ANCIENT VIEWS ON THE CAUSES OF BIAS IN HISTORICAL WRITING

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I. THE CAUSES OF BIAS

Tacitus' phrase *sine ira et studio* at the start of the *Annals* (1. 1. 3) is the most memorable claim by an ancient historian that he is free from bias. The same assertion had appeared at the start of his *Histories* (1. 1. 3), and we find other ancient historians claiming this impartiality for themselves and decrying the lack of it in their predecessors.[1] The claim is not as widespread as is sometimes stated or implied; but that it was a commonplace by the early Empire is assured when we read, at the start of Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis* (1. 1), *nihil nec offensae nec gratiae dabitur.* Polybius is the first extant historian to address the problem of bias directly; it was noted most frequently by those who wrote of the late Republic (e.g., Lucceius, Sallust) and the Empire (e.g., Josephus, Tacitus). Cicero's friend L. Lucceius appears to have made the claim most elaborately: he imagined that he had been tempted by Gratia, just as Hercules had been enticed by Voluptas, and had rejected the temptation, as had the great hero (*Fam.* 5. 12. 3).[2]

Most discussed are the two passages in Tacitus; Joseph Vogt's article "Tacitus und die Unparteilichkeit des Historikers" is perhaps the best known.[3] Vogt and other commentators are chiefly concerned to account for the disparity between Tacitus' claim and his failure to fulfill it. The sentiment itself has received scant analysis, evidently because it is assumed that the classical historians meant what we mean when we

1. Polyb. 1. 14, 8. 8. 5–9, 10. 21. 8, 38. 4; Cic. *Fam.* 5. 12 (on the historian Lucceius); Sall. *Cat.* 4. 2, *H.* 1. 6M.; Joseph. *BJ* 1. 1–2, *AJ* 20. 154–57; cf. *Vit.* 336–39; for criticism of predecessors, see below and n. 31. General statements enjoining impartiality are frequent: e.g., Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 8; Lucian *Hist. conscr.* 38–42. G. Avenarius, *Lucians Schrift zur Geschichtsschreibung* (Meisenheim am Glan, 1956), pp. 13–16, 40–54, 157–63, usefully reviews much of the ancient evidence. C. W. Fornara, *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), pp. 99–104, 169–93, has a challenging discussion of several aspects of the topic. I wish to thank the following for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper: W. R. Connor, E. Fantham, K. Raaflaub, K. Sacks, and G. Verbrugghe.

2. Cicero says Lucceius made the claim *quodam in prohoemio,* almost certainly in reference to a historical subject. Yet the phrase does not suggest the main preface to Lucceius' history, although this is where we would expect to find such a claim; possibly, then, in some later book of the "Italici belli et civilis historiam iam . . . paene . . . perfectam" (*Fam.* 5. 12. 2), which Cicero asks Lucceius to abandon temporarily to take up the project he now proposes. The "choice of Heracles" refers to Prodicus' allegory recorded at Xen. *Mem.* 2. 1. 21–34 (cf. Cic. *Off.* 1. 118).

3. *Würzburger Studien* 9 (1936): 1–20 = *Tacitus,* ed. V. Pöschl, Wege der Forschung 97 (Darmstadt, 1969), pp. 39–59.

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speak of the historian's impartiality and objectivity. In this study I will argue that they took a narrower and more particularized view of the problem, especially as it concerns the reasons why a historian might let prejudice distort his presentation. I will focus throughout on what the men of antiquity said and thought, not on modern discoveries of bias in the ancient historians, most instances of which are not noticed or mentioned by ancient writers. It is hoped that this study will explain, at least in part, why they went unnoticed.

One should first remark the way in which the idea is expressed. The Greeks and Romans usually spoke of the absence of favoritism or hatred.[4] Today the desideratum is often given as a positive and particularized virtue, "objectivity" or "impartiality," for which the ancients had no special vocabulary, speaking simply of the "truth," which could be compromised in ways other than through bias. What historical truth was, and how it could be attained, were questions seldom addressed (Polybius is the chief exception), partly because, no doubt, the concept of historical truth seemed obvious, and partly because the concept was so often couched in negative terms: when favoritism and hostility are removed, truth is the residuum. I will return to this idea at the end of the paper.

The claim to be free from partiality, hatred, and the like appears in historians who wrote contemporary or nearly contemporary history; those who wrote of the distant past, such as Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Diodorus, and Cassius Dio, do not make it.[5] Plutarch, in his *Life of Pericles* (13. 12), distinguishes clearly between the two types of history: the passing of time, he asserts, hinders historians of past events from attaining sure knowledge of what happened,[6] whereas in contemporary history it is envy and enmity, favor-seeking and flattery that distort the picture and impair the truth. Why this difference exists is explained when we look at the underlying causes of bias.

Tacitus' two prefaces present a clear picture. In the introduction to the *Histories* (1. 1) he declares that after Actium one could no longer find historians of talent like those of the Republic, who wrote with eloquence

4. E.g., Polyb. 38. 4. 8 παράδοσιν ἀμιγῆ παντὸς ψεύδους; Sall. *H.* frag. 6M. "neque me diversa pars in civilibus armis movit a vero"; Joseph. *BJ* 1. 2 περιέχει δὲ αὐτοῖς ὅπου μὲν κατηγορίαν ὅπου δὲ ἐγκώμιον τὰ συγγράμματα, τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς τῆς ἱστορίας οὐδαμοῦ, *AJ* 20. 154–56 τῆς ἀληθείας ἀμέλησαν . . . , μηδὲ . . . τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῆς ἱστορίας τετηρήκασιν; cf. Lucian's manner of describing the ideal historian at, e.g., *Hist. conscr.* 41: ξένος ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις καὶ ἄπολις, αὐτόνομος, ἀβασίλευτος. Examples couched positively are less common: e.g., Polyb. 10. 21. 8 κοινὸς ὢν ἐπαίνου καὶ ψόγου· ζητεῖ τὸν ἀληθῆ [sc. ἀπολογισμόν]; yet even this describes history by saying what it is not. On truth as the highest desideratum in history, see, e.g., Polyb. 2. 56. 11, 34. 4. 2; Cic. *De or.* 2. 62. Cf. Avenarius, *Lucians Schrift,* pp. 40–46. See also J. Woodman's incisive comments in his recent book, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* (London–Sydney–Portland, 1988), pp. 73–74, 82–83.

5. When Livy writes (praef. 5) that he is "omnis expers curae, quae scribentis animum etsi non flectere a vero, sollicitum tamen efficere potest," he is speaking of the anxiety that he will feel much later, when he comes to write of his own times. On Dionysius' statement at *Ant. Rom.* 1. 6. 5, see below at n. 29.

6. Cf. Livy 6. 1. 2: knowing events far in the past is as difficult as making out objects seen from a great distance.

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and freedom.[7] The truth, Tacitus says, was doubly compromised: first, by ignorance of statecraft, which was now the preserve of one man (*inscitia rei publicae ut alienae*); second, by the desire either to write what the powerful wished to hear (*libido adsentandi*) or to express one's hatred for them (*odium adversus dominantes*). Although Tacitus does not say so, the implication clearly is that adulatory histories are written for a living emperor to see, hostile accounts after a monarch's demise. In an aside he notes that readers more readily discern and despise the ambitious flatterer than the traducer, since the latter puts on a false front of speaking freely (*malignitati falsa species libertatis inest*). Tacitus then turns to himself: "mihi Galba Otho Vitellius nec beneficio nec iniuria cogniti. dignitatem nostram a Vespasiano inchoatam, a Tito auctam, a Domitiano longius provectam non abnuerim: sed incorruptam fidem professis neque amore quisquam et sine odio dicendus est." The conclusion is clear: recipients of favors will be prone to give flattering portraits of powerful patrons, those who have been injured, to malign them. Tacitus himself, therefore, has no cause to speak falsely about Galba, Otho, or Vitellius, because he did not know them; he will have to be on his guard, however, when speaking of their Flavian successors, since he was the conspicuous recipient of their favors and (the implication is clear) would therefore be inclined to give a rosier picture of them than the facts might warrant.

When we turn to the *Annals* the same or analogous sentiments reappear: historians of talent, who had flourished under the Republic, were deterred from writing in the midst of growing adulation (1. 1. 2). While emperors lived, their actions were falsified out of fear; when they were dead, their deeds were written up under the stimulus of recent hatred: "inde consilium mihi pauca de Augusto et extrema tradere, mox Tiberii principatum et cetera, sine ira et studio, quorum causas procul habeo." The *causae* are clearly *iniuria* in the case of *ira* and *beneficium* in the case of *studium*.[8] As in the instances of Galba, Otho, and Vitellius (*mihi nec beneficio nec iniuria cogniti*), Tacitus had had no experience of Tiberius and his three successors. Hence the causes that might have led to a biased account are absent. Note that it is not simply time that guarantees Tacitus' objectivity at *Annals* 1. 1. 2 (although it is an important factor) but also the absence of favors or harm done to himself, to his family and ancestors, and even to his close friends (on these extensions, see below).

The more immediate causes of bias, therefore, are emotions felt by the historian: hope and fear, favoritism and hatred. The causes of the

7. At *Agricola* 1. 2 he had also stressed the contrast between earlier and contemporary writers; of the earlier he says "celeberrimus quisque ingenio ad prodendam virtutis memoriam sine gratia aut ambitione bonae tantum conscientiae pretio ducebatur."

8. See Avenarius, *Lucians Schrift*, p. 48, n. 33; R. Syme, *Tacitus* (Oxford, 1958), p. 420, n. 1; and F. R. D. Goodyear, *The "Annals" of Tacitus*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 100–101, who also remarks on the unusual meaning of *procul habeo* here ("are far removed from me," not "I keep at a distance, avoid").

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emotions, in turn, are benefits one has enjoyed or hopes to enjoy and injuries one has received or fears to receive.[9] The objects of bias are most often autocrats, which explains the prominence of the disclaimer of bias by those who wrote in Hellenistic Greece and imperial Rome.[10]

The disclaimer does not appear in Herodotus, Thucydides, or Xenophon. Thucydides 1. 22 is sometimes cited as an example of the general sentiment; yet this passage is immediately concerned not with bias on the historian's part but with carelessness about the facts and with the prejudice (εὔνοια) and faulty memory of eyewitnesses, whose testimony the historian must gather and evaluate. That Thucydides thinks of himself as free from bias, however, is implicit throughout, and the same may be said of Herodotus.[11] The disclaimer may have had its origin in the later fourth century with historians who recorded the careers of Philip II and Alexander.[12] Another influence may have been the oath of the fourth-century juror, in which he swore to be free from hatred and partiality.[13] Certainly a common analogy to the ideal historian in antiquity was the ideal juryman.[14] The connection is apt, in that both juror and historian were to sit in judgment of the persons appearing before them and render a verdict on their behavior; the historian, like the juror, was not to allow personal feelings to influence his final judgment. But the analogy does not go very deep. Jurors were excused for having personal ties to the defendant, whereas the historian was faced with no such disqualification: he was self-appointed. The juryman was presented with the evidence gathered by others; the historian was himself in charge of the collecting. Above all, the juryman was himself judged competent or incompetent on the basis of the simple vote that he cast, guilty or not guilty; the historian was judged on the basis of a huge verbal construct in which a reader expected to find ample evidence of the writer's accuracy and moral sensibility.

In the disclaimer of bias by Tacitus and other historians the personal element is preeminent: each refers to the treatment that he has received from prominent individuals, whether rulers or acquaintances, who will appear in his pages. Did they recognize that the bias historians feel toward individuals could be extended to institutions, general historical conditions, and the like? Vogt and others believe that they did, since

9. See Avenarius, *Lucians Schrift,* pp. 46–54, for numerous passages; his division of the discussion into φόβος vs. ἐλπίς and χάρις vs. ἀπέχθεια, however, creates a dichotomy that the ancient texts sometimes belie (contrast the full text of Dio 53. 19. 2 with the selective quotation on p. 54).

10. On Polybius 8. 8. 3 (concerning Philip V) F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius,* vol. 2 (Oxford, 1967), p. 79, notes that the passage is "the first expression of a sentiment later to become a commonplace, that fear of rulers affects historical impartiality."

11. See Avenarius, *Lucians Schrift,* p. 52; Fornara, *Nature,* pp. 99–105.

12. Fornara, *Nature,* p. 64, selects Callisthenes as a detectable turning point, following L. Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (London, 1960), pp. 22–49, esp. 33, 46.

13. The first examples occur in Dem. 8. 1, 23. 97, 57. 63; see C. Weyman, "*Sine ira et studio,*" *ALLG* 15 (1908): 278–79, who collects other passages on the theme.

14. The analogy is everywhere present, for instance, in Lucian's *Hist. conscr.* (e.g., 38, 41, 47). Ἴστωρ, the cognate of ἱστορία and ἱστορέω, occurs already in Homer (*Il.* 18. 501, 23. 486), where it means a "judge" or "witness."

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Tacitus, like other ancient writers, connected such general states with particular individuals.[15] Now, though individuals loom large in ancient explanations of causation, I see no basis for such an extension of meaning in this connection. We today may be pleased to seek Tacitus' antipathy to Tiberius in that monarch's shaping of an institution—the principate—by promoting *delatores* and trials for *maiestas*. But this was not the way Tacitus thought, or the way the ancients thought generally. The idea is now so familiar that we assume they must have shared it; but Tacitus makes his own thinking clear. Personal benefits and injury are what engender bias; and since he received none from such as Tiberius or Nero, he cannot be prejudiced for or against them. This, then, is the reason why the disclaimer appears in historians who wrote contemporary or nearly contemporary history; for those who wrote of the distant past, such as Livy, the disclaimer would be silly, since it would occur to no one that Livy could have been helped or harmed by the individuals who appear in his pages.

Reflection will show, however, that the causes of bias extend somewhat beyond the personal and contemporary, narrowly interpreted, in two areas. The first concerns patriotic history. Alone of ancient writers Lucian and Polybius insist that the historian must be objective in matters pertaining to his native city.[16] Yet even Polybius concedes that the historian could show partiality, provided that he does not contradict the facts (16. 14. 6). Livy is more representative of the general attitude: in his preface (11) he cheerfully admits to his love for Rome, and he makes his attitude explicit in a number of other passages (e.g., 9. 16. 11–19. 17, 22. 54. 7–11, 27. 8. 4–10). Once again we see a wide gulf between the sensibilities of fifth-century historians and their successors, a gulf of which the ancients were keenly aware. Plutarch, for example, severely criticizes Herodotus for being a "barbarian lover" (*De malign. Her.* 857A). In the case of Thucydides, his failure to favor his native Athens brings down the harsh and uncompromising condemnation of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his *Letter to Pompeius* (3). The cause of Thucydides' hostility was his exile, says Dionysius: he bore his city a grudge thereafter. He consequently found her partly to blame for the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, whereas he ought to have shifted the blame wholly onto Sparta; Dionysius then proceeds to show how Thucydides could have written the first book of his history with this aim in mind. Bias could therefore be expected in the matter of patriotic feeling and, by extension, could be displayed against the enemies of one's country.[17] One need not be apologetic or write disclaimers about patriotic bias; on the contrary, it was something that one might even proudly admit, as does Livy (praef. 11): "aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit aut nulla

15. See Vogt's "Tacitus," p. 5.

16. For Lucian, see *Hist. conscr.* 40–41, and Avenarius, *Lucians Schrift*, pp. 49–54. For Polybius, see 1. 14, with the demonstration of his credo at 38. 4.

17. Josephus, for example, speaks of those who wrote biased accounts of the Jewish War either to flatter the Romans or out of hatred of the Jews (*BJ* 1. 1–2).

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umquam res publica nec maior nec sanctior nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit."

In addition to a historian's *patria,* friends and members of his family might produce bias in his work. So Livy catches Licinius Macer inventing noble deeds for an early Licinius (7. 9. 5): "quaesita ea propriae familiae laus leviorem auctorem Licinium facit."[18] Tacitus recognizes that injuries done to kinsmen can be remembered and may hurt long after the fact.[19] Josephus cites the gratification of those who will appear in the narrative (*AJ* 1. 2) as one of four motives that prompt men to write history, while Polybius couples friends with country when speaking of the historian's duty to preserve objectivity (1. 14). When the historian and his friends are part of a political faction, bias might extend to the group.[20]

According to the ancient view, then, a historian could be biased for personal reasons, the favors and injuries that he himself may have received from the men who populate his work; and when country, family, and friends affect a historian's objectivity, the reasons are no less personal. This is because country, family, and friends confer benefits upon the individual, in return for which he is expected to exhibit proper gratitude. Failure to acknowledge these debts in his life and writings is the sign of moral defect, as Dionysius' indictment of Thucydides demonstrates. Similarly, the historian is expected to make suitable pronouncements on the goodness and badness of the people appearing in his pages.[21] Again, failure to do so pointed to a serious imperfection in character. Polybius criticizes some of his predecessors for just this flaw. Phylarchus, for example, is to be condemned as much for his failure to praise noble actions as for his love of sensationalism (2. 61); and among Timaeus' many shortcomings is his unwillingness to praise the good qualities of his bête noire Agathocles (12. 15. 9).

Such strictures show that in his writing the historian's own character is as important as the character of the personages appearing in his pages, perhaps more so. As the historian is to judge the moral worth of his subjects, so the reader judges the moral worth of the historian.[22] Hence the historian must be centrally concerned with his own persona: he must

18. On the general problem of distortion caused by family considerations, see Cic. *Brut.* 62, Livy 8. 40.

19. Cf. *Ann.* 16. 28. 1 "Paconium Agrippinum, paterni in principes odii heredem," 4. 33. 4 "at multorum, qui Tiberio regente poenam vel infamias subiere, posteri manent" (although here Tacitus strictly is speaking of the readers of history rather than of historians themselves). It would be interesting to know how Tacitus treated his father-in-law, Agricola, in the lost portion of the *Histories.*

20. So Sallust at *Cat.* 4 (*partibus rei publicae*) and *H.* frag. 6M. (*diversa pars in civilibus armis*). Could this bias extend to members of one's social class as a group? I doubt it: although it is often claimed, for example, that Tacitus shows significant partiality for the senatorial order, there are too many negative descriptions of that body at work to sustain such a claim.

21. See Cic. *Fam.* 5. 12. 4, *De or.* 2. 63; Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3. Cf. Avenarius, *Lucians Schrift,* pp. 159–63; K. Sacks, *Polybius on the Writing of History,* University of California Publications in Classical Studies, vol. 24 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981), pp. 132–44, 166–70, 190–93; Woodman, *Rhetoric,* pp. 40–44.

22. Here again the wide gulf that separates historians of the fifth and early fourth centuries from those who came later is especially marked.

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endeavor to demonstrate his own ethical sensibility through the judgments he makes on others. Almost the entire force of Plutarch's attack on Herodotus centers on this point: despite a certain surface attractiveness, declares Plutarch, Herodotus possessed a captious and malicious nature, in consequence of which he either could not appreciate goodness or, if he did appreciate it, was unable to express that appreciation without undercutting and devaluing it. Κακοήθεια is Plutarch's term for this failing: the historian erred not out of carelessness or arrogance but because he was willfully ill-disposed and unjust: "He does not know how to give praise without finding fault."[23] Plutarch is at pains to emphasize that he is concerned throughout his essay not with Herodotus' lies in general, but with his deliberate lies.[24] By contrast, a good historian was expected to be not merely impartial but even generous; in matters of doubt he should adopt the more favorable, more creditable interpretation. This is Plutarch's injunction (*De malign. Her.* 855F). Josephus in his autobiography offers an illustration: he concedes that in the *Jewish War* he omitted to mention certain things; but he did so, he maintains, because a historian should refrain from harshly scrutinizing the bad behavior of others, "not out of favoritism to the people involved but out of his own moderation."[25]

Such remarks touch on a central incongruity in ancient historiography from the late fourth century B.C. on. The historian was not, on the one hand, to let emotions arising from personal experience intrude into the narrative;[26] on the other, he was to pronounce judgment in such a manner that his appreciation of goodness, his patriotism, and his feeling of gratitude for benefits received were on display for the reader's approval. To claim that there existed a line, however fine, between the two attitudes would be overly optimistic: a no-man's-land of considerable extent stretched between them. And since it was commendable both to claim to be objective and to advertise one's moral sensibility, a historian might venture to do both in the same breath. Josephus, for example, admits that because he cannot help feeling great pity for the Jews when he describes their terrible misfortunes, he must ask the reader to pardon him for indulging his emotions contrary to the law of history;

23. *De malign. Her.* 866D, 869A; Dionysius had argued the exact opposite in his *Letter to Pompeius* (3): ἡ μὲν Ἡροδότου διάθεσις ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπεικὴς καὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς συνηδομένη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς συναλγοῦσα.

24. *De malign. Her.* 870A; the distinction between deliberate and inadvertent falsehoods was important in evaluating a historian's character: see Avenarius, *Lucians Schrift,* p. 44, n. 23. Polybius, for example, does not think that Philinus and Fabius told deliberate lies, στοχαζόμενος ἐκ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς αἱρέσεως αὐτῶν (1. 14. 2).

25. *Vit.* 339. The dominant ἦθος of a historian could become the commonly accepted way of characterizing him: thus, e.g., Theopompus' overly critical nature (see Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6, Lucian *Hist. conscr.* 855A, and, in general, K. Meister, *Historische Kritik bei Polybios* [Wiesbaden, 1975], pp. 59–60), or, on the other hand, Livy's *mira iucunditas clarissimusque candor,* his treatment of *adfectus dulciores* (Quint. *Inst.* 10. 1. 101–2), and his being *candidissimus omnium magnorum ingeniorum aestimator* (Sen. *Suas.* 6. 22).

26. Cf. the general criticism at Marcellin. *Vit. Thuc.* 27 οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις πάθεσι συνέθεσαν τὰς ἱστορίας, ἥκιστα μελῆσαν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀληθείας, followed by examples from Herodotus, Timaeus, Philistus, and Xenophon.

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but if anyone should be immune to pity, he requests that the facts be chalked up to history, the grief to the author.[27] Similarly, Polybius would concede (συγχωρήσαιμ' ἄν) that the historian may give preference to his native land, but not that he may make pronouncements that contradict what has happened (16. 14. 6).[28] Dionysius, in the introduction to his *Roman Antiquities,* declares that he is writing not out of a desire to flatter (οὐχὶ κολακείας χάριν) but for the sake of truth and justice, and in order to thank his adopted city for the many good things it has bestowed upon him.[29]

So attractive was it for a historian to show partiality of which readers would approve that the claim of impartiality could assume a decidedly secondary place. This is the thrust of Cicero's request that Lucceius set aside the laws of history by writing up Cicero's exploits "a bit more sympathetically even than the truth might permit" (*Fam.* 5. 12. 3).[30] In doing so, says Cicero, Lucceius can display his finely honed sense of right and wrong (5. 12. 4): Cicero implies that it will be clear where the historian stands on touchy issues, and right-thinking men will approve. He alleges that he makes his request by letter rather than face to face "because a letter does not blush" (5. 12. 1). Yet clearly neither Cicero nor his friends thought the request excessive: after all, when the great man urged Atticus to borrow the letter to read, he did so with considerable satisfaction, pronouncing it *valde bella* (*Att.* 4. 6. 4).

II. DISCOVERY AND EXPLANATION OF BIAS IN PREDECESSORS

Authors who used writers of contemporary history as sources were sensitive to the question of how bias may have affected these sources. We encounter more comments on this problem than we do declarations by historians of their own impartiality or general proscriptions of bias. This sensitivity was heightened by the venerable practice of criticizing one's predecessors, a tradition begun by Hecataeus when in his opening words he scoffed at the "silly tales" told by the Greeks (*FGrH* 1 F 1a). Bias is prominent among such criticisms, which came into their own with the historians of Alexander and his successors and thereafter were most often made with reference to a historian's treatment of an autocrat, whatever his title, whether he was a Sicilian tyrant, a Jewish king, or a Roman emperor.[31]

27. *BJ* 1. 11–12; at 5. 20 he restrains himself from displaying his emotions to the reader. Cf. Plut. *Per.* 28. 3 (Duris' emotions when describing Athenian atrocities against his native Samos).

28. Meister, *Historische Kritik,* pp. 174 and 181, emphasizes the force of συγχωρήσαιμ' ἄν as a potential optative and denies that Polybius regarded this concession as applying to his own work.

29. *Ant. Rom.* 1. 6. 5. The κολακεία that Dionysius denies is presumably flattery of his adopted city, in which elements of falsity and self-seeking would coexist.

30. Both Fornara, *Nature,* pp. 101–2, and Woodman, *Rhetoric,* pp. 70–74, have some excellent remarks on this much-discussed letter.

31. On Alexander, see, e.g., Arr. 7. 14. 2 (writers for or against Alexander and Hephaestion); on Alexander's successors, Paus. 1. 9. 8, 1. 13. 9 (Hieronymus of Cardia on the Diadochi, esp. Antigonus and Lysimachus); on Sicilian tyrants, Diod. Sic. 21. 17 (Timaeus and Callias of Syracuse on Agathocles) and Paus. 1. 13. 9 (Philistus on Dionysius of Syracuse); on Herod, Joseph. *AJ* 16. 184 (the portrait by

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Separate monographs by nonhistorians, such as Plutarch's *On the Malice of Herodotus,* could be devoted to an attack; so could large portions of a narrative history (though this was somewhat exceptional), such as the twelfth book of Polybius, which is directed at the failings of Timaeus and certain other historians. Attacking Timaeus, in fact, became something of a cottage industry. Ister of Cyrene ("the Callimachean"), who coined the epithet ἐπιτίμαιος, composed a critique that ran, it seems, to more than one volume (Ath. 6. 272B). Polemon of Troy ("the Exegete") followed by writing *Against Timaeus* in at least twelve volumes (Ath. 15. 698B), in the course of which he seems to have included criticisms of Ister. Polybius, the last of the trio, is brief by comparison.[32]

Criticism of one's sources could be not only extensive but intricate. For example, Timaeus censured Aristotle for his version of the founding of Locri, and Polybius in turn censures Timaeus (12. 8): if Aristotle is to be properly discredited, says Polybius, he must be shown to have acted "either to curry favor (χάριτος . . . ἕνεκεν) or to receive a reward or out of personal enmity."[33] If one of these motives is not apparent, we should rather believe that Timaeus made his attack on Aristotle "out of ill will and malice." Two points are of interest here. First, if one looks at the ancient evidence, the motives for explaining bias do not extend much beyond those that Polybius notes here. Second, when the obvious explanations do not satisfy, there frequently was a fallback: the historian had a naturally malicious character. Thus Polybius says that Timaeus attacked Aristotle out of "enmity and malice." Bad character might also be embraced as the primary cause, although more normal explanations could be found. Plutarch, for example, selects κακοήθεια as the chief cause of Herodotus' falsehoods, even though other, more "regular" causes are at hand, such as his giving unwarranted prominence to his native Halicarnassus and its citizens (*De malign. Her.* 868A, 869F) while favoring barbarian races over the Greeks generally (857A), or currying favor with individuals by featuring them (Hipponicus son of Callias: 863B), or taking money for praising its donors (the Athenians: 862A), or, when the request for money was rejected, attacking those who withheld it (the Thebans: 864D).

If the usual motives do not seem operative and if bad character cannot be adduced, puzzlement is evident. Polybius, for example, in criticizing Theopompus for his hostility to Philip II, can only darkly invoke some "advantage" derived by Theopompus (8. 11. 6 τὸ σύμφερον),

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Nicolaus of Damascus); on Roman emperors, Tac. *Hist.* 2. 101 (contemporary historians of the Flavians), *Ann.* 16. 6 (detractors of Nero on Poppaea's death), Herodian 2. 15. 7 (contemporary historians of Severus).

32. Polybius himself did not escape criticism: Posidonius accused him of trying to curry favor with Ti. Gracchus by calling the 300 πύργοι that Gracchus had destroyed in Spain 300 πόλεις. Strabo, who reports the criticism (3. 4. 13 = *FGrH* 87 F 51), finds it plausible, because both generals and historians like to puff up the deeds that were done (καλλωπίζοντες τὰς πράξεις).

33. Walbank, *Historical Commentary,* 2:342, suggests that χάριτος ἕνεκεν may mean "to curry favor" (which I prefer) rather than "prompted by partiality" (Shuckburgh); on the passage as a whole, see Meister, *Historische Kritik,* pp. 13–29.

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but he specifies nothing; a few lines earlier (8. 11. 2) he had suggested that by reviling Philip, Theopompus perhaps was hoping to gain credit for impartiality, because at the start of his history he had praised the king! Josephus speaks of those contemporary historians who wrote of Nero out of either favoritism or hatred; and yet, he continues (*AJ* 20. 154–55), these writers also wrote biased accounts of Nero's predecessors, for whom they had no hatred, since they lived much later. Josephus exaggerates somewhat in writing πολλῷ χρόνῳ; Tacitus was nearer the mark when he spoke of *recentibus odiis* (*Ann.* 1. 1. 2) in describing the same phenomenon. But the point here is that Josephus is at a loss: he simply cannot explain why later writers would be prejudiced against someone already dead.

Though some of its practitioners championed contemporary history,[34] many of the ancients believed noncontemporary history to be more objective and hence a better thing. Contemporaries were too likely to be the recipients, or the prospective recipients, of benefits and injuries, whereas those who lived later would be exempt from such influences. A passage in Lucian's *How to Write History* (40) illustrates this belief: because Homer did not live when Achilles did, some people maintain that he could not have been biased in his favor, "for they can discover no reason why he would lie." Likewise Arrian (*Anab.* 1. 1. 2) prefers as sources Ptolemy and Aristobulus, who, since they wrote after Alexander's death, felt neither compulsion nor hope of reward from that monarch.

On the other hand, contemporary historians often faced an unpleasant dilemma. If they published a favorable picture of an autocrat during his lifetime, they laid themselves open to charges of flattery and self-promotion; if the account was critical, they risked punishment. A common solution was to withhold publication until after the autocrat had died. Ammianus, having arrived in his history at his own age (26. 1. 1–2 *ad usque memoriae confinia propioris*), also encounters *pericula . . . veritati saepe contigua;* some older writers, he observes, had chosen not to publish in their lifetimes, in order to avoid the dangers that might impair the truth, including the complaints of critics and the importunities of friends. Pliny the Elder wrote a history of his own times in thirty-one books but refused to publish it while he was alive, lest he expose himself to the charge of self-seeking (*ambitio*); publication, he assures Titus, will fall to his heir (*HN* praef. 20). The motive of the outspoken T. Labienus was different, his solution similar. The Elder Seneca recalls (*Controv.* 10 praef. 8) that at a recitation Labienus rolled up a large part of a book of his histories, declaring: "what I omit now will be read after my death" (Seneca adds: "Quanta in illis libertas fuit quam etiam Labienus extimuit!").

In a slight variation of this pattern, Livy's last twenty-two books, covering the years 43–9 B.C., appeared only after Augustus' death.[35] A

34. E.g., Polyb. 4. 2. 3, 9. 2; Joseph. *BJ* 1. 13–16.

35. The superscription to the *periocha* of Book 121 reads *qui editus post excessum Augusti dicitur;* cf. T. J. Luce, *Livy: The Composition of His History* (Princeton, 1977), p. 8, n. 17. I do not find

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particularly noteworthy example is given by Procopius. In the introduction to his *Persian Wars* (1. 1. 4–5, a heady mix of Herodotean and Thucydidean reminiscences) Procopius declares his allegiance to historical truth, eschewing the clever display of rhetoric or the improbabilities of poetry; he will venture, he says, to write negative things about even his closest friends, frankly revealing everything that they did, good and bad. This noble declaration was in fact untrue, as he concedes later in the introduction to his *Secret History:* it simply was not possible to say everything in his earlier works on Justinian's wars while the participants were still living. Now that they are dead, he can tell all (*Arc.* 1. 1–2).

Josephus and his rival historian of the Jewish War, Justus, illustrate a further twist (*Vita* 357–67). Justus composed his history shortly after the event but delayed publication for some twenty years; in it he had many critical things to say of Josephus' work in respect to both content and *Tendenz.* Nettled, Josephus attributes the delay to Justus' fear that if he had published it earlier, he would have been contradicted by the participants who were still alive: Vespasian, Titus, King Agrippa, and members of King Agrippa's family. Josephus, we now learn, had submitted his work to these monarchs for advance approval; Titus even inscribed the work with his own hand, ordering that it be published, while from Agrippa Josephus had received no fewer than sixty-two letters acknowledging the truth of the narrative (he quotes a few specimens for Justus' edification). In light of this confession, Josephus' earlier professions of impartiality (*BJ* 1. 1. 1–2; cf. *AJ* 20. 154), and especially his criticisms of historians who displayed χάρις to powerful patrons (e.g., *AJ* 16. 184, on Nicolaus of Damascus and Herod), have a distinctly hollow ring. Josephus is on the horns of a dilemma: he must choose between refuting Justus' criticisms of his veracity and protecting himself from charges that he had written to please the participants. He elects to risk a charge of toadyism in order to rebut the charge of inaccuracy.[36]

Hence the common and accepted belief that those historians who had no personal experience of prominent persons, especially rulers, were likely to give the most accurate accounts. Three responses naturally followed from this attitude. First is the tendency to believe that praise of a monarch after his death is likely to be true, since there can be no hope of reward. One illustration is Arrian's preference for Ptolemy and Aristobulus, mentioned above (Arrian does not acknowledge that they were contemporaries who had benefited from Alexander). Another is found at *Histories* 4. 81, where Tacitus recounts how Vespasian at Alexandria miraculously cured two people of their afflictions: "Those who were present attest even now to both events, when nothing can be

convincing L. Canfora's arguments ("Su Augusto e gli ultimi libri liviani," *Belfagor* 24 [1969]: 41–43) against accepting the superscription; cf. below, n. 38.

36. If Domitian was still on the throne when the *Vita* was written, it would help to explain Josephus' somewhat curious stance; see S. J. D. Cohen, *Josephus in Galilee and Rome* (Leiden, 1979), pp. 170–80. Earlier in the *Vita* (336) he had included Justus among those historians who wrote δι' ἔχθραν ἢ χάριν.

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gained from telling such a falsehood."[37] Second, where a historian was plainly independent of a living monarch's likes and dislikes, praise was due: so Tacitus has Cremutius Cordus praise Livy's independence from Augustus despite the friendship that existed between the two (*Ann.* 4. 34. 3 "Titus Livius, eloquentiae ac fidei praeclarus in primis"). Livy deserves to be believed because he cannot be thought to have written as Augustus wished.[38]

Third, the judgment of posterity will be free from the bias that affects contemporaries. Here is Cicero's exhortation to Julius Caesar in his speech on behalf of M. Marcellus (29): "servi igitur iis etiam iudicibus, qui multis post saeculis de te iudicabunt, et quidem haud scio an incorruptius quam nos; nam et sine amore et sine cupiditate et rursus sine odio et sine invidia iudicabunt." The writer of the panegyric to Julian recalls this passage (*Pan. Lat.* 3. 31. 1): "te . . . sciam . . . his maxime servire iudicibus qui de rebus gestis tuis sine odio et gratia venturis saeculis iudicabunt." Tacitus puts the same sentiment in the mouth of Aper in the *Dialogue on Orators* (23. 6). Indeed, Quintilian declares (*Inst.* 10. 1. 34) that in the courtroom historical examples have "a significant advantage [over the testimony of witnesses] in that they alone are immune to the suspicion of hatred and of favoritism."[39] And Ammianus, in giving an appraisal of Valentinian I, discusses that emperor's virtues separately from his vices: only posterity, "unconstrained by fear or base flattery," will be able to come to an unbiased synthesis (30. 8. 1), for which Ammianus sees himself as supplying the raw material.

III. POSTERITY'S RELATION TO THE PAST

For the contemporary historian, therefore, freedom to express one's beliefs (παρρησία, *libertas*) does not have quite the same meaning as it does for the historian of the remoter past. For the former it signifies fearlessness in speaking out, whatever the effects upon the feelings of

37. H. Heubner, *Die "Historien,"* vol. 4 (Heidelberg, 1976), p. 182, cites as a parallel Ov. *Tr.* 3. 10. 35–36 "cum sint praemia falsi / nulla, ratam debet testis habere fidem." Ovid is himself the "witness" here; contrast Quintilian's remarks at *Inst.* 10. 1. 34, quoted below at n. 39. In a remarkable passage at *Ben.* 4. 11. 4–6, Seneca declares that in deciding to whom to leave our money we as testators are concerned about matters that will be of no benefit to us; motives of self-interest have no influence (*remotis utilitatibus*), among which are "spes ac metus et inertissimum vitium, voluptas." Seneca likens the testator to an *incorruptus iudex,* whose only motive is to seek the best person to whom to leave his money.

38. E. Koestermann, *Cornelius Tacitus: "Annalen,"* vol. 2 (Heidelberg, 1965), p. 120, takes *fides* to refer less to Livy's reliability than to his reputation for high principles and a generous disposition (cf. above, n. 25); Fornara, *Nature,* p. 74, argues persuasively that it refers to Livy's independence. Cordus' assertion that Augustus knew how Livy portrayed Cassius and Brutus does not disprove the statement of the superscription to the *periocha* of Book 121 (see above, n. 35) that the book was published after Augustus' death, *pace* Canfora, "Su Augusto," pp. 41–43: we do not need to suppose that the argument Tacitus assigns to Cordus must be wholly correct in the facts it deploys; and since Book 120 brought the narrative at least to the death of Cicero in December 43, Augustus would have known how Livy described the bulk of Cassius' and Brutus' careers.

39. Cf. the same idea at *Inst.* 5. 11. 37 (*liberis odio et gratia mentibus*). B. L. Ullman, "*Sine ira et studio,*" *CJ* 38 (1943): 420–21, traces the derivation of Tacitus' phrase from Cic. *Marcell.* 29 through Quintilian; on Ullman's suggestion, see Goodyear, "*Annals,*" 1:100, n. 23.

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contemporaries: this is often an unpopular undertaking, and one difficult to achieve in any event.[40] But for the historian of the distant past it is an ideal that could be fully realized, because freedom—like its product, "truth"—is essentially a negative concept, made possible by the absence of fear and favor. Hence the frequent assurances by writers like Diodorus and Dionysius that they write the truth.[41] "History's customary freedom of speech" enables Diodorus to fulfill his obligation to bestow praise and blame as he sees fit.[42]

Thus the past, when viewed from this perspective, is wholly dead. The passions that animated the participants have passed away along with those who felt them: no one in the present is personally affected by the issues that were then so alive, no one cares about them. This view sometimes clashes with the obligation to write patriotic history, and it can be presented as the dominant view when it serves the historian's rhetorical purpose. For example, when contrasting histories of bygone days with the sensitive material that is his own subject, Tacitus writes (*Ann.* 4. 33. 4): "Few are moved to criticize the writers of ancient history; it is a matter of indifference whether you give greater praise to the armies of Carthage or of Rome." And Juvenal observes (10. 147–48) that the only persons who care about the great Hannibal are boys in their schoolroom declamations. On the other hand, Cicero declares (*Amic.* 28) that Rome will always hate the Carthaginian because of his cruelty, whereas the honorable conduct of Pyrrhus elicits "feelings not overly hostile" (*non nimis alienos animos*).

Is there any evidence for the ancients' acknowledging that someone, especially a historian, was biased against a deceased figure with whom he had not been personally involved? I know of none.[43] Naturally, a writer is not without feelings—admiration, antipathy, and the like—when he judges the goodness or badness of men, past or present. But when such feelings were independent of personal experience, a balanced assessment, compounded both of intellect and emotion, was thought possible: an unprejudiced, therefore true appraisal was the result. Hatred, love, and partisanship were emotions one usually felt for people one had known or whose acts had in some way touched one directly. The dead were rarely objects of these stronger, more "personal" feelings.[44]

40. Thus παρρησία was especially characteristic of Theopompus: Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6, *De imit.* p. 209. 13 Usener-Radermacher. Polybius concedes that personalities and circumstances sometimes prevent the contemporary historian from recording what really happened (8. 8. 8): ἀλλ' ἴσως τοῦτ' [i.e., the objective bestowal of praise and blame on monarchs] εἰπεῖν μὲν εὐμαρές, πρᾶξαι δὲ καὶ λίαν δυσχερὲς διὰ τὸ πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας εἶναι διαθέσεις καὶ περιστάσεις, αἷς εἴκοντες ἄνθρωποι κατὰ τὸν βίον οὔτε λέγειν οὔτε γράφειν δύνανται τὸ φαινόμενον. Cf. Hor. *Carm.* 2. 1. 6–8.

41. E.g., Diod. 1. 2. 2, 21. 17. 4; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1. 1. 2, 1. 6. 5, 9. 22. 5, *Thuc.* 8.

42. See Diod. Sic. 15. 1. 1 (τῇ συνήθει τῆς ἱστορίας παρρησίᾳ), 31. 15. 1 (τῇ τῆς ἱστορίας παρρησίᾳ); cf. 14. 1. 2 (τὴν ἀλήθειαν μετὰ παρρησίας κηρύττουσαν τὰ πάλαι σιωπώμενα).

43. Tacitus says (*Ann.* 4. 33. 4) that a reader of bad character can resent historical personages in whom he sees his own bad traits, fancying that a charge against them is also a charge against himself; he may also resent those with good qualities because the contrast is obvious. Presumably a historian of bad character could also have the same reactions.

44. Cicero (*Amic.* 28) says that we sometimes love or hate historical personages because of their uprightness or their bad character: "etiam eos, quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. quis

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Consider, for example, Cicero's remarks to the jury in his defense of A. Cluentius in 66 B.C. After describing the villainous, but now deceased, Oppianicus and the crimes for which he was tried eight years before, Cicero says that he perceives how shocked the present jury is to hear of Oppianicus' misdeeds. What must the earlier jurors have felt, he asks, if the present jury is so moved? His answer: the jurors then hated Oppianicus because of the enormity of his crimes; but—and this is the point—the present jury cannot hate him. The dead Oppianicus is past hating. Cicero's vocabulary is instructive (*Clu.* 29):

> sentio, iudices, vos pro vestra humanitate his tantis sceleribus breviter a me demonstratis vehementer esse commotos. . . . vos auditis de eo in quem iudices non estis, de eo quem non videtis, de eo quem odisse iam non potestis. . . . illi audiebant de eo de quo iurati sententias ferre debebant, de eo cuius praesentis nefarium et consceleratum voltum intuebantur, de eo quem omnes oderant propter audaciam.

The earlier jurors saw Oppianicus face to face and had to deliver a verdict upon him; everyone eight years ago hated the man, Cicero affirms. But the present jurors—though they are agitated (*commotos*) in accordance with the feelings that all men share (*pro vestra humanitate*)—cannot now hate Oppianicus (*odisse iam non potestis*), because they have had no personal experience of him. Hence, when Tacitus declares that he will write of Tiberius and his successors *sine ira et studio,* he can be taken to speak with full conviction; his declaration conforms wholly to the view on the causes of bias that the men of his time accepted.

Some remarks of Benedetto Croce on this subject illustrate the gap that separates the attitude of antiquity from that of our world.[45] On the one hand, Croce fully agrees with the ancient view that the past is wholly dead: "They are men of the past who belong to the peace of the past and as such can only be the subjects of history." He also argues that freedom from the emotions that engender bias is essential: "Only historical judgment liberates the spirit from the pressures of the past; it is pure and extraneous to conflicting parties, and guarding itself against their fury, their lures, and their insidiousness, it maintains its neutrality." On the other hand, Croce wholly rejects the notion that history should set up tribunals to judge the goodness and badness of the dead: "They . . . can suffer no other judgment than that which penetrates and understands the spirit of their work. . . . They now stand beyond severity or indulgence, beyond censure and praise." What he terms "historical judgment" is the opposite of what he calls "value-judgments" or "affective expressions," since the latter really aim at bridging the gap between the past and the present: "Our tribunals (whether juridical or moral) are

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est qui C. Fabrici, M'. Curi non cum caritate aliqua benivolam memoriam usurpet, quos numquam viderit? quis autem est qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp. Cassium, Sp. Maelium non oderit?" Tacitus at *Ann.* 16. 16. 2 denies that he hates those who died so tamely under Nero. On this difficult passage, see my forthcoming article, "Tacitus on 'History's Highest Function': *praecipuum munus annalium* (*Ann.* 3. 65)," *ANRW* 2. 33. 3.

45. The quotations that follow are taken from his *History as the Story of Liberty,* trans. S. Sprigge (New York, 1955), pp. 44–47.

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present-day tribunals designed for living, active and dangerous men, while these other men have already appeared before the tribunals of their day, and cannot be condemned or absolved twice." This is plainly opposed to the ancient point of view, since the ancients viewed "contemporary tribunals" as subject to the bias that most contemporaries feel; the final verdict must be reserved for the tribunal of posterity, over which historians of a later day will preside. Croce concedes that the historian cannot help but betray some value-judgments when he treats personalities of the past who are the "symbols of that which is loved and hated in the present," such as Socrates, Alexander, or Judas: "We need not feel guilty at having thereby revealed something in our minds that it was impossible to hide, something which we need not be ashamed of unless with shame for ignominious affections or for unworthy aversions. But these are not historical judgments, still less are they the object of historiography, as the judge-like historians imagined that they were, the imitators of Tacitus."

I return to Tacitus for a final question: what happens when the truism is contradicted, when the past is not a matter of indifference to those in the present? Cremutius Cordus, on trial in the reign of Tiberius for having praised Brutus and having called Cassius the last of the Romans in his histories, argues in his defense that Julius Caesar and Augustus not only allowed contemporary writers to praise their enemies but even suffered false and scurrilous remarks about themselves to pass as if unnoticed (*Ann.* 4. 34); but above all, Cordus continues, criticism of men who were dead was completely open: the dead were not subject to the hatred or love of the living (*Ann.* 4. 35. 1 "sed maxime solutum et sine obtrectatore fuit prodere de iis, quos mors odio aut gratiae exemisset"). To convict him as if this principle were not true, he argues, is senseless. Nor can it be maintained that through his narrative he somehow is creating present dissension. All that happened is long past; there are no "passions which yet survive":

> "Are Cassius and Brutus now in arms on the field of Philippi, or am I inciting the people to civil war by my harangues? Did they not die more than seventy years ago? Do we not know how they looked in life by their statues, which even the victor did not destroy, just as we know something of what they did through what men have written? To each man posterity gives his due. If I should be condemned, there will be those who will remember me, just as they do Cassius and Brutus."

It is Cordus' rhetorical strategy (doubtless Tacitus' invention)[46] to pretend that the real issue of the trial does not exist. Cassius and Brutus, though dead more than seventy years, are clearly very much the "symbols of that which is loved and hated in the present," to use Croce's words. Everyone knows this, including the defendant. Yet Cordus adopts as his main argument the widely accepted belief that the dead cannot be the objects of the love or hatred of the living. In effect, he is challenging his

46. See Syme, *Tacitus,* p. 337, n. 10; Koestermann, "*Annalen,*" 2:119.

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listeners and opponents to articulate what Cassius and Brutus do stand for in the political climate of A.D. 25—something that no one, understandably, is so foolhardy as to do out loud.[47]

Cordus is using a literary technique especially characteristic of the first century A.D.: the introduction into history and tragedy of persons of the past, including figures from mythology, who are made to represent the issues of the present. Tacitus tells us, for example, that toward the end of Tiberius' reign Macro, the praetorian prefect, accused Mam. Aemilius Scaurus of writing a tragedy in which certain verses could be taken to be critical of Tiberius (*Ann.* 6. 29. 3 "detuleratque argumentum tragoediae a Scauro scriptae, additis versibus qui in Tiberium flecterentur").[48] One thinks also of Curiatius Maternus in Tacitus' *Dialogue:* when we meet him in the year 75, he has written a *Cato* that has offended those in power (2. 1) and is at the very moment finishing a *Thyestes,* which will make clear whatever he had left unsaid in the *Cato* (3. 3).

This essay has been concerned with the ancients' declarations about the nature of bias in historical writing. When viewed from our modern perspective, their notions often seem puzzlingly narrow and incomplete. The episode of Cremutius Cordus represents a major problem that has only been touched on here: the extent to which figures of the past could stand as symbols of present concerns. And even if, for the sake of argument, we should agree that bias may be restricted to individuals of whom one has had personal experience, what of those emotions that the historian feels toward men of the past upon whom he is obligated to pass judgment? Cannot these emotions color and distort in some degree? This in turn raises the twin questions of what the ancients conceived historical truth to be and how they thought it could be achieved—two large questions indeed.[49]

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47. Cf. *Ann.* 3. 76, where Tacitus ends the book with the funeral of Junia, niece of Cato, wife of Cassius, and sister of Brutus: "sexagesimo quarto post Philippensem aciem anno supremum diem explevit. . . . viginti clarissimarum familiarum imagines antelatae sunt, Manlii, Quinctii aliaque eiusdem nobilitatis nomina. sed praefulgebant Cassius atque Brutus, eo ipso quod effigies eorum non visebantur." See the excellent article by W. Suerbaum, "Der Historiker und die Freiheit des Wortes: Die Rede des Cremutius Cordus bei Tacitus, Ann. 4, 34/35," in *Politik und literarische Kunst im Werke des Tacitus,* ed. G. Radke (Stuttgart, 1971), pp. 61–99, esp. 86–91.

48. The tragedy was an *Atreus* according to Cass. Dio 58. 24. 4, an *Agamemnon* according to Suet. *Tib.* 61. 3.

49. Woodman, *Rhetoric,* has a brilliant and provocative discussion of a number of basic issues involved in these two questions.

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