

## DEMOCRITUS AND PLATO \*)

BY

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A few years ago the French scholar Jean Bollack <sup>1)</sup> cast considerable doubt upon the long-accepted theory that a kind of 'jalousie de métier' was the reason why Plato had not mentioned Democritus' name in any of his dialogues. He based his thesis on a meticulous scrutiny of the passage of Diogenes Laertius <sup>2)</sup> where we are told that Aristoxenus in his 'Historical Notes' affirms that Plato wished to burn all the writings of Democritus that he could collect, but that the Pythagoreans Amyclas and Clinias prevented him, saying that there was no advantage in doing so, for the books were already in wide circulation. The comment of Diogenes, in Bollack's translation runs as follows: "En voici la preuve (viz. that they were in wide circulation): Platon mentionne, en effet, presque tous les philosophes qui l'ont précédé mais nulle part il ne cite Démocrite, même quand il aurait dû discuter avec lui, sachant de toute évidence que, quand il répondait au meilleur, il serait de cette manière parmi les philosophes". Plato in fact, Bollack argues, did not hold any grudge against Democritus, but on the contrary admired him and could afford not to mention his name, because it

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<sup>1)</sup> J. Bollack, *Un silence de Platon*, *Revue de Phil.* 41 (1967), 242-246.

<sup>2)</sup> IX 40 'Αριστόξενος δ' ἐν τοῖς Ἱστορικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι φησι Πλάτωνα θελήσαι συμφλέξαι τὰ Δημοκρίτου συγγράμματα, ὅποσα ἐδυνήθη συναγαγεῖν, Ἀμύκλαν δὲ καὶ Κλεινίαν τοὺς Πυθαγορικούς κωλύσαι αὐτὸν ὡς οὐδὲν ὄφελος· παρὰ πολλοῖς γὰρ εἶναι ἤδη τὰ βιβλία· καὶ δῆλον δέ· πάντων γὰρ σχεδὸν τῶν ἀρχαίων μεμνημένος ὁ Πλάτων οὐδαμοῦ Δημοκρίτου διαμνημονεύει, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐνθ' ἀντειπεῖν τι αὐτῷ δεοί, δῆλον εἰδῶς ὡς πρὸς τὸν ἀριστον οὕτως τῶν φιλοσόφων ἔσοιτο· ὃν γε καὶ Τίμων τοῦτον ἐπαινέσας τὸν τρόπον ἔχει etc. For an account of the difficulties of the text see Bollack.

was well known. In recognizing Democritus' authority Plato felt he would be considered a philosopher himself. According to Bollack the story about the burning of Democritus' books is one of the anecdotes the motifs of which "transcrivent une explication littéraire".

My purpose in this paper is to discover whether any external or internal evidence can be found either to support or to refute this theory. But before entering the arena I want to make some preliminary remarks which may help to put the question in the right historical context.

Firstly: stories about rivalry and even hatred between ancient philosophers are fairly common in the history books of antiquity. It is generally accepted that they are not always true: Plato and Xenophon for example are reported to have been great enemies, but there are indications that the whole story was concocted and may be written off as mere gossip <sup>1)</sup>.

Secondly: Aristoxenus, the author of the story, is an Aristotelian and *eo ipso* usually prejudiced against Plato and anything he does or says. Apparently firm facts sometimes turn out to be mere slander <sup>2)</sup>.

Thirdly: Democritus is not the only Presocratic philosopher whose name does not appear in Plato's dialogues. Archelaus, whom we know to have been Socrates' teacher, is missing and even Pythagoras figures only once. The absence therefore may be purely accidental.

The scope of this inquiry will be as follows. First I shall consider the opinions of ancient authors on the relationship between our philosophers: they are mentioned together in some 20 texts and the discussion of these should give us at least some information on that relationship.

In the second place I shall pass in review some texts from Plato's

<sup>1)</sup> K. Urban, *Über die Erwähnungen der Philosophie des Antisthenes in den platonischen Schriften* (Königsberg 1882), 2; G. Teichmüller, *Literarische Fehden im vierten Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Breslau 1884), 44, 78; I. Düring, *Herodicus the Crateteian* (Stockholm 1941), 5-6.

<sup>2)</sup> J. Moreau, *Aristote et son école* (Paris 1962), 266; I. Düring, *op. cit.*, 153-155; F. Leo, *Die griechisch-römische Biographie* (Leipzig 1901), 102; A. Dihle, *Studien zur griechischen Biographie* (Göttingen 1956), 70.

dialogues which in the eyes of some modern scholars contain a direct reference to Democritus <sup>1)</sup>).

In the third place I shall compare some aspects of the ethico-political theories of our philosophers. I hope that these three examinations will put us in a better position to judge the much debated question of the relationship between Democritus and Plato.

### I. ANCIENT AUTHORS ON DEMOCRITUS AND PLATO

Not much can be gained from the first text, namely Cicero's remark that both philosophers had travelled the whole earth <sup>2)</sup>. Travelling the earth was the hall-mark of every good philosopher in antiquity, with the notorious exception of Socrates <sup>3)</sup>.

In the second text we are informed that Democritus and Plato, just like Hippocrates, put the leading part of the soul in the head. But this datum does not help us very much either: it was a widespread theory in ancient philosophy which in the case of Democritus and Plato may have been held in opposition to the Sicilian medical school; it certainly does not indicate a particular area of agreement between them <sup>4)</sup>.

The same is true of the third passage, found in Stobaeus <sup>5)</sup>, that Democritus and Plato put happiness in the soul. Though we shall

<sup>1)</sup> No text is unanimously attributed to Democritus. The most important studies on this subject are:

P. Natorp, *Die Ethika des Demokritos* (Marburg 1893), 157 ff.

I. Hammer-Jensen, *Demokrit und Platon*, Arch. f. Gesch. d. Philos. 23 (1910), 92 ff. and 211 ff. (the ironical criticism of her ideas by W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, II [Cambridge 1965], 406 n. 2 does not seem to me to do justice to the value of the articles).

E. Sachs, *Die fünf platonischen Körper* (Berlin 1917).

E. Frank, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer* (Halle 1923, repr. Darmstadt 1962), 118-124.

J. Stenzel, *Platon und Demokritos*, in *Kleine Schriften* (Darmstadt 1957), 60 ff.

F. Überweg-K. Praechter, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Philos.* (Basel 1953), 91.

K. Reinhardt, *Hekataios von Abdera und Demokrit*, Hermes 47 (1912), 504 ff.

W. Theiler, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles* (Zürich 1925), 81 ff.

<sup>2)</sup> Cicero *De fin.* V 19, 50 (A 13, D.K. II, 86).

<sup>3)</sup> Cf. Diog. Laert. II 22.

<sup>4)</sup> Aet. IV 5, 1 (A 105, D.K. II, 109). See also Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 433-4.

<sup>5)</sup> Stob. II 7, 31 p. 52, 13 W. (A 167, D.K. II, 129).

see that both the word 'soul' and the word 'happiness' had different meanings in the philosophical systems of Democritus and Plato, this has no bearing on the fact that Stobaeus saw no discrepancy in their theories on this point <sup>1</sup>).

A note in Tertullian <sup>2</sup>) seems to be more helpful. He tries to show that the soul is immortal, but he attacks those philosophers "who contend that after death some souls remain attached to the body. For instance", he argues, "Plato in the *Republic* tells us how the unburied body of a deceased man did not decompose, obviously because the soul was not separated from the body. And Democritus draws attention to the fact that the nails and hair of a dead man continue to grow for some time". I am afraid, however, that here their unanimity is due rather to Tertullian's clumsy way of quoting than to genuine agreement.

In the first place Plato does not believe that the soul remained in the body after death, as Tertullian states, for he relates how the soul of the dead man had sojourned for ten or twelve days in the heavenly meadows <sup>3</sup>). As for Democritus, the only thing he wants to tell us is that it is impossible to state precisely at which moment a man is dead <sup>4</sup>). There is not a single trace of a belief in an afterlife in Democritus' work. The book *Those in Hades* was written in order to refute current ideas about hell and heaven and in many fragments we are told that the atoms of the soul are dissolved and scatter as soon as a person dies <sup>5</sup>). So on closer scrutiny the super-

<sup>1</sup>) E.g. Plato's remark (*Laws* IV, 715e-716a) that God is the beginning, the end and the middle of everything, that Justice follows him, and that he who clings to Justice will be happy, could hardly have been made by Democritus whose dislike of theology will be discussed later on. Cf. K. v. Fritz, *Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck bei Demokrit, Plato und Aristoteles* (New York 1938, repr. Darmstadt 1963), 34.

<sup>2</sup>) *De anima* 51 (A 160, D.K. II, 127).

<sup>3</sup>) *Rep.* X, 614 b 8 ἔφη δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ἐκβῆναι, τὴν ψυχὴν πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι σφᾶς εἰς τόπον τινα δαιμόνιον etc.

<sup>4</sup>) Cf. A 117 (D.K. II, 111) and B 1 (D.K. II, 130). The testimony of Cicero on this point (*Tusc.* I 34, 8 f.) makes it clear that even in antiquity there was no *communis opinio* with respect to Democritus' views on afterlife. See M. Pohlenz' commentary in his edition of the *Tusculans* (Stuttgart 1957), 102. Cf. also the theory that even the divine atoms were finally destroyed, in B 166 (D.K. II, 178) and Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 436 ff.

<sup>5</sup>) A 106 (D.K. II, 110). Cf. C. Bailey, *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*

ficial likeness is seen to conceal a deep gulf between their theories. But by the same token this text indicates very clearly that Tertullian felt no inhibitions about mentioning the two philosophers in one breath, a fact to remember.

In the following group of texts the differences between Democritus and Plato do not escape notice.

Theophrastus in a rather scornful paragraph rebukes both Democritus and Plato for inconsistency in their argumentation<sup>1</sup>). We read that "they resemble each other in their methods of reasoning, but Plato never robs the αἰσθητά of their external reality, whereas Democritus reduces them to affections in our sensitive faculty . . . But Democritus distinguishes some of the sense objects by the size, others by the shape, and a few by the order and position, of their atoms. Plato, on the other hand, refers nearly all of them to affections in us, and to our perceptive faculty. Consequently each of these authors would seem to speak in direct contradiction to his own postulate"<sup>2</sup>). So Theophrastus proves to be very well aware not only of their differences but also of their weaknesses. The same is true, at least partly, of Sextus, who argues that the followers of Plato and Democritus believed that the only realities were the objects of thought. Democritus reached this conclusion because there was no physical substratum perceptible to the senses, since the atoms which formed all things by their combinations had a nature devoid of all perceptible qualities, while Plato saw "that perceptible things were always coming into being, yet never existed". To us it may seem rather far-fetched to find a *tertium comparationis* in the totally different views of our authors, but I think it worth our notice that an ancient commentator was at least aware of the

(Oxford 1928), 159 ff. Also G. Vlastos, *Ethics and Physics in Democritus*, *Philos. Rev.* 54 (1945), 579 ff.—For the text of Tertullian cf. the excellent commentary by J. H. Waszink, *Tertulliani De Anima* (Amsterdam 1947), 528-9. See also E. Rohde, *Psyche*, Engl. ed. (London 1950), 408 (note 103 in chapt. XI) and Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 436.—W. Theiler, *Die Vorbereitung des Neoplatonismus* (Berlin 1930), 86, refers to Plotinus *Enn.* IV 4, 29, who borrows his theory from Democritus via Posidonius.

<sup>1</sup>) *De Sens.* 60 (A 135, D.K. II, 117).

<sup>2</sup>) On this passage see G. M. Stratton, *Theophrastus and the Greek Psychological Psychology before Aristotle* (London 1917), 191, but also N. Hartmann, *Platons Logik des Seins* (Giessen 1909), 65.

differences between their views, hidden behind a superficially similar terminology <sup>1</sup>).

In another text Sextus tells us that Democritus and Plato, in order to refute Protagoras, both taught that not all sense perception is true <sup>2</sup>). Though this is correct, we may add that they made this statement for entirely different reasons. Whereas Democritus holds that some sense perceptions are true and others are not, and that the true perceptions reach the mind, Plato deems no sense impressions trustworthy because they do not convey direct knowledge of the intelligible world <sup>3</sup>).

The last group of references to Democritus and Plato are concerned with both their style and their conceptions of inspiration.

At *Orator* 20, 67 (D.K. II, 92) Cicero speaking about rhythm tells us: "Therefore I see that to some people the style of Plato and Democritus seems to be more poetic than the style of the comic poets. Though they do not write verse, their style has a vigorous movement and uses striking ornaments". According to Dionysius *De comp. verb.* 24 Democritus and Plato (and Aristotle) are excellent in a middle style, for they can mix their words much better than other philosophers. In *De Oratore* II 46, 194 Cicero again connects the names of Plato and Democritus: "I have often heard that no one can become a good poet (this has been said by Democritus and Plato in their writings) without a kindling of the spirit and without a certain inspiration of something like frenzy". In *De divin.* I 38, 80 he says: "Democritus denies that any one can become a great poet

<sup>1</sup>) Sextus VIII 6 (A 59, D.K. II, 99). Cf. Bailey, *op. cit.*, 181.

<sup>2</sup>) Sext. VII 389 (A 114, D.K. II, 111).— On the relationship between Protagoras and Democritus cf. Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 350 and 484-8, R. Mondolfo, *Intorno alla gnosiologia di Democrito*, Riv. Cr. di Stud. di Filos. 1952, and T. L. Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics*, I (Oxford 1921), 179, who suggests that Democritus' work 'On the Contact of a Circle and a Sphere' was also written against Protagoras. — Cf. also J. Ferguson, *Plato, Protagoras and Democritus*, Bucknell Review 15 (1967), 49-58: Thrasymachus in *Rep.* I and Protagoras in the dialogue *Protagoras*, though not portraits of Democritus, are mouthpieces for his views. Plato does not depict his contemporaries; he puts into the mouths of figures of a former age the developed and contemporary form of their views. Ferguson further argues that Democritus may have studied under Protagoras.

<sup>3</sup>) Cf. Guthrie, *op. cit.*, II, 463 and III, 186 and Vlastos, *op. cit.*, 591-2 and *Phil. Rev.* 55 (1946), 60-61.

without being in a state of frenzy. The same thing is said by Plato". A similar theory is attributed to Democritus alone by Horace (*A.P.* 295): Democritus excludes from Helicon poets in their sober senses (*sanos poetas*). An actual quotation is to be found in Clement of Alexandria *Strom.* VI 168: Democritus says: "Whatever a poet writes with inspiration (*μετ' ἐνθουσιασμοῦ*) and holy spirit (*ἱεροῦ πνεύματος*) is very beautiful" <sup>1)</sup>. The last text on this subject is B 21, where Democritus is speaking about Homer: "Homer built a *kosmos* (universe or order?) of all kinds of words because he had a divine nature".

From Plato's dialogues we know for certain that he did in fact hold the theories on poetical inspiration ascribed to him by Cicero, and that his style is brilliant. In view of the unanimous testimony of a number of ancient authors we may also conclude that Democritus believed in poetical inspiration and that therefore their theories looked very much the same.

But here again we meet with the problem which we came across earlier in this paper: can we be sure that the ideas expressed by the same words are identical? In the case of the soul and its afterlife we found a deep discrepancy between their theories, and if we recall the theological views of our philosophers we may doubt whether the word 'enthusiastic' for example bore the same sense for them both. For Plato the words 'poetic inspiration' expressed by and large what his countrymen generally understood by this <sup>2)</sup>: the

<sup>1)</sup> B 17 and 18 (D.K. II, 146).

<sup>2)</sup> Cf. W. J. Verdenius, *Mimesis. Plato's Doctrine of Artistic Imitation and its Meaning to us*, *Philosophia Antiqua*, 3 (Leiden 1949, repr. 1972), 10 ff.

The most famous description of poetic inspiration is found in the *Io* (533 d). With respect to this text there has been a dispute, as yet unsettled, whether or not Plato borrowed his theory from Democritus. A. Delatte, e.g., in his book *Les conceptions de l'enthousiasme chez les philosophes présocratiques* (Paris 1934), 58 and 67, drew attention to the fact that Democritus wrote a book on magnetism (A 33, D.K. II, 91, 16), which may have inspired Plato to use his comparison with the magnet in the *Io* (533 c 9). H. Flashar, *Der Dialog Ion als Zeugnis platonischer Philosophie* (Berlin 1958), 52, tells us: "Die Quelle des ganzen Abschnitts dürfte in der Schrift Mikros Diakosmos des Demokrit zu suchen sein", and "Dass Platon im Ion überhaupt Gedanken von Demokrit aufgreift, steht für das Mittelteil des Dialoges fest". The same is said by F. Wehrli in *Phyllobolia P. v. d. Mühl* (Basel 1946), 13. But H. Cherniss and H. Fontenrose, in their review of this book

state of mind of a poet who, influenced by the presence of a god, was driven to utter in more or less elevated terms a deep insight into the *condition humaine* <sup>1</sup>). But this is hardly true of Democritus. His ideas about the 'divine' were largely moulded by his atomism; this can be shown by discussing a few of his fragments dealing with religion. Though we have to rely partly on reports by others, their tendency is so unequivocal that we may have some confidence that our conclusions will be right.

In the first passage Diogenes Laertius tells us (IX 45) that according to Democritus the cheerful man (εὐθυμος) should have no δεισιδαιμονία <sup>2</sup>). This δεισιδαιμονία he finds in those people of old who seeing the phenomena in the sky, such as thunder and lightning and thunderbolts and the conjunctions of heavenly bodies and the eclipses of sun and moon, dreaded the gods, believing that they were the cause of these things (A 75 = D.K. II, 102). Another rather critical note on what people believe is to be found in B 297: "Some men, not understanding the corruption of our mortal nature, and conscious of their own wicked deeds, drag on

in A. J. P. 71 (1950), 83, argue that, in the case of the comparison with the magnet, it is not Democritus whom Plato is referring to, but Euripides. In this respect Flashar, *op. cit.*, 55 agrees with them and for good reason. Democritus in fact nowhere uses the comparison with the magnet in his extant fragments and the title of the book certainly points to a scientific treatise on magnetism in general. Therefore I am inclined to believe that Plato's theory of poetic inspiration, perhaps even including the comparison with the magnet, was not borrowed from Democritus, but was in line with a current idea in the Greek world which went back as far as Hesiod. In *Theogony* 22 ff. we find a beautiful description of the divine calling of the poet. It would not be too difficult to substantiate these results with much more material from other poets: cf. C. de Deugd, *From Religion to Criticism* (Utrecht 1964), 21 f. This also leaves us with the conclusion that Flashar's thesis that Plato in the *Io* leant heavily on material from Democritus is not firmly based, and that it is much more probable that he wrote the section on poetry against the backdrop of current Greek ideas.

<sup>1</sup>) Cf. C. de Deugd, *op. cit.*, 21.

<sup>2</sup>) Unfortunately this passage has not been discussed by P. J. Koets, *Δεισιδαιμονία. A Contribution to the Knowledge of the Religious Terminology in Greek* (Purmerend 1929); it is clear, however, that it has the same unfavourable sense as the other quotations from Diogenes (see Koets, 41 f.). On the fear of the gods see also G. W. Ittel, *Lucretius Redivivus? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Bertrand Russells Auffassung über den Ursprung der Religion*, *Zeitschr. f. Rel. u. Geistesgesch.* 16 (1965), 43 ff.



their lives in fear and confusion of mind, imagining lying myths about the time after death". We have already met his disbelief in life after death in B 166 (see p. 340 n. 4). Another example of Democritus' negative attitude towards the divine is B 30: "Some few of the educated men <sup>1)</sup> raised their hands to the region which we Greeks now call air and said: 'Zeus ponders all things, knows, gives and takes away all things and is king of all' ". Norden <sup>2)</sup> only quotes this fragment as an example of the 'Er-Stil der Prädikation' without further comment on its meaning. But I am fairly sure he would have approved of Jaeger's <sup>3)</sup> opinion that "das schöne Bruchstück" is a very serious attempt to explain the origin of religious representations as "die Tat einiger weniger Geistesheroen; ihre Worte sind wie die sinnfällige Erläuterung der demokriteischen Furchttheorie und bestätigen, dass diese Furcht den Keim der Ehrfurcht in sich birgt". Pfligersdorffer <sup>4)</sup> holds the same opinion, namely that the λόγοι ἄνθρωποι are 'Kulturschöpfer' and have nothing to do with the Sisyphus of Critias who invented law and religion to bridle the masses. This is consistent with his statement that "Demokrit dem Götterglauben weniger unabhängig gegenüber gestanden sein dürfte als Prodikos".

In my opinion, however, Democritus does not regard these λόγοι ἄνθρωποι as 'Geistesheroen' but as impostors who make the credulous mob believe in non-existing self-created gods in order to keep them in check. I agree entirely with Bailey <sup>5)</sup> that there is an obvious note of contempt in the whole passage (cf. ὀλίγοι and δὲ ν ὕ ν καλέομεν). Democritus here denounces the false belief

<sup>1)</sup> Th. Cole, *Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology*, Am. Phil. Ass. Monograph 15 (Western Reserve University 1967), 58 n. 34, translates λόγοι by 'men with skill in speech'. His note is worth reading.

<sup>2)</sup> E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos* (Leipzig 1913, repr. Darmstadt 1956), 164.

<sup>3)</sup> W. Jaeger, *Die Theologie der frühen griechischen Denker* (Darmstadt 1964), 209.

<sup>4)</sup> G. Pfligersdorffer, *Λόγιος und die λόγοι ἄνθρωποι bei Demokrit*, Wien. St. 61-62 (1943-1947), 22 and 27 (he quotes there Rohde, *Psyche*, II, 179). Cf. also W. Spoerri, *Späthellenistische Berichte über Welt, Kultur und Götter* (Basel 1959), 165 ff.

<sup>5)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 175. Cf. also Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 479, who has the same opinion, and C. H. Kahn, *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology* (N. York 1960), 148 n. 3. Also W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos* (Stuttgart 1940), 195-6, and R. Philippson, *Democritea*, *Hermes* 64 (1929), 167-175.

of men in hero-gods, just as in an earlier fragment he denounced the belief that the celestial occurrences were caused by the gods.

At first sight this conclusion seems to be inconsistent with another fragment (B 166) in which Democritus is reported as saying that of the 'idols' (εἰδωλα) that draw near to men some are beneficial and others harmful, and praying (εὔχετο) to meet with propitious 'idols' <sup>1</sup>). But in the first place it is by no means certain that Democritus used the verb εὔχετο here: it has all the characteristics of an insertion by Sextus. And even if Democritus had used it, Guthrie <sup>2</sup>) could be right in asserting that the verb need mean no more than 'desired'. If so, the only conclusion is that he adapted his language to that of ordinary men <sup>3</sup>), just as in B 175: "The gods bestow all good things on men, but man draws upon himself all bad and harmful things", and B 217: "Only those people are beloved by the gods who hate to do wrong". These fragments definitely aim at moral improvement: they are not the expression of Democritus' own considered views on theology but are influenced by the language of the man in the street. We may also compare B 234 where Democritus takes men to task for praying to the gods for health, whereas they do not know the real cause of their illness, their lusts.

Secondly the uncertainty of even ancient commentators about the real character of these 'idols' reveals that Democritus' views on religion have puzzled his readers from the outset. On some the 'idols' made the impression that they came from other beings which we perceive by means of them <sup>4</sup>), just as we also receive into our

<sup>1</sup>) For the belief in the influence of δαίμονες (idols) on diseases see M. Detienne, *La notion de 'daimon' dans le pythagorisme ancien* (Paris 1963), 46 ff. We may compare the prayers of Socrates (e.g. *Phaedrus* 279 bc and *Tim.* 27 bc and 48 e). Though I think that these are mere formulae and that they do not tell us much about Socrates' or Plato's feelings on religion, there is no contempt in them. For another view cf. G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato* (Amsterdam 1949), 360: "De ernst van het gebed is onmiskenbaar".

<sup>2</sup>) Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 479, Nestle, *op. cit.*, 196 n. 12, and V. E. Alfieri, *Atomos Idea* (Firenze 1953), 185.

<sup>3</sup>) Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 480 and Zeller, *Die Philos. der Griechen*, I (Leipzig 1892), 936: "Nur Sache des Ausdrucks ist es, wenn hierfür in populärer Sprache die Götter gesetzt werden". Therefore I think that Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, II (Berlin 1932, repr. Darmstadt 1959), 243 is wrong to assume that "er eine Religion besessen und verkündet hat".

<sup>4</sup>) A 79 (D.K. II, 104) ἀπὸ τῆς θείας οὐσίας.

eyes films of the objects we see. Cicero <sup>1)</sup>, on the other hand, tells us that sometimes Democritus attributed a divine nature to these 'idols' themselves and that he thought that there was no god apart from the 'idols'. Democritus' view of perception, however, points to the first theory as the most probable, and if the word 'gods' is used for the 'idols' we again see Democritus' language adapted to common usage: these gods are the gods of our experience and as such have no transcendental meaning at all <sup>2)</sup>).

The true 'god' is then "mind in spherical-shaped particles" which pervades the universe and is breathed in by us <sup>3)</sup>. So we see that Democritus' religious feelings ran in fact counter to popular beliefs, and all his remarks on soothsaying and divination by explanation of dreams and inspection of entrails should be read in the light of his new conception of the divine <sup>4)</sup>. Soothsaying is possible, but not by virtue of some mysterious superhuman force, but through the rational explanation of the position and forms of the divine or fiery atoms that one can discern in the object under examination <sup>5)</sup>. When Democritus wishes to use words like θεῖος to describe the nature of these atoms, this should be regarded as no more than a concession on his part to the current vocabulary of ordinary men <sup>6)</sup>.

Let us now return to the 'poetical' fragments. It looks very much as if the words used in the fragments (ἐνθουσιασμός, *adflatus*, ἱερὸν πνεῦμα, θεάζουσα φύσις) have not been forced upon him by later authors, but are his own words or literal translations of them. Two kinds of interpretation are possible: Delatte <sup>7)</sup> e.g. argues that the meaning of θεάζουσα is not different from θειάζουσα 'in-

<sup>1)</sup> *De natura deorum* I 43, 120 (A 74, D.K. II, 102).

<sup>2)</sup> See Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 481 and probably Jaeger, *op. cit.*, 206. Bailey, *op. cit.*, 177, has another view. See also Nestle, *op. cit.*, 195, and in general V. E. Alfieri, *Il divino in Democrito e in Epicuro*, in *Studi Mondolfo* (Bari 1950), 85-120.

<sup>3)</sup> See Rohde, *op. cit.*, 386 and 407 n. 101.

<sup>4)</sup> B 166; A 77, 137 and 138. For the whole problem: Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 82-3.

<sup>5)</sup> On the problem of those popular θεοί see W. Pötscher, *Strukturprobleme der aristotelischen und theophrastischen Gottesvorstellung* (Leiden 1970), 54.

<sup>6)</sup> E. R. Dodds, *Telepathie und Hellsehen*, in H. Bender (ed.), *Parapsychologie* (Darmstadt 1966), 6-25. Recently Th. W. Africa, *Science and the State in Greece and Rome* (New York 1968), 65, has also been misled in this respect.

<sup>7)</sup> A. Delatte, *op. cit.*, 32-33. Cf. Alfieri, *Atomos Idea*, 183-4.

spiré par les dieux', and that ἐνθουσιασμός has not yet the metaphorical sense which it has, for example, in Longinus' *On the Sublime*<sup>1)</sup>, but still means literally 'possessed by the gods'. The expression ἱερὸν πνεῦμα then warrants taking the whole fragment in a religious sense. On the other hand, according to Delatte the words φύσις and *ingenium* make it clear that "cette inspiration était conditionnée par le naturel même du poète"<sup>2)</sup>. Because he does not want to take the words in a metaphorical sense, but thinks it necessary to give them a "certaine valeur littérale", he suggests the following solution: "Par l'intermédiaire de la fonction respiratoire les Spectres animés, les dieux de la religion vulgaire, introduisent dans le corps du poète ces effluves atomiques de feu et d'intelligence qui complètent le naturel bien doué du sujet et en font un 'inspiré' "<sup>3)</sup>.

This 'hypothèse' however (as Delatte calls it himself) suffers from an unfortunate vacillation between two theories: a. Democritus believes in the traditional gods, and b. In Democritus' materialistic philosophy the highest entity is the atom beyond which there is no place for the divine. Because Delatte does not make a choice between them, it is no surprise that he has to confess at the end of his examination: "non liquet". And therefore I think it will prove more profitable to follow up the lead we found in our discussion of Democritus' views on religion: he evidently does not believe in the traditional gods but sometimes uses the traditional words to transmit his ideas about the essential elements of our world. We may conclude then that the 'holy breath' means the flow of most subtle atoms coming down to us from the outer areas of the universe. These 'divine' atoms fill the mind of the poet and make it 'possessed by the gods', 'divine', 'inspiré par les dieux'. The words *adflatus* and πνεῦμα keep their literal meaning, but the other expressions (θεάζουσα, ἱερὸν and ἐνθουσιασμός) lose it and are used in a metaphorical sense: 'elevated', 'subtle'<sup>4)</sup>, 'high-mindedness'<sup>5)</sup>.

<sup>1)</sup> 13, 2; 15, 1; cf. also 32, 7.

<sup>2)</sup> P. 34.

<sup>3)</sup> P. 51.

<sup>4)</sup> ἱερὸν already has its 'metaphorical' sense in Homer (e.g. *Iliad* VIII 66; XI 194, etc.); θεάζουσα is a ἄπαξ; ἐνθουσιάζω has a metaphorical sense in Plato's *Philebus* 15e. For the concept cf. Homer *Od.* 22, 347 θεός δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἴμας παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν. But the difficulties of using modern termi-

Two conclusions may be drawn at this point. Firstly, though Plato had his reservations about the Olympic gods of tradition, he usually tried to interweave his own theories with the religious conceptions handed down over the centuries. Democritus on the contrary abruptly severed the link with popular beliefs. The 'religious' vocabulary which he continues to use, is devoid of its popular meaning and is adapted to the needs of his atomism. In the last section of this paper we shall discuss this difference between our philosophers in a more detailed manner.

Secondly there is a remarkable unanimity in the attitude of Democritus and Plato to poetry in general and to Homer in particular. We saw that even for Democritus poets live on a higher level than ordinary men, but on the other hand there is not the slightest evidence that, as Koller<sup>1)</sup> suggests, in Democritus' eyes "Dichtung keine Techne ist, sondern *nur* der Ratio unzugängliche *Gottbesessenheit*" (his italics). The stress laid upon the words *ingenium* and φύσις points in the opposite direction (see p. 348 n. 2). Similarly there is no evidence for Vollgraff's view<sup>2)</sup>; after admitting that the fragments of Democritus on Homer are very laudatory indeed, Vollgraff reminds us of Xenophanes and Plato, "qui paient pareillement tribut à Homère tout en lui disant ana-

nology (metaphor etc.) in discussing ancient religious terms, are made clear by W. Brede Kristensen, *Symbol en Werkelijkheid* (Arnhem 1961), 7 ff. Cf. also J. M. Paise, *Les rapports de Platon et de la philosophie présocratique*, Les ét. class. 35 (1967), 338.

<sup>1)</sup> Cf. also B 11 (D.K. II, 140), where 'real knowledge' is said to investigate 'more subtly' (ἐπι λεπτότερον). This subtlety is called in other texts metaphorically 'sacredness'. See Bailey, *op. cit.*, 114 for the "considerable exaggerations" to which his theory of poetic inspiration gave rise, and Vlastos, *op. cit.* (1945), 581: "religious terms are used in Ionian rationalism so long as they can be adapted to the exigencies of naturalistic logic". I think I am entitled to say, after this discussion, that the pessimism of G. Finsler, *Platon und die aristotelische Poetik*, 172, has been shown to be unjustified: he found himself unable to explain "wie Demokrit die Enthusiasmolehre begründet und mit seiner Lehre in Einklang gebracht hat". Cf. also H. Gundert, *Enthusiasmus und Logos bei Platon*, *Lexis* 2, 1 (1949), 30 and Frank, *op. cit.*, n. 344.

<sup>2)</sup> H. Koller, *Die Mimesis in der Antike* (Bern 1954), 151.

<sup>3)</sup> *L'oraison funèbre de Gorgias* (Leiden 1952), 133 on the θεία φύσις. F. Wehrli, *Die antike Kunsttheorie und das Schöpferische*, *Mus. Helv* 14 (1957), 46 ff.

thème". Democritus, he argues, may have been equally critical of Homer. But whereas in the case of Xenophanes and Plato he is obviously right, it is hardly a sign of good scholarship simply to apply this conclusion to Democritus *sans plus*. Xenophanes had accused Homer of having invented the Greek gods, and because he felt that these gods were meaningless and even disgusting, the only course open to him was to abhor their creator as well. Democritus, however, apart from the reference to the λόγοι (B 30), who might be poets, does not specifically impugn the poets for inventing the bogus world of the Olympians and therefore is not likely to have nourished any ill feeling towards Homer.

As for Plato, there are so many texts in which he extols the qualities of Homer and praises poetry in general that we must conclude that his positive attitude towards poetry is genuine. It is by no means "a concession to the reader's sentiments", as Popper <sup>1)</sup> puts it. Nevertheless in the *Republic* he banishes the poets from his ideal state. How can these statements be reconciled? I think that in this matter Verdenius <sup>2)</sup> is right in asserting "that Plato's personal appreciation of art is compatible with his criticism of its cultural function and that both his appreciation and his criticism are in accordance with his general philosophy". In Plato's eyes the poet was a privileged person, but because this poet took himself too seriously and could not adapt himself to the needs of the community, Plato had to refuse him admission to his ideal state which was built up with a view to the well-being of *all* its citizens <sup>3)</sup>.

We shall see in the last section of this paper that Democritus' ideas about an ideal state were slightly different and that, for that reason, he did not feel obliged to bar poets from entering. He may even have welcomed them. Vollgraff's theory was almost certainly based on an inadequate understanding of the impact of Democritus' political ideas on his views on poetry.

At the end of our examination of ancient texts in which the names of Democritus and Plato are mentioned together, we may

<sup>1)</sup> K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, I (London 1945), 200 n. 39.

<sup>2)</sup> Verdenius, *op. cit.*, 40. For the banishment see *Rep.* 607 a.

<sup>3)</sup> Flashar, *op. cit.*, 59.

conclude that we have not found any awareness of hostility, and hardly of discrepancies, between our philosophers. Apart from one text their names were quoted in order to tell the same story about them, or in support of the same theory.

But on closer scrutiny we discovered that the references have often been misunderstood and that the similarity of certain words cannot conceal a yawning chasm between the philosophies of Democritus and Plato. There is however no reason to conclude from these texts that ancient authors believed in a deep hostility between them. I would even go as far as to say that they considered their theories very much akin in many respects.

## II. PLATO'S DIALOGUES

As we have seen, the fact that Plato does not mention Democritus in his dialogues had already struck Diogenes Laertius. Though, as a matter of fact, his name does not figure in any writing of Plato, we have already found in discussing the *Ion* (p. 343 n. 2) that some modern scholars claim to be able to discern traces of Democritus even in Plato's earliest dialogues, while others are much more careful and speak of common sources or current ideas. In support of their theory the former scholars brought together a large array of texts in which they suspected that the theory referred to was Democritean. But in spite of all their endeavours, no clear evidence was found. As Natorp<sup>1)</sup> puts it in his discussion of some passages of the *Republic*: all these similarities between Democritus and Plato (gathered from the *Republic*) "sind von der Beschaffenheit, dass ein Einfluss des Demokritos, stände er nicht sonst schon fest, daraus kaum mit Sicherheit gefolgert werden könnte". I think, however, that this influence is by no means established yet, because the *Philebus*, which is supposed to furnish the irrefutable evidence, produces nothing unequivocally Democritean. The similarities between the *Philebus* and some fragments of Democritus are in fact so superficial and so coincidental that almost any other philosopher could be substituted for Democritus. Thus Natorp's remarks on

<sup>1)</sup> Natorp, *op. cit.*, 171.

the 'Geschlechtslust' are particularly inappropriate. In the relevant passage in the *Philebus* (46 a ff.) we find no hint of this sort of 'Lust' and the comparison between Epicurus and Plato is hardly convincing. His arguments are followed too frequently by exclamations like: "Angesichts dieser Fülle zusammentreffender Indicien hiesse es aller Wahrscheinlichkeit Hohn sprechen, wenn man die Stelle anders als auf Demokritos beziehen wollte" (p. 160). The same is true of the texts from the *Protagoras* (352 bc, 356, 357 a) and the *Gorgias* (490 a, 493 ac, 494, 526 c, etc.). It will never be certain (as Natorp himself admits), whether in these rather vague passages Plato was influenced by Democritus or not. As to the γαλήνη of *Phaedo* 84 a there is no certainty whatsoever that Plato had Democritus in mind, as Natorp supposes. Aeschylus used this word in a metaphorical sense (*Ag.* 740) and there is no reason why Plato should have preferred to borrow from Democritus, if he borrowed at all.

But rather than jump to conclusions on too little evidence I shall try to extend insight into this problem by discussing in the following section some more texts which have sometimes been supposed to be Democritean.

In the *Phaedo* (99 b) Socrates tells us that he had long ago put aside a purely 'materialistic' interpretation of the evolution of the universe and scornfully refers to a man who compares the world to a wide trough supported on a foundation of air. Now we know that Archelaus, Socrates' teacher, believed that the earth was a watery swamp, high around the rim and hollow in the middle (A 4, D.K. II, 46); and Democritus is said to have taught (A 87, D.K. II, 26) that the earth was hollow in the middle and oblong, which might be the prosaic description of the more poetic 'wide trough' in Plato. So Democritus may be the object of Plato's attack, but there is nothing to stop us from believing that Plato had Archelaus in mind; therefore this question cannot be decided with any degree of certainty <sup>1</sup>).

In the *Republic* (583 b) Plato gives an account of the theory of one of the philosophers (τῶν σοφῶν) that every pleasure is unreal

<sup>1</sup>) See G. C. Braga, *Platone, Il Fedone* (Firenze 1959), 171, 179 and 184.



(shadow-painted) except for that of the wise <sup>1)</sup>. Adam <sup>2)</sup> and Hackforth <sup>3)</sup> (following Grote) identify this philosopher with some Pythagorean friend of Plato's, while Natorp <sup>4)</sup> and R. G. Bury <sup>5)</sup> take him to be Democritus. Both the Pythagoreans and Democritus are known to have maintained this theory. Moreover Democritus was acquainted with Pythagorean views <sup>6)</sup>. So it will be impossible to decide for certain to whom Plato was referring. All we can say is that there is not much cogency in Adam's argument that Plato was unlikely to treat the Archmaterialist with so much consideration. This is really begging the question. We are concerned with a theory which obviously pleases Plato and therefore it is unthinkable that Plato should speak unkindly of the philosopher in question. So we could argue equally well that this text proves that Plato's attitude towards Democritus could be favourable, provided of course that we accept the theory that Plato knew Democritus' works.

We now come to a number of dialogues which I consider to be the early ones in Plato's last works: *Cratylus* <sup>7)</sup>, *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, (*Timaeus*), and *Philebus*. We find a profound pre-

<sup>1)</sup> For an interesting discussion of 'painted pleasures' see T. M. J. Penner, *False Anticipatory Pleasures: Philebus* 36 a 3-41 a 6, *Phron.* 15 (1970), 166.

<sup>2)</sup> J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, II (Cambridge 1902), 379.

<sup>3)</sup> R. Hackforth, *Plato's Examination of Pleasure* (Cambridge 1958), 87. But cf. also 121. Also E. Haag, *Platons Kratylos* (Stuttgart 1933), 38-39.

<sup>4)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 171.

<sup>5)</sup> *The Philebus of Plato* (Cambridge 1897), 95-96.

<sup>6)</sup> See D.K. II, 82, 19 and 83, 1. Also W. Burkert, *Weisheit und Wissenschaft* (Nürnberg 1962), 148, 185 n. 70, and especially 240.

<sup>7)</sup> On the question of the date of the *Cratylus* cf. L. Méridier, *Le Cratyle* (Coll. Budé, Paris 1931), 39 and 46; G. J. de Vries, *op. cit.*, 206; M. Warburg, *Zwei Fragen zum Kratylos*, *N. Phil. Unt.*, 5 (Berlin 1929), 36-61 ('Heraclides Ponticus als Vermittler zwischen Demokrit und Plato'); Haag, *op. cit.*; E. Weerts, *Platon und die Herakliteer*, *Philologus Suppl.* 23, 1 (Leipzig 1931). As to Democritean influences in the *Cratylus* cf. Haag, *op. cit.*, 86. It seems rather arbitrary to say, without any argument, as does P. R. Hofstätter, *Vom Leben des Wortes* (Wien 1949), 49 n. 52: "Haags Auffassung des Kratylos als einer Kampfschrift gegen die Materialisten scheint mir wenig überzeugend". See also R. Philippson, *Platons Kratylos und Demokrit*, *Philol. Wochenschr.* (1929), 924, who holds that "Platon vielleicht des Abderiten Theorie (Wörter sind ἀγάλατα), wenn auch mit Kritik, berücksichtigt hat". On the whole problem see also J. V. Luce, *The Date of the Cratylus*, *A.J.P.* 85 (1964), 136-154.

occupation with letters and words which is very Democritean <sup>1)</sup> (*Crat.* 424 c and 426 c, *The.* *passim*, *Phil.* *passim*, and *Tim.* 48 bc <sup>2)</sup>), a discussion of *διαίρεσις*, a new method of reasoning in which Plato mixed the scientific principles of Democritus with his own (*Cratylus*, *Sophist* and *Politicus*) <sup>3)</sup>, an attack on those who deny the existence of pleasures (the σοφοί of *Phil.* 44 b and *Rep.* 583 b) and on philosophers who drag everything from heaven to earth in order to touch it with their hands before they will acknowledge that anything exists (*The.* 155 c and *Soph.* 246 a) <sup>4)</sup>. In *The.* 191 c we find a famous reference to the comparison of memory with wax which had in fact been used by Democritus and was severely criticized by Theophrastus <sup>5)</sup>. The sarcastic way in which Socrates deals with the comparison in the *Theaetetus* may indicate that he has borrowed it from an opposing school <sup>6)</sup>. The fact that Plato uses it in quite a different sense certainly does not prove that he did not borrow it, as Friedländer <sup>7)</sup> supposes. It is typical of Plato first to borrow images and comparisons from other philosophers and then to adapt them to the needs of his own thought <sup>8)</sup>. Nor does his use of comparisons with letters in four dialogues prove that he invented them himself, as Friedländer thinks <sup>9)</sup>. It might equally be argued that this reference marks the growing influence of the materialists' thought on Plato's philosophy, provided that, as I said before, we accept Plato's acquaintance with Democritus in the first place. Though admittedly in this group of dialogues the possible references

<sup>1)</sup> B 142, B 186, 19, 20, B 164, A 127 and A 128. Cf. also Epicurus' *Letter to Herodotus* 75 ff.

<sup>2)</sup> Haag, *op. cit.*, 47. Cf. also E. Sachs, *op. cit.*, 193 ff.

<sup>3)</sup> Haag, *op. cit.*, 75, J. Stenzel, *op. cit.*, *passim* and J. Stenzel, *Die Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles* (Breslau 1917), 112 ff. See also S. Sambursky, *A Democritean Metaphor in Plato's Cratylus*, *Phron.* 4 (1959), 1-4.

<sup>4)</sup> On this passage see De Vries, *op. cit.*, 75 and F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London 1935), 231, who says: "There is no need to look for one set of persons who held this belief to the exclusion of others".

<sup>5)</sup> *De Sens.* 51 (D.K. II, 115).

<sup>6)</sup> Cf. De Vries, *op. cit.*, 271-2, A. Diès' 'notice' in his edition of the dialogue (Paris 1955), 143, and Stratton, *op. cit.*, 62 ff.

<sup>7)</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 456 n. 60.

<sup>8)</sup> P. Louis, *Les métaphores de Platon* (Paris 1945), 16 ff. and 124.

<sup>9)</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 497 n. 22.

to Democritus are more frequent and more important than in the earlier dialogues, there is still no certain evidence that Plato either borrowed from him or attacked him <sup>1)</sup>).

Next we shall consider the *Timaeus*. On various occasions Diels <sup>2)</sup>, Ahlvers <sup>3)</sup> and Guthrie <sup>4)</sup> have expressed the view that someone should go afresh into the problem of Democritean influence in the *Timaeus*. As we know, Taylor <sup>5)</sup> vigorously defended the hypothesis that throughout the dialogue Plato was influenced by Pythagoreans. Archer-Hind <sup>6)</sup> goes out of his way to demonstrate that Democritus supplied the material with which Plato built his universe. And Ingeborg Hammer-Jensen <sup>7)</sup> thinks she can show that somewhere in the course of this work Plato came to know Democritus' philosophy and consequently reversed his attitude to problems of cosmogony. Unfortunately, there is no room in this paper for a full-scale discussion of the whole issue. What I want to do is to take two specific texts from the *Timaeus* to illustrate the difficulties involved.

At 46 d Taylor explains the word *πλεῖστοι* as the majority of 'men of science' who suppose the auxiliary causes to be not auxiliary but primary causes of all things <sup>8)</sup>. This implies that materialistic doctrines in general are frowned upon in this passage. Taylor suggests that the 'hot and cold' and the 'moist and dry', which Plato discusses here, are the two principal pairs of 'opposites' in

<sup>1)</sup> On the *Politicus* cf. J. B. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman* (London 1952), 110 and 135, and Cole, *op. cit.*, 103.

<sup>2)</sup> D.K. II, 83 note.

<sup>3)</sup> A. Ahlvers, *Zahl und Klang bei Platon* (Bern and Stuttgart 1952), 67.

<sup>4)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 406 n. 2.

<sup>5)</sup> *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus, passim* (see his index). See also E. A. Wyller, *Der späte Platon* (Hamburg 1970), 135 and 145: "Plato is antidemocritean" and: "in ausgesprochenem Gegensatz zu Demokrit geht Plato in der Elementarkörper-Theorie nicht von der Materie, sondern von der Form aus". Similarly P. Friedländer, *Platon*, III (Berlin 1964), 335, rejects any Democritean influence in the *Timaeus* (see also 346 and 500 n. 32).

<sup>6)</sup> In his *Commentary, passim* (see index).

<sup>7)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 228 f. See also U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Platon*, I (Berlin 1919), 581 and the 'notice' of A. Rivaud in his edition of the *Timaeus* (Paris 1925), 25.

<sup>8)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 292. In the Loeb edition of the *Timaeus* (London 1961), 105, Bury refers to Anaxagoras and the Atomists. On the whole problem also J. B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues* (<sup>2</sup>Amsterdam 1967), 34-35, 132-3.

'materialistic' systems (his quotes). Now Taylor, as we know, will not accept that there are any allusions to Democritus and therefore we may assume that he is here hinting at the Pythagoreans, whose theories of the opposites were well known. But Archer-Hind <sup>1)</sup> suggests that the whole section "contains a polemic partly against Anaxagoras, partly against Democritus". And we know from the ancient evidence that while these opposites play an important part in Democritus' philosophy, they also figured in the thinking of other philosophers. Therefore I fear we must again say, unfortunately, that we have no firm basis for a reliable decision.

A roughly similar case is Plato's statement (60 c and 79 b) that there is no void (*κενόν*). The void, as we know, plays a very important role in the Atomists' thought. But notwithstanding his rejection of the (atomists'?) void Plato introduces his theory of the holes (*διάκενα*) (58 b, 60 e). Obviously there is a discrepancy between the two theories which certainly cannot be removed by Taylor's suggestion that we give an inceptive force to the words *οὐκ ἔξ* in 58 a 1. Plato wishes to sustain the theory of the 'holes' but is obviously loath to admit the word *κενόν*. In view of this inconsistency we may suppose that he was combating someone who held that the *κενόν* existed and whose philosophy as a whole he rejected. Possibly he was afraid that his theories would be identified with the theories of his opponent. On the other hand he thought that much could be gained by accepting the theory of the 'holes'. Therefore he allowed the rejected theory to slip in as it were by the back-door. Because the Atomists advocate the existence of a void, probably following the lead given by Zeno and Melissus, it is easy to understand that Mrs. Hammer says that Plato "diese Theorie nur von den Atomisten haben kann" <sup>2)</sup>. But we know that the early Pythagoreans also admitted the existence of a void. They revised their philosophy because of the criticisms of the Eleatics <sup>3)</sup>. So again

<sup>1)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 161.

<sup>2)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 103. On this problem also Ch. Mugler, *Le κενόν de Platon et le πάντα ὁμοῦ d'Anaxagore*, R.E.G. 80 (1967), 210-219.

<sup>3)</sup> Guthrie, I, 277 ff.; J. E. Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics* (Cambridge 1948, repr. Amsterdam 1966), 49 and 101; H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore 1935), 144 and 404; Kirk-Raven, *Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge 1957), 289 ff., 303 ff., 405 ff.

there is no certainty as to the origin of these *διάκενα* in the *Timaeus*. We may however draw an important conclusion. Plato goes out of his way to demonstrate that two typically 'materialistic' terms (cause and void) do not fit into his philosophical system. But at the same time he has to admit, albeit tacitly, that these concepts cannot be left out of account. So in the end he firmly integrates them into his own philosophy, but also surrounds them with the most careful precautions. The materialistic 'cause' is degraded to the status of a mere auxiliary cause and the *κενόν* shrinks to be only a loophole in matter, without some of its most characteristic features <sup>1</sup>). Again we must admit that we have no certainty that Plato is in fact opposing Democritus, but we are undoubtedly on firmer ground than ever before <sup>2</sup>).

The last dialogue I shall discuss in this section is the *Laws*. Taken by itself, Plato's account of the origin of states in the third book of the *Laws* offers no sure support for the theory that it has to do with Democritus <sup>3</sup>). The tendency of the story is surely retrogressive, which is in stark contrast with any atomist theory, and it is shot through with religious conceptions which are also wholly alien to Democritus. But what strikes the reader is the vehemence with which Plato repeatedly asserts that the divine should be present at the beginning of every undertaking and that God should

<sup>1</sup>) For other words which are used by Atomists and Plato in different senses cf. *οὐσία*, *τὰ ὄντα*, *ἰδέα* and *εἶδος* (A 37, 42, 57 and B 167 and 300). In Plato they refer to intelligible being, whereas in Democritus they indicate the being of the atoms and their shape and form. For Democritus' very subtle theories on *τὸ οὐκ ὄν* = the void, and *τὸ μὴ ὄν* = absolute nonbeing cf. Bailey, *op. cit.*, 118. For *εἶδος* cf. K. v. Fritz, *op. cit.*, 40 and Frank, *op. cit.*, 99.

<sup>2</sup>) On other allusions to Democritus in the *Timaeus* see N. Hartmann, *op. cit.*, 61 and 69; see also J. Gould, *The Development of Plato's Ethics* (Cambridge 1955), 192-203. For the difference between Democritus and Plato see the excellent discussion by K. Gaiser, *Platons ungeschriebene Lehre* (Stuttgart 1963), 149 ff. with notes 127 and 128. See also J. Kerschensteiner, *Kosmos* (München 1962), 175.

For the date of the *Timaeus* see the interesting discussion between G. F. L. Owen, *Class. Qu. N.S.* 3 (1953), 79 ff. and H. Cherniss, *The Relation of the Tim. to Plato's Later Dialogues*, *A.J.P.* 78 (1957), 225 ff. There is no doubt that Cherniss' arguments are more convincing. See also J. M. Rist, *The Order of the Later Dialogues of Plato*, *Phoenix* 14 (1967), 207-221.

<sup>3</sup>) The best and most recent discussion of the problem is by Cole, *op. cit.*, 107 ff., where we find many references to modern works on this subject.

rule the perfect state <sup>1</sup>). This is of course in agreement with all Plato's other works.

However, the fact that he is so insistent on this point cannot but indicate that he is thinking of another solution of which he was aware and which may have haunted him throughout this book <sup>2</sup>). Besides, if we examine the whole chapter alongside other accounts of the origin of mankind we are surprised to see how many features are the same in Democritus and Plato. There is the formation of successively larger aggregations which recalls a central tenet of atomism. There is also the theory of the coalescing but conflicting *νόμοι* in Plato which may be connected with a similar theory of Democritus on language <sup>3</sup>). So behind the smoke-screen of a purely retrogressive and therefore typically Platonic conception of history, built on generally accepted religious beliefs, there are obviously some hidden motives for the composition of these lines. The waves of atheistic and materialist thought were spreading further and further in fourth century Athens. And such thinking was diametrically opposed to Plato's own views. Therefore he tried to incorporate the Atomists' progressive views on technology (which he accepted) in his 'Kulturgeschichte', which was fundamentally retrogressive on the subject of morals and religion. In this way he expected to break the impetus of the attack. We find this curious but vehement resistance to atomist theories in a renewed form in the fourth book <sup>4</sup>).

My conclusion here is that Aalders <sup>5</sup>) is right in asserting that Plato is not directly influenced by Democritus in the *Laws*. But at the same time I agree with Cole's theory that materialist ideas,

<sup>1</sup>) In this respect it is interesting to note that Taylor's (*op. cit.*, 84) only 'certain' Platonic reference to Democritus is a religious remark in the *Laws* (X, 899 d). J. Tate, on the other hand, states that the materialists of the *Laws* X 889 e are more probably followers of Archelaus than of Empedocles or Democritus (*Class. Qu.* 30, 1937, 48 ff.).

<sup>2</sup>) See Havelock, *op. cit.*, 44-51.

<sup>3</sup>) Cole, *op. cit.*, 109.

<sup>4</sup>) Havelock, *op. cit.*, 44.

<sup>5</sup>) G. J. D. Aalders, *Het derde boek van Plato's Leges, I: Prolegomena* (Amsterdam 1943), 111-115: "Plato schijnt weliswaar bepaalde denkbeelden der atomistiek gekend te hebben, maar over de wijze waarop hij deze heeft leren kennen, valt niets met zekerheid te zeggen".

which probably stem from Democritus' works, are used indirectly in the construction of Plato's own *Weltanschauung* <sup>1)</sup>.

Summing up the results of this section we arrive at the conclusion that there is no certain indication that Plato knew Democritus or that he used or combated his ideas in his dialogues. There are however so many texts, especially in the later dialogues, which could refer to atomist theories, that acquaintance with Democritus' books must be deemed very likely. This is in accordance with the fact that we have ancient reports that Democritus visited Athens <sup>2)</sup>; it is of course highly improbable that in a small town like Athens conspicuous new theories would have remained unknown to the inquisitive mind of Plato.

If therefore we have to admit that Plato was acquainted with atomist theories, we must also conclude that he did not always combat them. Sometimes indeed he rejected them completely, but in other texts he avidly used them, and in important passages he slightly changed words or concepts in order to integrate them into his own philosophy. In this way Plato avoided being called a materialist but also avoided forsaking the main stream of contemporary science.

### III. ETHICS AND POLITICS

As we have seen, the ancient authors were not, in general, reluctant to mention the names of Democritus and Plato together, if they

<sup>1)</sup> On further Democritean influences in the *Laws* see L. Robin, *Platon* (Paris 1968), 157. See also G. J. D. Aalders, *Moderne critiek op de Nomoi van Plato*, Tijdschr. v. Phil. 12 (1950), 623: "ook de ethiek van de Nomoi schijnt op het eerste gezicht een radicaal andere te zijn dan die van de Politeia. In het vijfde boek vindt men zelfs een *hedonistische ethiek*". Also Bakker, 54 ff., Gould, *op. cit.*, 93 (who compares *Laws* 691 c 5 ff. with Dem. B 233), and Raven, *op. cit.*, Ch. XIII.

<sup>2)</sup> On the dates of Democritus' life see J. Ferguson, *On the Date of Democritus*, Symb. Os. 40 (1965), 17-26. His theory, however, that Democritus' scientific writings were published before 400 and his ethical sayings after that date is no more than a shrewd supposition. I think that Havelock, *op. cit.*, 147 ff. is more correct in asserting that, when Thucydides penned the Funeral Speech of Pericles, he was expressing an intellectual debt to Democritus. On his stay in Athens see A 11 (D.K. II, 86) and B 116 (D.K. II, 165).

believed that they held the same theories. Nor do we see any tendency in Plato's dialogues to show either scorn for or hostility to atomist theories. So there seems to be nothing to stop us agreeing with Bollack's interpretation of the passage in Diogenes Laertius that Plato did not mention Democritus' name out of deference because he hoped in this way to become a philosopher himself.

In spite of these results we are still far from being able to explain the story of Plato's wish to burn Democritus' books. There is, of course, the possibility that the usually anti-Platonic trend in Peripatetic historiography was responsible for the invention of a story which had no foundation in fact. But it is also possible that beneath a semblance of friendly feelings towards Democritus a ferment of unrest was brewing in Plato's mind, and eventually produced this outburst of irrational emotionality. My task in this section will be to examine whether there are indications of this unrest. For this purpose I shall compare some of the most important Democritean ethical and political notions with the relevant ones in Plato.

Plato's prime interest *in philosophicis* was not in mathematics, physics, rhetoric or whatever else may have fascinated his contemporaries. His prime interest was in the well-being of mankind: all the other sciences could provide no more than the foundation for his ideal state in which the highest degree of happiness was to be attainable by all <sup>1</sup>). The head of this state was to be a philosopher, not primarily because of his knowledge as such, but because of his ability to put an end to the misery of mankind (*Rep.* 473 d). The intellectually less well equipped were, if necessary, to be forced to obey the orders of this philosopher in their own interests.

There is no doubt that the state of happiness for each human being was also Democritus' main objective. But I think that his way to reach it was slightly different from Plato's. In order to

<sup>1</sup>) See *Rep.* 466 a and 472 c-473 e. The cosmological *Timaeus* is probably meant to usher in an ethical dialogue, the *Hermocrates*, which however remained unwritten (see Taylor's *Commentary*, 13 ff. and Christ-Schmid, *Gesch. d. gr. Lit.*, I [München 1912], 701). But what Plato abandoned here, he undertook in the *Laws*. Cf. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, 363, Gould, *op. cit.*, 195, and Rivaud's 'Notice' (*op. cit.*, 7 ff.). Also Hackforth, *op. cit.*, 3 f.



make this point clear I will set out here the main features of his ethical theory which is in fact in close harmony with his physical ideas <sup>1</sup>).

The τέλος of life is εὐθυμία (cheerfulness), which is often also called well-being, harmony, symmetry, imperturbability <sup>2</sup>) or happiness (εὐδαιμονία) <sup>3</sup>). Cicero <sup>4</sup>) states that even if Democritus tried to find this happiness in the pursuit of natural science, he nevertheless intended that this scientific study should procure him peace of mind. As in Plato, scientific investigation is not an end in itself but the firm foundation of a happy life.

Democritus likes to compare this state of happiness with a calm sea not disturbed by wind and storm <sup>5</sup>) and he says that the man who wants to be cheerful must not be over-active either in private or in public <sup>6</sup>). This again sounds rather familiar. According to Plato, too, πολυπραγμοσύνη is a bad quality in a man (e.g. *Rep.* 443 d 3). While Plato's attitude towards this quality is usually hailed as sound, Bailey <sup>7</sup>) argues that Democritus' remark gives a picture of self-centred and cautious inactivity in an extreme form. This is in complete agreement with Guthrie's unfavourable judgment <sup>8</sup>) that for fence-sitting and avoidance of committal it would be hard to beat B 253, where we are also told that it is not profitable for

<sup>1</sup>) On the problem whether or not the ethical sayings by Democrates (*sic!*) belong to the *corpus Democriteum* see Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 489 ff. and Alfieri, *op. cit.*, 196. Most modern authors see a close relationship between the physical and ethical sayings. Cf. M. Heinze, *Der Eudämonismus in der griechischen Philosophie* (Leipzig 1883), 62, Natorp (*op. cit.*), Von Fritz (*op. cit.*), Vlastos (*op. cit.*), Havelock (*op. cit.*), and C. C. W Taylor, *Pleasure, Knowledge and Sensation in Democritus*, *Phron.* 12 (1967), 6 ff. Bailey (*op. cit.*, 188) thinks that his ethics are largely independent of his physics. On a similar problem in the case of Pythagoras see C. J. de Vogel, *Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism* (Assen 1966). On Empedocles' works: Kirk and Raven, *Presocr. Philos.*, 355 ff.

<sup>2</sup>) Compare this ἀθαμβία with what Plato said at *The.* 155 d 3. Cf. also Vollgraff, *op. cit.*, 118 ff.

<sup>3</sup>) See A 1, 45 and A 167 and 169.

<sup>4</sup>) *De fin.* V 8, 23 (A 169, D.K. II, 129).

<sup>5</sup>) Cf. "de eenvoudigen van geest, die ergens in de windstilte leven" (M. Ter Braak, *Van oude en nieuwe christenen* [Amsterdam 1961], 22).

<sup>6</sup>) B 3 (D.K. II, 132).

<sup>7</sup>) *Op. cit.*, 199.

<sup>8</sup>) *Op. cit.*, 491.

good men to neglect their own affairs and engage in others'. Heinze<sup>1)</sup>, on the other hand, qualifies Democritus' attitude as 'unegoistisch', and Langerbeck says: "die starke ethische Spannung ist frei von jedem Quietismus"<sup>2)</sup>. The same divergence reveals itself between the opinions of R. Bakker<sup>3)</sup> (there is in Democritus sophistic individualism) and Vollenhoven<sup>4)</sup> (Antiphon's individualism is not found in Democritus).

Because of the differences between these opinions it seems worthwhile to initiate a new investigation into the real intentions of Democritus. Only if we are sure what these were, shall we be able to make a more profitable and fruitful comparison between Democritus and Plato. For that purpose I propose to take a close look at those sayings which are labelled egoistic by Bailey. He refers e.g. to B 191: "He who wants to be cheerful should take little thought of those who are admired; rather he must contemplate the lives of those who have a hard time so that what he has and possesses already may appear great and enviable to him. . . . A man should not seek the things (of the rich), but be cheerful with the others, comparing his own life with the life of the less fortunate and holding himself blessed when he thinks of what they suffer and considers how much better is his own life and fortune". Now I do not see any reason for labelling the contents of this fragment a "self-centred view of life *in which the less fortunate have their function in helping to secure one's own satisfaction*" (my italics)<sup>5)</sup>. Democritus does not mean to glorify the position of the more fortunate, but to prevent the less fortunate from considering their own sufferings disproportionately great. But the most important point Democritus wishes to drive home is that in this way man is prevented from doing wrong and acting against the laws. He wants to protect society from the ill feelings of frustrated men. So the utterance is not self-centred but written with a view to a better life in the community. There is

<sup>1)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 714. Cf. also Havelock, *op. cit.*, 133 and 144-5, and Alfieri, *op. cit.*, 204-5: "non egoismo".

<sup>2)</sup> H. Langerbeck, *Δόξαι επιρρουσμένη* (Berlin 1935), 63.

<sup>3)</sup> *Lot en daad, geluk en rede in het Griekse denken* (Utrecht 1957), 30.

<sup>4)</sup> D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, *Geschiedenis der Griekse Wijsbegeerte*, I (Franeker 1950), 394.

<sup>5)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 199.

no indication at all that in his eyes 'Schadenfreude' is a virtue <sup>1</sup>). Democritus expresses the same sentiment in B 107a: "It is not becoming for human beings to laugh at other people's fate: they should wail" <sup>2</sup>); and in B 293: "Those who take pleasure in the misfortunes of their neighbours do not understand that what fortune sends is common to all". With reference to this fragment Van der Wal <sup>3</sup>) remarks that it expresses a view which is closely connected with the feeling of Schopenhauer <sup>4</sup>) that other people's sufferings *are* one's own sufferings. He suggests that there is only one difference, namely Democritus' theory that they may *become* one's own sufferings. I do not believe, however, that Van der Wal is right, for there is no verb in B 293, and therefore the safest way of arriving at a sound interpretation is to supply a verb in the present tense. This actually discloses a most lively consciousness on Democritus' part of the burden of suffering common to mankind, which we also find in B 196: "To forget one's own sufferings produces overboldness". There is not the slightest indication that this saying points to future sufferings, the possible results of an inconsiderate act over which one can have repentance <sup>5</sup>). The wording is such that we have to admit that Democritus definitely had in view the miserable situation of mankind in general which we should continually try to alleviate. If we are mindful of the sufferings in which we live we are certainly kept from doing wrong to other people. This way of life will undoubtedly contribute to one's own happiness as well, but it is no more egoistic and blameworthy than what Jesus preaches in the Sermon on the Mount.

<sup>1</sup>) See L. G. v. d. Wal, *Het objectiviteitsbeginsel in de oudste Griekse ethiek* (Groningen 1934), 123-125; cf. also the famous proem of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* II, especially vv. 3-6:

Suave, mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis  
 e terra magnum alterius spectare laborem:  
 non quia vexari quemquamst iucunda voluptas,  
 sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est.

<sup>2</sup>) See Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 387 n. 4.

<sup>3</sup>) *Op. cit.*, 128.

<sup>4</sup>) *Die Grundlage der Moral*, 265. Schopenhauer's theory, however, is based on his idea of the common 'Wille' which makes different people in fact the same: pain is inflicted on the 'Urville'. How far from Democritus! See J. D. Bierens de Haan, *Schopenhauer*, 74-76.

<sup>5</sup>) Cf. B 43 and 66.

Democritus' conception of friendship has, according to Bailey <sup>1)</sup>, an equally selfish ring, though he concedes that in some of these sayings the selfishness seems at least to be mitigated by a truer feeling. He quotes B 92: "One should receive acts of kindness with the intention of making greater returns", and B 96: "The really kind man is not the man who looks for a return, but he who chooses to be good". Now I think there is no more selfishness in these sayings than in B 99: "The man who does not have one good friend does not deserve to live", or B 109: "Fault-finders are not made for friendship", and B 103: "The man who loves no one cannot be loved by anyone". And how could it possibly be selfish to state that not all one's kin are friends, but those who agree about τὸ συμφέρον (B 107)? Yes, it could indeed sound selfish if, as Bailey does, one translates συμφέρον by 'their interests'. But it certainly does not sound like that if one keeps to the real meaning, 'what is suitable'. We shall see later that only the good, the true and the beautiful are 'suitable', and then it will be clear that unanimity among men about the highest moral standards is indeed a very strong tie for friendship devoid of any notion of selfishness.

A much more difficult problem emerges in Democritus' sayings about marriage and the rearing of children, which Bailey calls cynical. At first sight one is inclined to think that in this case all the evidence is on his side, for B 275 runs: "The rearing of children is precarious, for if it succeeds it involves much struggle and anxiety and if it fails it is worse than any other form of pain". And in B 276 we read: "It seems to me (δοκεῖ μοι) that one should not have children; for I see in the possession of children many great dangers and many sorrows, for those who flourish are few and even they are thin and weak" <sup>2)</sup>. And in B 277 he recommends that, if one really

<sup>1)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 207-8.

<sup>2)</sup> In my opinion LSJ *s.v.* εὐθιγέομαι hint at the interpretation of καὶ ὀλίγα τὰ εὐθιγέοντα καὶ ταῦτα λεπτά τε καὶ ἀσθενέα which I propose here. The only difficulty which I see is that in the preceding sentence Democritus uses the word παῖδας which is masculine, whereas here he seems to allude to the word παιδία. A somewhat similar switch is described in Kühner-Gerth, *Griech. Gram.*, I, 61. For the quite common use of δέ = γάρ see J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford 1954), 169 and Kühner-Gerth, II, 230. D.K., II, 202, translate the phrase by "wenig Segen und dies nur in geringem und schwachem Masse"; Bailey, *op. cit.*, 206: "the blessings are rare, and such

wants to have children, one should adopt those of one's friends, because one can choose out of many the child that suits one's mind". But if you beget them for yourself, there are many dangers, for you must put up with the child that is born".

B 278, however, has a quite different ring. Whereas in the previous fragment (B 276) Democritus holds that in his opinion (δοκεῖ μοι) there is no need (οὐ χρῆναι) to have children and speaks about the χρέμη of other people to beget them, he now drops the word μοι before δοκεῖ and says that "people think (ἄνθρωποισι δοκεῖ) that by the laws of nature and some old constitution it is one of the necessities (τῶν ἀναγκαιῶν εἶναι) for men to have children. It is clear that it is also necessary for other living creatures. For all of them produce young by the laws of nature without any advantage to themselves. But when they have been born, they toil and feed them as best they can, and they are full of fear so long as they are small, and when they are suffering they are distressed. Such is the nature of all creatures having soul (breath). But it has become customary to think that to a man a certain advantage accrues from his child". So in Democritus' eyes there is a natural necessity to have children, but if one chooses to have none, one has the right to do so. On the other hand, of all living creatures only man can derive any benefit from his children. In B 280 we see that Democritus does not even refrain from advising that one should bestow good things upon one's offspring: "It is possible without spending much of one's property to educate children and set a wall of defence round their property and person" <sup>1</sup>). An equally positive attitude towards having children as they are, only weak and feeble". But the combination of λεπτός and ἀσθενής occurs more often in Greek texts (e.g. Arist. *Eccl.* 539) to denote the weaknesses of the body and so goes very well with the literal sense of εὐθιγέοντα (fattened up). Therefore there seems to be no need to seek a metaphorical sense in the three terms (as is also done by Enriques and Mazotti, *Le dottrine di Democrito* [Bologna 1948]: "mentre i benefici sono pochi e per di più deboli e leggeri"; cf. also Alfieri, *Gli Atomisti*, Bari 1936, 272).

<sup>1</sup>) The translation of this saying is uncertain. The last word (αὐτῶν) could refer to the parents (for this reflexive use of αὐτῶν see Kühner-Gerth, *op. cit.*, I, 564 n. 3) or to the children. The second version is chosen by Diels-Kranz, and the first by Bailey (*op. cit.*, 207). I am inclined to share Diels' opinion and then the meaning is even less egoistic than Bailey already admits it is.

ren comes to the fore in B 272: "He who gets a good son-in-law finds a son, but he who gets a bad one loses a daughter".

In spite of these positive sayings most modern authors agree with Bailey in finding fault with Democritus' attitude towards family life. Van der Wal<sup>1)</sup> calls his statements 'notorious' ('berucht') and argues that the privilege of adopting a child can only be set apart for a small group of egoistic philosophers. Heinze<sup>2)</sup> thinks there is an 'Inkonsequenz' between the positive sayings and the negative ones, and only Natorp<sup>3)</sup> seems to defend Democritus' honesty without reserve. I can go along with his thesis that Democritus has a certain personal "Abneigung gegen die Sorge für den Nachwuchs, die einerseits mit der eigentümlichen Stellung des σοφός, andererseits mit der δυσχέρεια gegen die Geschlechtslust (B 32, 127, 235) zusammenhängt". But apart from this very personal point, in which the man is visible behind the philosopher, there seems to be a deep inner consistency in Democritus' thought, which removes the foundation for Guthrie's sceptical view that "there will never be any means of judging for certain what responsibility the great philosopher of atomism has for these maxims".

To start with, Heinze's supposition that Democritus' sayings are not consistent is due to his disregard of the significant use of μοι before δοκεῖ in B 276. Democritus in fact reveals his ideas about having children to us from two different points of view. In B 278 he straightforwardly admits that in the eyes of men there seems to be a natural necessity to have children. These children are a great support to their parents, when parents grow old<sup>4)</sup>, provided they have assumed the right attitude towards them. Therefore it is not surprising that Democritus devotes many maxims to the problem of education<sup>5)</sup>, which will enable them to acquire that attitude. Besides, this education also provides a very good weapon

<sup>1)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 130.

<sup>2)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 717 (= p. 75).

<sup>3)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 117 ff.

<sup>4)</sup> So already in Hesiod (*Theog.* 603 ff.). See also N. Geurts, *Het huwelijk bij de Griekse en Romeinse moralisten* (Amsterdam 1928), 17 ff.

<sup>5)</sup> See Natorp, *op. cit.*, 118.

against the onslaughts of Chance (Τυχή) <sup>1)</sup>. Democritus in fact believes that, for the time being, Chance cannot be grasped by human intellect, but also that its secrets may be disclosed one by one by eager and incessant study. Chance, he believes, is no external force which comes in to explain what could not otherwise be shown to follow from his fundamental principles; it is a perfectly normal manifestation of 'necessity' but the limits of human comprehension make it impossible to determine what the cause of some things is. Chance therefore is something 'subjective' <sup>2)</sup>, and, whereas in an objective sense it does not deviate from the inexorable laws of Necessity (in physics this leads to determinism), we may conclude that from a subjective point of view (in the field of ethics) it is possible to act upon the 'unpredictable' results of Necessity. It is notably this theory of chance which enables Democritus to say that man is free to act according to his own will, because he is not subject to a relentless determinism. In view of the fragmentary state of Democritus' writings it will be difficult to say whether or not he was fully aware of this great problem which physical determinism poses for the writer on ethics. But we are certainly not justified in saying that the question was not even simmering, and particularly not that this seems to show that Democritus' ethics is largely independent of his physics <sup>3)</sup>. In B 276 we see Democritus using his freedom. Although in an objective sense it is necessary to have children, he prefers not to have them himself <sup>4)</sup>. Democritus' personal view is that the impact of Chance upon the birth of a child is so great that he does not want to take the risk. Because the risks are less great once the boy has been born and has grown a little older, there is no objection to adopting the child of a friend. We may conclude therefore that there is no 'Inkonsequenz' at all

<sup>1)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 121 ff. and 142 ff. Cf. also Alfieri, *op. cit.*, 96-122.

<sup>2)</sup> Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 417.

<sup>3)</sup> Bailey, *op. cit.*, 188. On determinism in general see J. C. Opstelten, *Beschouwingen n.a.v. het ontbreken van ons ethisch wilsbegrip in de oudste Griekse ethiek* (Mededel. Kon. Ned. Akad. v. Wet. afd. Lett. N.R. 22:1, Amsterdam 1959), 18. See also P. Hube, *The First Discovery of the Freewill Problem*, *Philosophy* 42 (1967) 361: "D. was unaware of the problem".

<sup>4)</sup> In a sense this attitude is comparable to Paul's personal advice to the Corinthians (first Ep. ch. 7) about marriage and the rearing of children.

in Democritus' theories about family life, but that they are on the contrary closely related to his physical theories. This discussion also makes it clear that the accusation of selfishness levelled against Democritus is groundless. He wanted in good faith to ensure that Chance should not influence his life; and since not everyone was likely to adopt his *Weltanschauung*, he was certain that there would always be children for adoption. But even if this had proved not to be the case, Democritus would not have cared much. In his philosophy there is no external authority which ordains the preservation of mankind. In this respect he differs widely from Plato in whose writings we repeatedly read that we have a duty to beget children for the state <sup>1</sup>).

But before entering on this aspect, I wish to focus my attention on the question of what the word 'pleasure' means in Democritus, and to what degree it has affected his ethical thought. There are as a matter of fact some apparently striking contradictions in his sayings concerning pleasure which have puzzled the learned world to this very day. B 188 runs: "The landmark (ἄρος) of what is profitable or harmful is the enjoyment (τέρψις) or lack of enjoyment (ἀτερπία) that we feel". But in B 74 we read: "Do not accept any pleasure if it is not suitable (συμφέρη)", and in B 207: "We must not choose every pleasure (ἡδονή), but that which is concerned with the beautiful". This is in accordance with what Stobaeus says (A 167): "Happiness arises from the discernment of pleasures", and with B 69: "The same thing is good and true to all men, but pleasure differs from one to another". So there is also pleasure which is not good and true, and this assertion leads us into the following dilemma: Is pleasure the criterion of suitability or is suitability the criterion of pleasure? Some scholars have tried to eliminate the difficulty from the fragments by pointing out that Democritus used two terms to denote pleasure: τέρψις and cognate words, and ἡδονή and cognate words <sup>2</sup>). In their opinion τέρψις is morally healthy pleasure, whereas ἡδονή indicates bodily pleasures. Whilst our own subjective judgement should decide whether these ἡδοναί are

<sup>1</sup>) *Rep.* 458 e, 460 b, 461 b; *Laws* 721 a, 773 b and 783 d; *The.* 149 d. See also Geurts, *op. cit.*, 14-5.

<sup>2</sup>) Cf. Alfieri, *Gli Atomisti*, 254 n. 640 and Van der Wal, *op. cit.*, 99 ff.



good or bad, the *τέρψις* (ἐπὶ τῷ καλῷ) <sup>1)</sup> is in itself the criterion of good and bad. But however tempting this supposition may be, there are also texts in which Democritus uses the two words indiscriminately <sup>2)</sup>. Another direction is taken by Vlastos <sup>3)</sup> and McGibbon <sup>4)</sup>. Vlastos holds that *δρος* in B 188 means 'landmark' and not 'criterion'. In his view Democritus does not exhort us to seek pleasure as the ultimate state of happiness, which possibly encompasses the good and the beautiful within its boundaries as a by-product, but he only wants to say that pleasure is a sign to us: when we attain the good and the beautiful, we shall also feel pleasure and conversely, when we are in a pleasurable state, we may conclude that our activities are good, or, as McGibbon puts it, are suitable for attaining the ideal state of mind. So Democritus is no simple hedonist but it is open to him to believe "that the ideal state and with it supreme pleasure lay in attending to objective values". By these carefully chosen words McGibbon aptly expresses the difficulties of the problem: pleasure is not a subjective criterion but no more is it an objective standard by which we gauge the level of the good and the beautiful in a given case. On the other hand, the good and the beautiful are not themselves objective values by which to decide whether pleasure is suitable or not. It is true that *σωφροσύνη* enhances enjoyment and increases pleasure (B 211) and that *φρόνησις* is a protection against unhappiness (B 119, 193) <sup>5)</sup>. But there are also a few statements which show that *φρόνησις* is not the decisive principle in all ethical problems. Democritus was fully aware that those who speak the most beautiful words, sometimes do the meanest deeds (B 53a and cf. 81 and 82), whereas many who did not learn reason, live according to reason (B 53). The ultimate standard which determines what is good is not reason, nor

<sup>1)</sup> I agree with Bailey (*op. cit.*, 195) that *καλός* in B 207 has a mainly moral sense (as afterwards in Plato). But I do not believe that we have nothing but the aesthetic side in B 194. There too the moral sense predominates. See Van der Wal, *op. cit.*, 102 and Natorp, *op. cit.*, 99.

<sup>2)</sup> B 211 and B 235. On the difference between the words *ἡδομαι* and *εὐφραίνομαι* see Plato *Prot.* 337 c.

<sup>3)</sup> First art. (1945), 588.

<sup>4)</sup> D. McGibbon, *Pleasure as the Criterion in Democritus*, *Phron.* 5 (1960), 75-77.

<sup>5)</sup> On stupidity and its consequences see B 54 and 83.

pleasure, nor even τὸ ἀγαθόν itself, but is to be found in the feelings, the heart, or the will of the individual <sup>1</sup>). In the last resort it is the ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ himself who establishes the moral standard <sup>2</sup>). This is well expressed in B 62: "It is good not merely to refrain from injustice but not even to wish to do it", or in B 68: "In assessing a man's worth, intent is no less important than action".

In Democritus' eyes there is no need to go beyond this purely individual ethical standard. And here again we come across a crucial concept in Democritus' philosophy which is categorically condemned by Plato. In Plato's eyes the good and the true do not depend on the judgment of an individual but are reflections of ideal entities standing in a state of supremely undisturbed rest, attainable only by the highly trained metaphysician. An awareness of the ideal good is to be implanted in the hearts of men by persuasion <sup>3</sup>). Otherwise people, perhaps unconsciously, might harm each other in pursuing their own advantage. For the sake of the good of the community Plato has to keep in check the pure individualism of thinkers like Democritus. Here again it appears that the political faith of our philosophers lies at the root of their differences.

Let us now turn to the last part of this section in which I propose to discuss in somewhat greater depth this political faith of Democritus and Plato. Not many modern scholars, I think, would approve of Nestle's verdict that "die politischen Bruchstücke (deren Inhalt keineswegs einheitlich ist) dem Demokrit wahrscheinlich abzusprechen sind" <sup>4</sup>). On the contrary, there are all kinds of indications in his works, as Havelock has made clear, which make it possible to suggest the basic relationship of his political theory to his physics or metaphysics <sup>5</sup>). Democritus' political beliefs will be made clear from the following passages. In B 251 we read: "Poverty

<sup>1</sup>) Van der Wal, *op. cit.*, 112-115. Cf. also Natorp's outburst of enthusiasm, *op. cit.*, 102: "Man kann lange suchen, bis man bei den Alten wieder, oder bei einem der Neueren vor Kant, einen so klaren Ausdruck der 'Autonomie' des Sittlichen findet". Also Heinze, *op. cit.*, 706 (= p. 64): "Demokrit betont ganz besonders das Subjektive, die Seite des Gefühls". Cf. Guthrie, *op. cit.*, 350.

<sup>2</sup>) Langerbeck, *op. cit.*, 66. See also C. W. Müller, *Gleiches zu Gleichem* (Wiesbaden 1965), 102.

<sup>3</sup>) Cf. Archer-Hind's edition of the *Phaedo* (London 1894), 151.

<sup>4</sup>) *Op. cit.*, 204.

<sup>5</sup>) *Op. cit.*, 154.

in a democracy is as much to be preferred to what is called prosperity under despots as freedom is to slavery". At first sight this saying seems to show unambiguously that Democritus is a democrat. But some years ago Aalders<sup>1)</sup> very aptly pointed out that this maxim alone is not enough evidence for such a far-reaching conclusion. If, for example, he argues, we knew about Plato only that he despised the policy of sheer power-politics of men like Lysander and his satellites (*Menex.* 244 c) and that in the *Republic* he preferred democracy to tyranny, we should probably propose the thesis that Plato thought democracy the best form of government, which, as everyone knows, is wrong. In the same way the supposition that Democritus is a democrat is not well founded; this is borne out by some fragments with a more oligarchic ring which is "strangely Platonic"<sup>2)</sup>: B 49: "It is hard to be ruled by an inferior", and B 75: "It is better for fools to be ruled than to rule". But it seems far-fetched to call his political faith moderate oligarchy on the strength of these maxims<sup>3)</sup>. I would prefer to keep to Aalders' second suggestion, that it is no more than "moderate democracy".

Together with these "strangely Platonic" maxims I shall quote here some other fragments which could have been collected from Plato's Dialogues. B 252: "A well-managed state more than anything else ensures success and everything is included in it; if it is preserved, so is all besides; if it is destroyed, all is destroyed". B 157: "One should learn the statesman's art as the greatest of all and engage in those endeavours from which great and brilliant results accrue to men". B 287: "Common difficulties are worse than private ones, for there is left no hope of rescue". All these aphorisms give the impression that Democritus has in mind the same organisation of the city as Plato. But I think that this comparison with Plato's thought is no sooner made than it should be

<sup>1)</sup> G. J. D. Aalders, *The Political Faith of Democritus*, *Mnemos.* IV 13 (1950), 302-313.

<sup>2)</sup> Bailey, *op. cit.*, 211.

<sup>3)</sup> As Aalders suggests. This is the more unlikely as Aalders himself proves that the δύνασται of B 251 are the oligarchic rulers. But that the difference between this expression and 'moderate democracy' is perhaps not so great as modern readers might believe, is made clear by D. Loenen, *Protagoras and the Greek Community* (Amsterdam 1940), 76 ff.

withdrawn. For the background of Plato's thought is surely not a moderate democracy: in his eyes (at least in the *Republic*) democracy is the worst political system but for tyranny. From a historical point of view this theory is quite understandable: it was in *democratic* Athens that Socrates had been sentenced to death and this event moulded Plato's political theories decisively. The flaws inherent in democracy were brutally disclosed by Socrates' execution and therefore the ideal ruler of the πόλις is for him the wise man, the philosopher, the protector of tradition. The philosopher alone is able to control the misdeeds of the masses and to avert outbreaks of hysteria. To all citizens this philosopher is the best guarantee of the highest degree of happiness attainable on earth. It is clear that theoretically this lofty idealism merits our deepest respect; but in practice the weaknesses of men forced Plato to impose severe laws on the people of his ideal community, in order to keep down the aspirations of the well-to-do and the excessively powerful. These laws included the banishment of atheists from the πόλις, because religion, as of old, gave a deeper meaning and an atmosphere of sanctity to the πόλις and offered a secure foundation for its ethics. People who denied this were not regarded as good citizens and were to be converted or expelled <sup>1</sup>). There was no room for poets either because they could not control their divine inspiration in a rational way so as to make it useful to their fellow-citizens. The birth rate in this state was, as we have already seen, to be high. It was also, in the last resort, the state (or the philosopher-king) which would decide what was right or wrong, and no individual could ever hope to live completely according to his own will. In short there was no room for new-fangled cleverness or

<sup>1</sup>) E.g. *Laws* 890 c; that it was very dangerous to have your own faith in fifth century Athens is shown in the religious trials of Anaxagoras and Democritus' fellow-citizen Protagoras. This conservative climate may have influenced Plato's own ideas about city-life. See B. Farrington, *Science and Politics in the Ancient World* (London 1946), 75-6, and especially E. Dérenne, *Les procès d'impieété intentés aux philosophes d'Athènes* (Liège-Paris 1930). — On Plato's connections with the aristocratic circles in Athens see A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (\*Paris 1950), 279 and M. C. D. Kuilman, *Gedachten over geluk en adel bij Platoon* (Vlaardingen 1949), *passim*. On the other hand, Democritus' connections with the rich were not so good (fr. A 17).

individual speculation, and in the course of this study we have already seen that Democritus' philosophy was not likely to fit in with these restrictions in Plato's state. Democritus preached no religion, did not care about procreation, had no ill feelings towards poets and wished the individual to go his own way. As I have already said more than once, the differences between them should by no means be stressed: Plato's ideal state was not totalitarian in the sense that he deliberately wished to stifle all personal initiative. His eagerness to show concern for the individual, however, often led him to stress the importance and primacy of the community. Even in the *Republic*, and undoubtedly in the *Laws*, his solicitude for the individual is almost religious in its intensity<sup>1</sup>). Now we might surmise that this deepening of his solicitude (from *Republic* to *Laws*) had been caused by the impact of atomist thinking<sup>2</sup>). But other events may also have brought about this change in his *Weltanschauung*: in the meantime he had seen the failure of his experiment in Sicily.

So both the state and the individual were of prime interest to Plato with this restriction, that the state should guarantee the happiness of the individual. Democritus was also interested in individual and state alike. He was no egoistic fence-sitter, but was willing to show his commitment to public affairs. It is true that we read in B 3: "The man who intends to be cheerful must not be over-active either in private or in public". But we have already seen

<sup>1</sup>) On the relation between *πόλις* and religion in Plato see L. T. J. M. Gubbels, *De godsdienst in de Staat van Plato's Wetten* (Nijmegen 1955); V. Goldschmidt, *La religion de Platon* (Paris 1949), 122 and 132 ff.; O. Reverdin, *La religion de la cité platonicienne* (Paris 1945), 9 f.; F. Solmsen, *Plato's Theology* (Ithaca, New York 1942), 162 ff.; Wilamowitz, *Glaube*, I, 16; R. W. Hall, *Plato and the Individual* (Den Haag 1963), 218; Gould, *op. cit.*, 106 ff.; E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Boston 1957), 219. Cf. also G. J. de Vries, *Antisthenes Redivivus* (Amsterdam 1952); C. J. de Vogel, *Het totalitarisme van Plato's Staat en het totalitarisme van de R. K. Kerk*, *Annalen v.h. Thijmgenootschap* 40 afl. 2 (Utrecht 1952); D. Loenen, *Mens en Maatschappij in Plato's Republiek* (Assen 1935). Gould, *op. cit.*, 130 rebuts with good arguments the heavy attack made by Walbank in J.H.S. 66 (1946), 150. See also Farrington, *op. cit.*, Popper, *op. cit.*, and Hall, *op. cit.*, 9.

<sup>2</sup>) Solmsen (*op. cit.*, 186), however, thinks that Democritus "must have been guilty of all the sins that Plato castigates in the first part of book X of the *Laws*". But cf. Aalders (quoted on p. 371 n. 1), 311 ff.

that this feeling is typically Greek and by no means Democritean (see p. 361). Moreover, apart from the above fragments, in which he encourages the best men to take on governmental responsibility, he says in B 253: "If a man neglects public business, his reputation suffers, even though he neither steals nor does any wrong". Democritus' commitment to public affairs is no less than Plato's but it arises from a strictly personal decision and cool reasoning. This mark of individualistic thought reveals itself also in his conception of law. B 245 runs: "Laws would never have forbidden every man to live as a law unto himself, if one man did not do harm to another. For envy lays the foundation of civil strife". And B 248: "The purpose of law is to benefit the life of men, and this it can do, when they themselves are willing to be benefited". In B 181 we read: "He who is kept from injustice by law is likely to do wrong secretly, but he who is led to the right by persuasion is not likely to do anything wrong either openly or secretly". In these fragments we find the same tendency towards a sort of 'Willens-oder Gewissensethik' as we came across in other ethical sayings (p. 370). For Plato the laws have a more sacred or even a divine character <sup>1</sup>).

Closely connected with their conceptions of law are their views on punishment. For Democritus (as for Plato) it is quite clear that the very existence of any society depends upon sanctions against the transgressor (B 261, 262, 260, 258). But on one point they take different views. Democritus complains that, even if a man is guiltless of crime, he can acquire a bad reputation and even suffer something (*παθεῖν τι*) by being negligent in public affairs (B 253). As Havelock <sup>2</sup>) has admirably shown, this statement is very important since it seems to imply that Democritus had some qualms about the usual audit of magistrates after the expiration of their term of office. Because this audit was usually performed by the common people (who will not always have been able to discern the difficulties with which a magistrate had to cope), and because anyhow men have better memories for errors than for successful

<sup>1</sup>) Havelock, *op. cit.*, 135 and 399 ff. and Solmsen, *op. cit.*, 164 ff. Also Gould, *op. cit.*, 104-5.

<sup>2</sup>) Havelock, *op. cit.*, 153.

performances (B 265), Democritus may have felt that there was something wrong in the rather automatic enforcement of penalties. The office-holder should have the opportunity to refer to extraordinary circumstances which would set him free. On this point Democritus proves to be aware that the democratic polity of Athens which actually condemned its functionaries to death, even if their error was due to external circumstances, was not the last word in politics. On the other hand, he felt no urge to discard the whole system on account of this relatively small deficiency.

Plato, however, definitely rejected the whole democratic system because of its flaws, and thus he did not solve the problem of the audit, but simply did away with it. Plato's conception of fixed and inflexible laws prevented him from making necessary exceptions, whereas Democritus believed that a man to whom government was entrusted had to be credited with so much devotion to duty and such a high degree of integrity that no one would think of passing judgment on his possible errors. To this risk the state had to expose itself in order not to commit a greater fault by punishing a morally innocent office-holder. In this respect Democritus' individualistic thinking proved to be more honest than Plato's thought in which the πόλις played a far more important role.

Democritus' independence of the traditional views on the πόλις also finds expression in what is called his cosmopolitanism. In B 247 we read: "To a wise man the whole world is accessible, for the entire world is the native land of a good soul". Democritus felt at ease in the whole world, he visited as many countries as he could (like Herodotus, Pythagoras or Plato himself) and he never thought of creating a self-sufficient city with a limited number of inhabitants; such a city was simply unnecessary. It is true that there are also some remarks in Plato about life on a higher level than in a πόλις: the soul of a philosopher who lives in a small city disdains its parochial affairs and pervades the whole universe, whereas his body stays in the city (*The.* 173 e). This spiritual or (as in *Republic* 486) scientific cosmopolitanism is, however, completely different from the literal cosmopolitanism of Democritus. This difference has, I think, been completely misunderstood by Natorp, who says: "So vollständig bewährt sich, Satz für Satz, die Geistesverwandtschaft

zwischen Demokritos und Platon" <sup>1)</sup>). He gives proof of a better understanding of the fundamental differences between their political theories, when he states: "freilich würde das Lob der demokratischen ἐλευθερίῃ bei Platon nur ironische Anerkennung finden". But even here he misses the important point that this freedom lies at the heart of Democritus' philosophy and that it is closely interwoven with democracy (B 251). Freedom of speech is a mark of this general freedom, though to judge the right time for it is risky (B 226), and the really free man (ἐλευθέριος) will use his advantages on behalf of the community (B 282). This feeling has been astonishingly well expressed in "the most remarkable of his sayings" <sup>2)</sup> (B 255): "At that time when the powerful (classes) confronting the have-nots take it on themselves to make their resources available to them and to do things for them and to please them: this is the situation in which you get (the phenomenon of) compassion and the end of isolation and the creation of comradeship and mutual defence and then civic consensus and then other goods beyond the capacity of anyone to catalogue in full". I think that this fragment, which neither in content nor in temper has a parallel in the better-known classical thinkers <sup>3)</sup>, proves once and for all that Democritus' individualistic thought never results in vulgar egoism, but that his belief in mankind encourages him to leave things to the decisions of man himself, a spirit of toleration which ran diametrically counter to Plato's conceptions.

Our survey of some significant aspects of the ethical and political ideas of our philosophers leads us to the following conclusions.

1. Both Democritus and Plato regard the happiness of all as the main goal in life.
2. The acquisition of knowledge is closely interwoven with the attainment of this goal.
3. Democritus' sayings are no more egoistic than Plato's.
4. Plato's concern for the individual is, generally speaking, the same as Democritus'.

<sup>1)</sup> *Op. cit.*, 177.

<sup>2)</sup> Bailey, *op. cit.*, 212.

<sup>3)</sup> Havelock, 143. Cf. Alfieri, *Atomos Idea*, 206: (This fragment) "è il più bel messaggio che l'atomismo antico potesse lasciare al mondo moderno".



5. In weighing the interests of the individual against those of the community, however, Democritus does not put the heavier weight in the same scale as Plato.

6. Because religion is the foundation of ethics of Plato's ideal state, Plato banishes the atheist from his state. Democritus has no need to do so, because his attitude towards religion is different.

7. Because the poet has no concern for the good of the community, Plato bars him from his state, whereas in Democritus' fragments we find only friendly remarks about poets.

8. Having children is a necessity in Plato's state, while Democritus feels that everyone should have the opportunity to remain childless.

9. Human laws are, in Plato's view, the images of objective ideal standards, whereas Democritus believes that man himself is able to make laws and should have the freedom to decide what is right or wrong.

10. Therefore the audit of an unsuccessful office-bearer is not permitted by Democritus, while, unlike Plato, he wishes to maintain democracy.

11. The good and the beautiful are objective entities in Plato's philosophy, while Democritus sees an intimate relationship between these values and the pleasure which man feels in his heart.

12. Cosmopolitanism is an integral part of Democritus' philosophy, whereas Plato is a typical representative of the Greek city-state.

13. Freedom of the individual is the first item on Democritus' list of priorities in life, while Plato feels that it is sometimes subordinate to the interests of the community.

#### GENERAL CONCLUSION

Because our ancient evidence shows that Democritus and Plato were not considered to be personal enemies, and since we found that Plato, at least in his later dialogues, seems to make conscious efforts to integrate into his own system theories which are usually dubbed materialistic or even atomist (though we must concede that there is no certain evidence that he borrowed them from Democritus)

we should accept Bollack's positive interpretation of Diogenes' text from which we started.

On the other hand our survey of their ethico-political theories indicated that besides many similarities there are very important differences between them in this field, particularly when it comes to the place of freedom for the individual. Now I think that Plato, too, was convinced in his heart that freedom was the most precious possession of the individual. Had he not glowingly described Socrates as a man who *chose* to obey the laws, although he would have profited more, in the eyes of men like Crito for example, from being disobedient? He was aware that even in that awful predicament it was a free man's choice, and not in the first place the authority of the laws, that put an end to a man's life. And when he realised that in his own state personal initiative and personal freedom had to be stifled, or at least made subordinate to the needs of the community, whereas Democritus had made it the cornerstone of his political edifice, he felt that he had fallen short of the essential goal in life. Psychologically it is fully understandable that, after this had become clear to him, he decided to buy Democritus' books and burn them in order to prevent people from discovering his most important shortcoming in comparison with the most influential philosopher of his time.

Therefore I believe that even this part of Aristoxenus' story, which is sometimes supposed to be mere fiction, proves to be true.

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