prosecutor. This outcome has profound methodological and analytic consequences. By omitting plea bargaining literature entirely, the authors have scanted perhaps the most significant part of the criminal justice process, the part that develops the "data" the authors call for transforming into "information."

Let me continue my criticism by suggesting that the authors' "decisional" apparatus is finally perhaps a bit overblown. After summarizing all the research, the "factor" that turns out to influence the "decision alternative" to call the police, to arrest, to be required to post bail, to be sentenced to prison, and to serve a lengthy prison term is the seriousness of the crime. The secondary factor is the seriousness of the offender's prior criminal record, and the tertiary factor is whether or not the criminal and the victim previously knew one another. The authors also report that where victim and offender know each other authorities will bend over backwards to reconcile the two rather than to incarcerate the offender. All this is undoubtedly true, but I suggest that none of it is news.

To summarize briefly my views about this book: It is sober, intelligent, carefully compiled, usefully informative, lucidly written. Whatever my reservations about the approach, the authors show themselves to be superb exponents of it. The book—the approach—has shortcomings, but nobody who reads this journal or who regards himself as a serious criminologist can afford to be without it.

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Taboos in Criminology, Edward Sagarin, ed. Pp. 149. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage, 1980.

As a science, criminology seeks *true beliefs* about the causes of behavior. As a tool of public policy, criminology also seeks to promote *good behavior*. According to criminology's own theories, beliefs are important determinants of behavior. Thus the problem: Since true beliefs may promote bad behavior, and false beliefs may promote good behavior, the criminologist must often decide which he or she prefers, truth or goodness.

In some cases, the decision is easy. Most criminologists, I suspect, side with the evolutionists against the creationists, merely noting that in matters of fact science is superior to religion. Some of our theories require that we agree with the creationists that buggery, druggery, and muggery may be promoted by godlessness, but to most of us ordinary crime is sufficient-

ly petty that we need not consider sacrificing our scientific integrity to prevent it.

In other cases, the choice between truth and goodness is more difficult. When a criminal justician opposes research aimed at uncovering childhood characteristics predictive of subsequent criminality, or disputes the findings of such research on obviously specious grounds, most of us understand that he or she is merely choosing good and safe over true and potentially dangerous. Our theories require that we agree that crime prevention policies could be based on true beliefs about crime. So, in such cases, at least some of us are willing to sacrifice pursuit of truth about crime to ward off evil in the guise of crime control.

In the extreme case, science-based beliefs about the causes of crime are matched against clearly despicable policies said to be natural consequences of their acceptance. *Taboos in Criminology* deals with choice in this situation, with race, sex, intelligence, and crime on the one side and racism, sexism, elitism, and genocide on the other. Contributors to the volume (which stems from a session of the 1979 meetings of the American Society of Criminology) take explicit positions on the issue of whether truth in these matters is worth the consequences.

The lines of argument open to those who would defend truth or goodness in such circumstances are limited, and most of the logical possibilities are in fact represented in the book. Those of us spared the necessity of developing and defending a position should be grateful to the participants. We can find fault with the positions expressed and thus maintain the illusion that our own commitment to truth *and* goodness is unqualified.

The most difficult position to maintain is that adopted by Edward Sagarin, organizer of the session and editor of the volume. Attempting to occupy the reasonable middle ground, Sagarin refuses to treat truth as trivial (a standard device of those inclined toward goodness), and he cannot bring himself to the view that the truth about race, intelligence, and crime would have good consequences (which would also point the way out of his predicament). The solution Sagarin hits upon is instructive: Science dealing with dangerous topics should be held to unusual standards of adequacy; it should be, in fact, "impeccable." Those on the side of science would, I suspect, welcome application of rigorous scientific standards in this area. But if the "scientific adequacy" criterion is to be scientifically acceptable, it must be applied equally to both sides. Sagarin misses this point, applying the standards of science only to those who make assertions in "dangerous" areas and applying no standards to those denying such assertions. For example, Sagarin characterizes research on IQ and delinquency as "shabby." To show what he means by shabby, Sagarin invokes Piltdown man, Cyril Burt, and parapsychology against such research. If the research in this case is shabby, how are we to characterize the devices Sagarin uses to dispute it? If, in some contexts, the per-

fect is the enemy of the good, in Sagarin's hands it is the best friend goodness will ever find.

Andrew Karmen, too, seeks a solution, but does so from a creationist point of view. His question is how best to combat "scientific racism and elitism" without doing research and without giving up the data that document discrimination. Karmen settles finally on "confrontation [as] the only viable strategy." The essence of confrontation is to expose the implications and consequences of racist and elitist ideas "by recalling the lessons of the past."

When Robert A. Gordon disputes Karmen's lessons, noting that high-IQ populations have been more likely than low-IQ populations to be at risk of genocide, Karmen does not provide the "forceful and furious reply" he has led us to expect. Instead, he returns to his position that the existence of taboos in criminology is a myth. Karmen's reluctance to enter this factual debate is understandable. If millions have been killed because of an intellectual superiority accurately perceived by their killers without the aid of science, the role of research is not that alleged by Karmen, and the consequences of the truth it reveals are not necessarily those he assumes.

And this is of course the nub of the problem. Those on the side of good behavior cannot address the factual issues without calling into question their own assumptions about truth and its consequence. (If the issues are really factual, their resolution cannot be known in advance.) Those on the side of truth, on the other hand, must argue that the *consequences* of truth are irrelevant, problematic, or beneficial. The beneficial view is represented by Michael E. Levin, who believes that "knowledge and curiosity are good, ignorance bad. The more we know, the better off we are and the better the world is."

Clearly, if we are to reconcile these contrasting views, we are going to have to examine assumptions about human nature and society. When we do so, we discover, not surprisingly, that those on the side of goodness assume a divided, evil society, where the rich and the powerful are dedicated to the preservation of their own position at the expense of the people. In such a society the task of criminology is to protect the poor and the weak from the predatory activities of their class enemies, and any criminology that focuses on crime as traditionally defined is by definition "racist and elitist." Those on the side of truth, in contrast, assume a consensual, good society populated by taxpayers concerned about crime. In such a society, the task of criminology is to provide information about crime to be used as the people see fit, and any criminology that focuses on phenomena unrelated to crime is misusing the taxpayer's money.

Both sides thus claim the people as their constituency. Perhaps then we should determine whose side the people are on. How would the questions go? We might start with "Do you think criminologists should study crime?" In the analysis, we might want to stratify by IQ, excluding those

whose scores fall below 125. After all, it may be hard to code their laughter yes or no.

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The Struggle To Be Human: Crime, Criminology, and Anarchism, Larry Tifft and Dennis Sullivan. Pp. 204. Orkney, England, Cienfuegos Press, 1980. $12.

The Mask of Love: Corrections in America—Toward a Mutual Aid Alternative, Dennis Sullivan. Pp. 181. Port Washington, N.Y., Kennikat Press, 1980. $17.50.

I would not suppose that many readers will find the arguments made by Larry Tifft and Dennis Sullivan to be immediately convincing; indeed, I think that is not the authors' aim or hope. Debates among criminologists rest upon at least one common assumption, namely, that Law and State, however imperfect, are our only means to peaceable social existence. These authors not only reject that assumption, but they also perceive Law and State as destructive of peaceable society and inimical to social justice. They stand, therefore, outside the various continua within which rehabilitationists, protectionists, psyche-remodelers, and others propose and contest solutions to the question of crime. Clearly, they are also outside the conservative-to-Marxist spectrum. They are sociologists and radical, but "radical sociology," as the term is used currently, will not contain them. Within the accepted framing of questions and answers, what they have to say in their books is inappropriate—and (in the legal sense of the term) willfully so.

Tifft and Sullivan do not fail to make an abundance of empirical points: extended "nothing works" arguments, for example; or arguments that draw upon common knowledge of the awful human cost of the maintenance of State-power, maintenance of caste and class privilege, maintenance of what, in societies grounded in violence, is called "order." But they do not want these arguments to end in a quagmire of lesser evils, slightly lesser harms, done in the name of prevention of harm. (Nothing works!) Their hope is to challenge everyone—and first of all those who, in manifold relevant occupations, have made a career, a vocation, and a dedication of *helping*—to the most radical questioning of how-we-live, how-we-live-together, how we help, and how we hurt. There are many people, if hardly too many, to make arguments against capital punishment or psychosurgery or the Gulag-solution. Tifft and Sullivan are making the