54 (8.6)
	(ii) Because no one was working any better	24 (3.8)	44 (7.0)
	(iii) Rejection of the system	22 (3.5)	31 (5.0)
8	Did your co-workers, at times, do their job less than conscientiously? (If *Yes*, interviewer checks reasons below for that behaviour)	325 (59.7)	355 (57.0)
	(i) Too much work at home, family responsibilities	136 (21.8)	151 (24.0)
	(ii) Because no one was working any better	87 (12.8)	117 (18.8)
	(iii) Rejection of the system	74 (11.8)	82 (13.1)
9	Indicate whether you personally benefited on the job from the trade union organization?	435 (80.3)	363 (58.5)
10	Indicate whether you were helped on the job by agencies of the CPSU?	252 (47.2)	128 (20.7)
11	Did you share the ideology of the CPSU	241 (45.5)	170 (27.6)
12	Did you believe that during your lifetime living conditions would improve materially in the USSR?	440 (80.9)	438 (70.5)

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Table 6a

Party Loyalty *(Percentage in categories)*

Response to the Questions: "Did you share the ideology of the CPSU during Brezhnev period (BP); during Gorbachev period (GP)?"

	Brezhnev – Yes Gorbachev – Yes n=131 22.7% B-G-Yes	Brezhnev – No Gorbachev – No n=265 45.8% B-G-No	(Too young BP) Gorbachev – No n=74 12.8% G-No	Brezhnev – Yes Gorbachev – No n=108 18.7% B-Yes/G-No
Age:	%	%	%	%
22–41	13.0	21.9	94.6	21.3
42–51	35.0	39.6	4.1	50.9
52–76	51.9	38.5	1.4	27.8
p=.0001 *				
Education:				
High School	16.0	26.8	20.3	20.4
Vocational	7.6	14.0	23.0	8.3
Technical	29.8	25.3	25.7	27.8
University	46.6	34.0	31.1	43.5
p=.009				
Salary:				
<200 rubles	51.1	62.7	78.1	61.9
>200 rubles	48.9	37.3	21.9	38.9
p=.002				
Job:				
Professional	26.0	25.7	14.9	30.6
Managerial	13.7	2.6	1.4	2.8
Supervisor	11.5	9.8	5.4	15.7
Clerical/Service	14.5	14.7	21.6	18.5
Skilled	11.5	10.6	12.2	6.5
Semi-/Unskilled	16.0	24.5	29.2	17.6
Farm Labour	6.9	12.1	14.9	8.3
p=.0001				
Work Site:				
Farm-V	13.7	7.2	8.1	5.6
Polyklinika	3.8	4.2	0.0	0.0
University	9.2	7.2	4.1	11.1
Library	15.3	12.1	17.6	17.6
Co-op	8.4	7.5	10.8	8.3
Kirov Factory	9.9	8.7	1.4	11.1
Cable Factory	9.2	6.0	8.1	4.6
Valve Factory	13.7	9.1	5.4	12.0
Rope Factory	10.7	18.9	21.6	14.8
Farm-S	6.1	19.2	23.0	14.8
p=.006				
Social Status: p=.001	22.1	12.5	2.7	15.7
Belief in Soviet Work Ethic: p=.006	70.2	62.6	50.0	73.1

*** χ^2 test**

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Table 6b
Party Loyalty *(Percentage in categories)*
Response to the Questions: "Did you share the ideology of the CPSU during Brezhnev period (BP); during Gorbachev period (GP)?"

	B-G-Yes	B-G-No	G-No	B-Yes/G-No
Work Attitudes				
Creative nature job % Yes p=.0009 *	65.9	50.6	37.8	56.5
Leadership role job % Yes p=.0002	48.1	30.2	21.6	40.7
Good pay % Yes p=.01	64.1	57.0	54.1	48.1
Too many work hours to meet plan % Yes p=.005	32.1	49.8	36.5	40.7
Attitudes to CPSU				
Helped by Trade Union during GP % Yes p=.002	71.8	52.5	52.7	60.2
Helped by CPSU during BP % Yes p=.00001	77.9	23.9	50.0	67.3
Helped by CPSU during GP % Yes p=.00001	63.8	7.9	4.1	7.4
Believed life would improve during BP % Yes p=.0004	90.8	75.1	62.5	86.1
Believed life would improve during GP % Yes p=.00001	86.3	65.2	76.7	52.8
Best for work in BP % Yes p=.00001	79.7	56.0	32.0	71.0
Best for work in GP % Yes p=.00001	20.3	44.0	68.0	29.0

* χ^2 test

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

APPENDIX
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Section One

Q1. How many different jobs have you held through 1991? ___________

Q2. *(Interviewer asks about no more than three jobs—each held for at least two years—through 1991. If there are more than three jobs, interviewer will ask about first, last, and job that lasted longest in between)*
Describe what you did on the job, and the type of organization where you worked: (ex. factory, farm , office, clinic)

First job
Type of organisation ____
Job title ____
Job description: ____
____
Job held from ________ to ________

Second job
Type of organisation ____
Job title ____
Job description ____
____
Job held from ________ to ________

Third job
Type of organisation ____
Job title ____
Job description ____
____
Job held from ________ to ________

Q3. Indicate what you liked among the following in your ***first*** job?
(Interviewer checks all items selected by respondent)
[ ] 1 Being part of the collective
[ ] 2 Good organisation with technical resources
[ ] 3 Clear and reasonable job demands
[ ] 4 Leadership role on the job
[ ] 5 Social utility of the work
[ ] 6 Job-related conveniences (close to home, housing, day care, services)
[ ] 7 Creative nature of the work
[ ] 8 Relative freedom from controls
[ ] 9 Good pay
[ ] 10 Interest in the work itself
[ ] 11 Possibility for career advancement
[ ] 12 Acquiring new skills that raised self-esteem

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Q4. Indicate what you did not like among the following in your ***first*** job?
(Interviewer checks all items selected by respondent)
[ ] 1 Bad relations with co-workers
[ ] 2 Management engaged in unfair practices
[ ] 3 Poor quality or shortages of technical resources
[ ] 4 Too many work hours, especially at month's end to satisfy the plan
[ ] 5 Working conditions were harsh, unsanitary, or exhausting
[ ] 6 Job-related inconveniences (far from home, inadequate housing/services)
[ ] 7 Boring or tedious nature of work
[ ] 8 Ideological control from above
[ ] 9 Strict rules or red tape
[ ] 10 Low pay
[ ] 11 Obstacles to initiative on the job

{Q5–Q8 repeat Q3–Q4 for ***second and third jobs***}

Section Two
Q9. The following questions relate to the **Brezhnev years (1964–82/85)**:
Please answer **Yes** or **No**

1 Did you feel committed to fulfilling the plan at work? **Yes** **No**

2 Did you on occasion "play hooky," report late, or leave early? **Yes** **No**

3 Was alcohol consumed during working hours? **Yes** **No**

4 Did you have occasion to engage in activity – not as part of your official job – for which you received some form of remuneration (either in money, barter, or services)? **Yes** **No**

5 Did you take materials home from the job site? **Yes** **No**

6 Were you upset when it did not matter how you performed at work? **Yes** **No**

7 Did you, at times, do your job less than conscientiously? **Yes** **No**
(If Yes, interviewer checks reasons below that were relevant to that behaviour)
[i] Too much work at home/ family responsibilities
[ii] Because no one else was working any better
[iii] Rejection of the system

8 Did your co-workers, at times, do their jobs less than conscientiously? **Yes** **No**
(If Yes, interviewer checks reasons below that were relevant to that behaviour)
[i] Too much work at home/ family responsibilities
[ii] Because no one else was working any better
[iii] Rejection of the system

9 Indicate whether you personally benefited on the job from the trade union organisation? **Yes** **No**

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

10 Were you helped on the job by agencies of the CPSU? **Yes** **No**

11 Did you share the ideology of the CPSU? **Yes** **No**

12 Did you believe that during your lifetime, living conditions would improve materially in the USSR? **Yes** **No**

Q10. Same questions relating to the **Gorbachev years (1985–91)**

Q11. During which time period were conditions best for you personally at work? Check only one of the two periods below.
[1] Brezhnev years
[2] Gorbachev years

Section Three

Q12. Respondent's year and place of birth:
[ ] Male [ ] Female

Q13. Respondent's formal education
[1] None
[2] Primary
[3] High School
[4] Vocational
[5] Technical
[6] Post-Secondary (including institute, university, post-graduate)

Q14. Father's education:
[1] None
[2] Primary
[3] High School
[4] Vocational
[5] Technical
[6] Post-Secondary (including institute, university, post-graduate)

Q15. Mother's education:
[1] None
[2] Primary
[3] High School
[4] Vocational
[5] Technical
[6] Post-Secondary (including institute, university, post-graduate)

Q16. Respondent's Monthly Salary in 1988:
[1] under 100 rubles
[2] between 100 and 200 r.
[3] between 200 and 300 r.
[4] more than 300 r.

Interviewer: date of interview:

This content downloaded from 188.72.96.102 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 23:45:20 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions